Post-Democratization Politics: Clientelism and Corruption

. The constitutional heritage of former regimes, in which public resources have been widely utilized to obtain sustenance of backing networks causing the complication of administrative processing, influences the political landscape of the state after democratization (Gee, 2015, p. 42). Different types of backing and clientelism prevail across the political system and administrative procedures, as proved by yielding and acquisition operations being frequently adjusted on the basis of individual relations. Moreover, the elevating level of dependency on costs for political crusades has developed opportunities for political corruption and state seizure, especially at the local level (Strachan, 2014a, p. 12). Thus, the facts demonstrate that elevated levels of costs of political crusades and campaigns stimulate lawmakers and members of councils of provincial and district

assemblies misuse their authority in complicating administrative processes and searching costs to defray for their campaigns in order to win the assembly seats and assist in financing their parties’ operations (Hunes et al., 2014, p. 32).
Cross-country analysis, which attempts to define typical reasons of complicated administrative processings and corruption, focuses on structural factors that are frequently connected with low income levels, income imparity, open trade, and long subjection to democracy. Such framework suggests that states with high revenue levels (for instance, high GDP) demonstrate lower levels of administrative operations complications and prevailing corruption (Sack, Rahman, Turkewitz, Buehler, & Saleh, 2014, p. 72). Such structural agents perform a significant function in defining major determinative factors of corruption and entangled administrative procedures (Sack et al., 2014, p. 72). Nevertheless, these factors and institutions alone cannot be regarded as a single account of the Indonesian existing structural issue. Moreover, such determinatives offer restricted policy reform options and additional analysis is required to implement the appropriate strategy to impede and combat corruption in Indonesia. Besides, the country is historically used to living in the networks of patrons and clients, which has actually stimulated the complicacy of administrative operations (Sack et al., 2014, p. 74). Administrative operations have been entangled so as to ensure that governmental relatives, business community friends, and major military authorities are granted such advantages as monopolies and exceptional supply contracts combined with tax breaks in exchange for personal support (Gee, 2015, p. 45). This extremely converging and particularistic regime has resulted in weak administration and clientelist structures within the entire Indonesia (Hunes et al., 2014, p. 34). This is the major reason why the country encounters a moderate pace of reforming on corruption issues as the culture of patronizing is deeply entrenched in complicated administrative operations. Bribery acts and corruption are frequently hidden behind unclear and entangled administrative procedures and are often disregarded by Indonesian authorities as corrupt operations (Strachan, 2014b, p. 27). Moreover, anticorruption, bureaucracy, and market liberalization reforms are implemented at a steady pace due to the fact that they pose serious hazards to the oligarchical frameworks of long-established elites within the economical sphere, while these established elites perform a crucial function regarding national and local politics (Gee, 2015, p. 45). Decentralization is another factor affecting the existing situation. Despite the fact that numerous scholars and development practitioners regard decentralization as an efficient means of reforming the governance system, it can become effective only after an appropriate change of administrative procedures. It should not merely authorize local governments with elevated resources and liability, but also guarantee that local governments are made amenable for the public services supply and the usage of public capital. Thus, the shortage of liability and amenability creates vigorous incentives for local elites to seize resources and affect policies for their individual concerns instead of caring for the entire society, which offers more possibilities for corruption to flourish (Hunes et al., 2014, p. 38). In addition, the type of decentralization might also influence the levels of corruption in a decentralized economy. Thus, the case of Indonesia demonstrates that corruption becomes larger when spendings are decentralized, while the capital gathering is sustained under the liability of the central government (Sack et al., 2014, p.

71). Despite the fact that the primary objective of decentralization has been rapidly obtained as cities and villages currently revel a higher level of responsibilities, the level of transparency, liability, accountability, and strong clear administrative institutions are still missing, inflicting numerous challenges to the success of the decentralization procedure and impeding the combat against corruption (Strachan, 2014a, p. 14). The facts demonstrate that implementation of decentralization has actually introduced fresh agents and actors, while altering the course of actions of corruption at local levels, elevating possibilities/incentives for the authorities to conduct affairs in a corrupted manner (Strachan, 2014a, p. 14). Local governments currently take advantage of a broad variety of discretionary proxy and superintendence over the utilization of more than 50 percent of the government budget (Hunes et al., 2014, p. 46), while incorporating over-resourcing from timber and mineral and having no appropriate inner and outer accountability arrangements in

place. These resources are transferred to local governments under a revenue sharing scheme and they represent up to 80% of the total revenue collected by these jurisdictions (Gee, 2015, p. 44). In addition, local governments also appear to be accountable for basic infrastructures and supply of public attendances, incorporating education, health, agriculture, and transportation, which generates a favorable ground for complicated administrative operations and offers numerous possibilities for manipulation of funds dedicated to these services. Moreover, approximately 2.5 million governmental officials have been appointed to the district level government, which is characterized by weak organizational resources and structures (Gee, 2015, p. 44). Finally, the establishment of local elections for mayors and city councilors also appears to be an agent affecting control of corruption in Indonesia. The facts and analysis demonstrate that the last local elections cannot be characterized as free of frauds since the reports illustrate numerous manipulations with votes, bureaucrats’ mobilization, voters intimidation, etc. (Strachan, 2014b, p. 27). Moreover, the present political finance regulations also seem to be inadequate (Sack et al., 2014, p. 73). Elevated costs of election campaigns have actually stimulated candidates to look for endurance from the private sector or attempt to abuse public resources and funds. Thus, the administration procedure seriously suffers from restricted human and fiscal resources, political interferences, and exposure to bribery (Sack et al., 2014, p. 73). Accountability is a determinative factor of success for any decentralization process, especially in combating corruption and making administrative operations clear and adequate (Sack et al., 2014, p. 71).