Peter Singer Arguement That We are Speciesist

Speciesism, as defined by Peter Singer, “is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species” (Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 6). The rationale for the preferential treatment encapsulated in this definition is simply the fact that those receiving the preferred treatment belong to the same species, and not on the basis of any grounds of higher intelligence or other attributes.

Singer ensures that the reader can easily relate to this concept by drawing parallels between it, racism and sexism. Drawing this parallel also automatically associates speciesism with a negative emotion in the mind of the reader, since the concepts of racism and sexism generally carry powerful negative connotations in the modern age. It is then easier for Singer to convince the reader that a variance in treatment for animals simply based on the fact that they are not human is “morally indefensible” (Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 16). Speciesism thus becomes a powerful vehicle to convey the arguments he makes against the difference in treatment afforded by humans to animals as compared to other humans.

Singer’s argument that our society is speciesist hinges on his observation that “most human beings… [would] cause pain to animals when they would not cause a similar pain to humans for the same reason” (Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 17). His hypothesis is that “the overwhelming majority of humans” take varyingly active and passive roles in championing activities that cause irreparable harm to other species in the name of the “most trivial interests of our own species” (Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 9). The examples he provides to substantiate this theory range from accounts o...

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...ting pain is too scattered and too varying to be wholly accounted for in the calculus of the utilitarian Singer. Since humans have varying experiences, the amount of grief experienced by each human is correspondingly different as a product of their multifaceted experiences. If this is the case, then the amount of grief and pain experienced by a certain event cannot be objectively measured even among members of the same species – how then can we hope to objectively measure and quantify the pain felt by different horses because of the same “hard slap across… [their] rump[s]” (Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 15)? While the minimization of pain may be a useful tool in theory, it unfortunately renders itself ineffective when held up to the crucible of a world replete with emotions, distinct personalities and experiences, and the unique individuality of each living creature.