Richard White's Friendship and Commitment

Richard White's Friendship and Commitment

In this paper, I will examine the duties of friendship. I will look at arguments in favor of the view that there are special moral duties involved in friendship, but will ultimately reject this view. I will then explain what role I see friendship having in morality even without these duties.

In Richard White’s article “Friendship and Commitment”, White argues that friendship is an “inherently moral activity” (81). He argues that part of being a friend is having certain obligations, like being helpful or emotionally available. These are obligations that are above and beyond what we owe to a stranger. He also thinks that being a friend involves a commitment. He says specifically, “when I spend time with someone, accept their help, and make myself available to that person, by sharing the more intimate aspects of myself, I am also creating an expectation that is equivalent to a commitment, given the institution of friendship and all that it commonly entails” (82). In being someone’s friend, aside from the commitments and obligations, he argues, you are also morally endorsing her. That is, you are implicitly saying that there is something valuable about them – that your friend is someone worth knowing.

Let us suppose that all of this is actually the case – that friendship really does imply certain commitments, obligations, and endorsements. Do any of these matter morally? I’ll address endorsements first, followed by obligations and commitments.

When someone is your friend, this seems to imply that you think there is something valuable about that person. But the things I find valuable in her might have nothing to do with morality – for instance, she might be intelligent and able to argue effectively. She might make me laugh. She might be fun to be with. None of these are morally relevant, and yet a combination of them would probably be sufficient for me to be friends with someone. As such, it seems that being a friend with someone does not actually imply a moral endorsement of that person.