Retributivism In Igor Primoratz's Theory Of Punishment

Retributivism is the set of theories of moral justification of legal punishment predicated on a concept of desert. Punishment under a just law is justified because the moral agent, having broken an objective moral rule, is responsible for his or her actions and must suffer for them. Traditional retributive punishment is an application of deontological ethics (ie. duty based ethics or rule based ethics) and so stands in contrast to consequentialism, or the idea that the morality of an action is determined by its ramifications thereafter. For the retributivist, punishment is the “right” thing to do because it satisfies innately valuable moral concepts like justice or fairness. Consequentialists, on the other hand, might justify punishment by its deterrent effects, reformative potential or even its communicative power. In Justifying Legal Punishment, Igor Primoratz clarifies the distinction: “As opposed to the utilitarian [ie. consequentialist] theory, which seeks to justify punishment by its consequences and thus looks to the future, we have the retributive theory, which looks to the past.” It is important to note that though each of these moral systems look in opposite directions temporally, both subscribe to the idea of objectivity meaning

Restoration to a previously held equilibrium implies proportionality of punishment; Justice is not satisfied until the debt is repaid, so there is a duty to punish beyond a mere justification; mitigating circumstances are allowed - if a person is not in control of their actions while they commit a crime, then they are not shirking their duty to society. All the while the theory is able to duck some of Kant’s harshest critiques. Morris’s theory, for example, does not imply the lex talionis principle and so gives significant leeway on the specific mode of