Response To Raphael Demos's Analysis Of Plato

2. Demos’ Rebuttal

The year after Sachs published his analysis of Plato’s arguments, Plato expert and Harvard Professor of Philosophy, Raphael Demos, published a response to Sachs’ article. This response has since formed one of the core arguments against Sachs’ determination and his views have been echoed by numerous scholars. What makes Demos’ argument palatable is his emphasis on the uniqueness of Platonic justice and on figuring out Plato’s logic in connecting it with vulgar justice.

Though he agrees with Sachs that Plato’s assumption that Platonically just men “will conform to the canons of vulgar morality” should be scrutinized, Demos does not condemn Plato’s argument straightaway. When in The Republic, Socrates jumps from speaking of normal justice towards others and begins to discuss justice as a personal virtue, Demos makes a point to discuss the technical difference between a fallacy and a lacuna. Demos states that the problem is not the conclusions Plato comes to, but rather the fact that he never stopped to fill in the gaps in his logic

for those listening. The specific gap occurs when, in Book IV, Socrates takes for granted the connection between common vulgar justice and the individualized Platonic justice. This, he asserts, is not a fallacy but a lacuna, and there are still logical ways in which Platonic justice would entail vulgar justice. Therefore, Demos does not render Plato’s conclusions invalid, but rather attempts to find the missing links in Plato’s argument (Demos).
Similar to Sachs’ argument, the fundamental flaw that Demos identifies in The Republic is based in Plato’s usage of the term ‘justice.’ When in Book IV, Socrates “asserts and takes as obvious that ordinary justice immediately goes with this justice in the soul,” Socrates operates as though Platonic justice is at once an individual virtue necessary for harmony of the soul and a prerequisite for universal welfare (White). Herein lies the logical disconnect. If justice is a personal virtue and state of orderliness of the soul, “why then should a just man in this sense of justice care to bring about a proper ordering of other people's lives?” Acknowledging that his attempts to piece together Plato’s argument is and can only be speculation, Demos works to bridge the lacuna. Demos posits that a Platonically just man will be governed by reason, and, since reason is a type of desire, it aspires to the ideal form of the good. He proposes the idea that, because aiming for the form of the good means aiming for good in general, a Platonically just soul would endeavor to produce goodness around him. By this reasoning, Plato was able to conclude that vulgar justice presupposes the presence of a Platonically just soul. (Demos)
Demos brings another helpful interpretation of Platonic justice to counter Sachs’ fallacy diagnosis.

He notes the uniqueness of Plato’s definition of justice and theorizes that in Platonic justice, it is not justice which has been changed, but rather its playing ground has been changed. Plato uses justice to mean harmony within a community, whether this community comprises parts of the soul or citizens within a republic. Demos focuses on the idea of ‘giving each its due’ in order to promote harmony. The failure to give one his due is the cause for injustice. Demos simplifies the solution to Sachs’ dilemma by proving through morality that vulgar justice stems from Platonic justice. He states that because the Platonically just soul can only be healthy through reason, and since “the concern of reason is that the good should be exemplified everywhere,” giving each his due becomes part of one’s self-fulfillment.

(Demos).
3. Other Considerations
In order to make sense of the arguments of The Republic, it is also worthy to note the stipulations behind Socrates’ acceptance of the challenge. In Book II of The Republic, once Glaucon has issued his challenge and Adeimantus has detailed the major points of interest he would like to see addressed, Socrates offers some context by revealing his own state of mind. After his debate with Thrasymachus in Book I, Socrates states, his point of view was unaccepted, and therefore there is not much more he can do. However, he then claims, “On the other hand, I can’t not help out. For I’m afraid is might be impious to be here when justice is being spoken badly of.” (Plato and Bloom 368b). This admission on the part of Socrates may downgrade some of his argument’s saliency. Socrates essentially claims that he can do no harm to the argument as long as he endeavors to defend it, which suggests he may not have intended to perfectly answer the questions of his companions in the first place, but rather intended to simply persuade them of his opinion with whatever means necessary.
It is somewhat unreasonable to expect intrinsic benefit to be explained, as the human language is created around tangible objects and benefits, and Plato was most likely aware of this. Plato’s Socrates mentions his incapacity to do more for his claim on several occasions throughout The Republic, but his companions on each occasion cajole him into remaining in the conversation. While perhaps this is a technicality, it is hard to believe that Plato would insert this into the work multiple times without thinking of its effect. It is not unthinkable that, recognizing his inability to give a concrete answer but also seeing an opportunity to improve his peers, the Platonic Socrates embraced the subject though “it was not Plato's intention to answer the problem posed” (Schiller). He may have decided to create an argument so elaborate that anyone caught in the midst of it (without the luxury of leisurely analyzing his logic) would be unable to refute it. This may seem far-fetched, but the ornate prose of The Myth of Er was at least part of its credibility, and Socrates was well aware of his companions’ weakness for lofty ideas. It is not altogether unlikely that he would, being personally convinced of justice’s merit, attempt to mold them into just beings throughout The Republic despite his inability to logically argue for justice’s worth in terms of intrinsic effects.
The debate over whether the Platonic Socrates truly proved justice superior to injustice in The Republic is ongoing and the subject of a massive literature which started compiling over fifty years ago. The purpose of this essay was to analyze the arguments put forth on the subject, with a key focus on the initial arguments of David Sachs and the response by Raphael Demos, both experts in the field of philosophy. Of course, limitations in the translation of the texts contributes largely to the ambiguity of the word ‘justice’ in The Republic, effectively rendering all further commentary on the subject speculation. Those enchanted by the ideas and stories of The Republic may be disillusioned upon discovering the logical gaps within Plato’s work and will perhaps conclude the work, having failed to achieve its central goal, is now devoid of all truth. On the contrary, the finding that Plato was unable to conclusively support his argument is grounds for wider research. It certainly opens new opportunities to determine Socrates’ reasoning behind entering into an argument where he was doomed to fail technically, but could appear to succeed. Despite the Platonic Socrates’ inability to prove justice superior to injustice, his lessons do not lose their merit entirely, but rather offer new possibilities to ponder the effects of justice on daily life.