Red Scare Synthesis Essay

In the era of both Red Scares, from the 40s to the 60s, anti-communism ideals were running rampant; during this time, many government actions and actions from the people either enhanced or degraded the fear of communism, and it is truly expressed by Richard M. Freeland, M. J. Heale, and Landon R. Y. Storrs describing this period of U.S. history. They take a stand about what caused it and what contributed, with Heale seeking more of a government approach, Freeland with a broader aspect focusing on how the world brought about this change in the United States, and Storrs being more akin to civilian actions which ultimately affected the entirety of the United States and the issues with the New Deal era. Whereas all of these issues that the authors

discuss are important in their own right, Storrs humanistic approach sheds a different light on the decades long argument on the what started and what pushed the Red Scare into becoming a Red Menace in its own right.
With Freeland’s belief on how the Red Scare was shaped, he chooses to look at the problem with a broad scope.

This belief can best be seen through his thesis statement, as he says “These emotions [About the Red Scare] were aroused and these patterns of belief developed, it is argued, as the result of a deliberate and highly organized effort by the Truman administration in 1947-48 to mobilize support for the program of economic assistance to Europe called the European Recovery Program, or Marshall Pan.” Throughout his writing, based on what he said in his thesis, he gives the premise that the Red Scare was primarily influenced by powers abroad, and how the Truman Doctrine had effects on how American people saw the threat of Communism. He delves into that aspect, by giving the actual speech from Truman about the plans that the U.S. government had to combat Communism in Europe. Their plans, in fact, were to try and halt geopolitical expansion of the Soviet Union in particular, and fed off that fear to fuel what the American people felt about it already. Unlike Heale and Storrs, although the state level and civil level are just as important, he puts and importance on the U.S. ties to Europe and the devastation that occurred after World War II. Freeland calls this a common “theme” when it comes to the Truman Doctrine, as the actual doctrine mentions it many

times.
After the Truman Doctrine was formed, the Marshall Plan that set everything said in motion was enacted. Freeland focuses on this particular issue, as well, and delves into just how the Marshall Plan affected the U.S. and the fear of communism as well as what happened with the government. Freeland states his opinion about the actual Marshall Plan by saying “America import policies proved to be the weak point in the original strategy…the militarization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Europe in the 1950’s was at best partial attributable to the Truman administration’s failure to build solid political support for its commercial program…related willingness to rely upon anti-communist propaganda techniques in promoting E.R.P. [European Recovery Plan.]” Freeland is stating that if they didn’t focus on changing Europe to fit the American ideal and to focus more on getting support, coupled with their push for anti-communism, then the Marshall Plan may have stood a chance in the American view.
Freeland states the debate centering around the Marshall Plan as “one of the most important public debates in the United States in the postwar period.” His primary emphasis with this pushes out the people and the state level of the affects with this. He seems to instead attribute most of what happened during the Red Scare era to the deals that began in the 1940s and 1950s. He also just generally deviates from Heale and Storrs with this view, to the point where there is hardly any correlation between what he views as the push for anti-communism and what they believe it was. It could be because as he was growing up, he went through the Red Scare in its entirety, as he wrote the book in 1972. This could have affected his point of view, making him glance over what went on around him and instead wanting to find a root issue that didn’t involve civilians.
Unlike Freeland, Heale’s approach is relatively different about the origins of the Red Scare and who began it.

In all of his writing, he tends not to mention the bigger picture, but focuses more on the smaller, more state level of issues. He believes that with states creating their own HUACs, known as “little HUACs,” and regulating themselves with who to charge for communist ideas, that they ultimately had the power, and that all of this roughly began before the actual Red Scare took place, mainly during the 1930s to 1950s. Thus giving time for the states to enact their own views on how to deal with anti-communistic

ideas.
Heale’s basic idea can be best summed up in his thesis, where he says “McCarthyism – or red scare politics – was a complex phenomenon, and can be explained only by addressing the American political structure as a whole and by reference to a variety of pressures.” These variety pressures, according to Heale, are mainly state pressures that forced the anti-communist action to unfold. He bases his chapters on each state, and what they do, such as Michigan, Massachusetts, and Georgia, and details each states actions toward forwarding or even trying to prevent the Red Scare from furthering in some instances. Sometimes, however, he focuses a bit too much on the state level. Most talk about civilian action seems to be brushed to the side or just lightly touched on, whereas what Storrs does is vastly different. An example can be best seen when he talks about little HUACs, “…loyalty tests began to supplant little HUACs [House Un-American Activities Committee] as a favorite state anticommunist device.” There isn’t much empathy when it comes to his writing, where when he discusses loyalty tests, he doesn’t focus much on repercussions or what people went through when these tests were being pushed, besides the usual statements of these tests ruining people’s lives. Unlike Freeland, too, he seems to refuse to think of this in a bigger picture. Everything he relates to starting the Red Scare all happen in the states, before the 1960s. The most Heale does in this aspect is relate this embracing of anti-communism with the Ku Klux Klan’s embracement of segregation. Another instance he blames the Red Scare on people throughout state government, is when he says, “Such preemption of the issue, however, sometimes by authorities of moderate disposition who hoped to control it, could result in the unlocking of a Pandora’s Box.” In this statement, he places the blame on these “authorities,” which are mainly Government officials, instead of focusing at anyone else involved with the push for anti-communism. Although Heale states true point when it comes to the Red Scare, he focuses too much and too heavily on state action and what local governments have decided to do during this era. His point of view can be summed up by how he views that it’s all relative to where people are and what their states often choose to do, by saying “An identification of both the location and the timing…makes possible a fuller understanding of the scope, intensity and evolution of the red scare politics in the U.S.” However, tying to what Storrs believes, he also does feel that “fundamentalist impulses” ate away at the New Deal system, which he believes was also an issue with the Red Scare politics throughout this period of history.
Storrs takes a different approach compared to Heale and Freeland, as she writes mainly about civil liberties that are violated as the New Deal is pushed back because of the fear of communism. She states in her thesis, “In addition to its well-known violation of civil liberties and destruction of careers, the Second Red Scare curbed the social democratic potential of the New Deal through its impact on policymakers who sought to mitigate the antidemocratic tendencies of unregulated capitalism.” It’s also important to note that her focus isn’t on what comes before, but mainly on the actual second Red Scare as it happened in the 1960s. She takes an approach that mainly focuses on the civilian side on dealing with the Red Scare. Her grievances with the loyalty trials prove this, as she states that they “have pervasive affects.” She does delve into some government matters when discussing the New Deal, however, and ties that to the anti-communist agenda, explaining how if it weren’t for this fear, then ideas given from the New Deal would have been passed. However, since most deals were liberal centric, they weren’t considered due to how “radical” they seemed. When she states an opinion by another historian that barely focuses on the people, she states “Schlesinger’s evocative portrait omitted a cohort of leftist women and men whose presence was crucial to Washington’s transformation and to the design and implementation of many hallmark New Deal policies.”
Her focus on civilian action also brings a new view point to the many arguments about the Red Scare, where she believes that action and inaction all played a major role in how it was formed. When she discusses the loyalty program, she does mention how the government changes but instead, plays on how the people felt and how they were forced, by saying “However, to understand the loyalty program’s full power…how many high-ranking civil servants were forced out by the threat of constant reinvestigation, and not just by a routine change of administration.” When discussing a loyalty case that took place during the Red Scare, she states “…under the pressure of investigation the Keyserlings adopted anticommunist rhetoric and edged away from causes associated with the left.” Thus she makes the statement again that anything remotely close to liberalism was often seen as communistic thought, and many just wanted to protect themselves from further backlash. Her view on this seems to be filled with a bit of vitriol, as throughout her writings, she has a tone of harsh realism with these issues, and often puts the anti-communism movement in view that chastises the people involved for not going forward with the New Deal.
The discussion of the Red Scare in politics has been going on for years, from when Freeland wrote his book in the 70s to when Storrs wrote hers in the early 2000s. Each author sets a different point of view, where one could believe that the Red Scare started as close to the people as possible or how it was all government action that caused the forward of the anti-communist agenda. However, the ideal that it started closer to the people is sounder as it did have to do with people being sought after for them possibly being communist. Storrs eloquently writes about this issue, as she delves into what the people felt and how they mainly couldn’t do anything about what they were being put through. She writes that all they could do was comply with the government, and thus it toppled legislation that could have potentially helped the United States. Her view is a bit like a domino effect, which ties neatly to how these events unfolded and escalated. If it weren’t for the people’s fear, then new legislation would have been passed, and liberal legislation that could have benefitted the economy in the New Deal was side stepped.
Although Freeland, Heale, and Storrs, in their own right, are not wrong, Storrs also seems to have an empathetic that the other authors don’t bring to what the Red Scare was about. Most historians focus on the government and politics that went with this era, both at state and federal levels, but the plights of the people who went through this are either a side note or added to give more background. Her focus on trials that affected legislation allows for this point of view that is often glanced over.