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Evolution of Strategy Throughout the Peloponnesian War
In the years leading up to the Peloponnesian War as described by Thucydides, Athens and Sparta formed a successful alliance defending Hellas from a Persian invasion. This alliance dissolved soon after leaving Athens, possessing a robust naval force, and Sparta, possessing a formidable military force, as independent city-states. Each developed policies that reflected their unique systems of government and defined the nature of relationships with their respective allies. These policies shaped the strategies that each city-state developed and implemented during the 27 year Peloponnesian war. This paper examines the evolution of Athenian and Spartan strategy using the ends, ways, and means
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Thus, Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies voted for war. Sparta envisioned a long war that could be won only with a strong naval force enabling Sparta to influence Athens’ distant allies to disrupt the flow resources that fed the Athenian navy. Lacking time and resources, Sparta decided on a simple strategy to discredit Athens’ highly capable military General, (ends), with a land attack on Attica within full view of Athens and its residents (ways). Sparta’s strategy used its existing strong military force and ensured military actions were completed prior to their harvest (means).
As the war progressed with minimal gains on either side, Athens and Sparta each evolved their strategies. Athens continued to allow Sparta and the Peloponnesians to attack Attica, increased its presence in Peloponnesus, and subdued revolting allies. Spartan meanwhile grew its allied naval capability which they used to counter Athenian attacks and promote insurrections among Athens’
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While one might conclude that Athens did not evolve its strategy correctly, its failure was more the result of incorrect assumptions and bad intelligence than of faulty strategy. Athens wrongly assumed that it would receive significant support from new allies and that Syracuse would lack a capable force. Sparta’s strategic success in the defense of Syracuse was perhaps enabled more by accurate intelligence than on its own ability to plan. While Athens and Sparta each evolved their strategies throughout war, a comparison of the strategies at the point of the Sicilian expedition to the original visions expressed by Athenian and Spartan leaders at the start of the war may clarify which was more
Imagine two countries, so different from each other, that conflicts were inevitable. Athens and Sparta were not countries, however, they were city-states of Greece with many contrasting values. Athens was the city of the arts, reading, and writing. Meanwhile, military was the only thing the on the Spartans’ minds. Athens and Sparta differ in many ways due to their governments, economies, and cultures.
Dating back to 449 B.C., Sparta and Athens always had an alliance, but as time grew that balance slowly began to fall as one felt threatened by another. Before any sight of unsteadiness the Spartans and Athenians had a bound partnership. Beginning after their domination of the Persian war, the two states slowly became aware of one another’s growing power. More time went by, and the Spartans began to grow conscious of the other states, feeling wary and paranoid around them (Fox, 170). No state was particularly to blame for the strain on their peace treaty, nor for the war, it came as the two states developed. Eventually the two states had clashed enough and declared war. Although the Spartans gave the Athenians a chance to back down and temporarily stall war, the two states would never be equal, their allies resented one another far too much. The growing urge for power was bound to take over sooner or later. Finally, after 7 years of uneasy tension, Sparta could wait no longer and declared war against Athens (Fox, 167). Although the Athenians and Spartans lived together in peace for so long, they existed in a fragile balance that was bound to eventually lead to war.
The Peloponnesian War and the Decline of Leadership in Athens Thucydides set out to narrate the events of what he believed would be a great war—one requiring great power amassed on both sides and great states to carry out. Greatness, for Thucydides, was measured most fundamentally in capital and military strength, but his history delves into almost every aspect of the war, including, quite prominently, its leaders. In Athens especially, leadership was vital to the war effort because the city’s leaders were chosen by its people and thus, both shaped Athens and reflected its character during their lifetimes. The leaders themselves, however, are vastly different in their abilities and their effects on the city. Thucydides featured both Pericles and Alcibiades prominently in his history, and each had a distinct place in the evolution of Athenian empire and the war it sparked between Athens and Sparta.
There are times in history that something will happen and it will defy all logic. It was one of those times when a few Greek city/states joined together and defeated the invasion force of the massive Persian Empire. The Greeks were able to win the Greco-Persian War because of their naval victories over the Persians, a few key strategic victories on land, as well as the cause for which they were fighting. The naval victories were the most important contribution to the overall success against the Persians. The Persian fleet was protecting the land forces from being outflanked and after they were defeated the longer had that protection. While the Greeks had very few overall victories in battle they did have some strategic victories. The Battle of Thermopylae is an example of a strategic success for the Greeks. The morale of the Persian army was extremely affected by the stout resistance put up by King Leonidas and his fellow Spartans. The Greeks fought so hard against overwhelming odds because of what they were fighting for. They were fighting for their country and their freedom. They fought so hard because they did not want to let down the man next to them in the formation. Several things contributed to the Greeks success against the Persian invasion that happened during the Second Greco-Persian War.
Spartan culture is a great example of how a society’s infrastructure will directly affect both, its social structure and superstructure. It also serves as a warning that any society that becomes too rigid in its structure and too static in its values will not last long when confronted with more agile and adaptable cultures. This paper will explore why Sparta became the Hellenic army par excellence, how this worked to create a very specific social structure founded on martial values, and, finally, how that social structure would ultimately be the undoing of the culture.
While Simon Hornblower acknowledges the limitations of the alliance, he is perhaps the strongest proponent of the importance of Persia’s financial support. He recognizes that Sparta’s victory at Notion in 407 was as much the result of poor Athenian leadership as Persian money, and that this financial backing did not prevent the disastrous loss at Arginusai the following year. Despite these statements, Hornblower is adamant that “The Peloponnesian War had been won because of Persian money.” P.F. Rhodes continues this reasoning in A History of the Classical Greek World, 478-323. He contends that Persia’s assistance helped Sparta effectively combat Athens at sea, and allowed them to remain engaged until Athens could no longer continue. These theories all center around the question of why Sparta won the war. However, if we flip our perspective and examine why Athens lost the war, Persia’s money becomes considerably less significant. It is to this examination that we now turn our
J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. gives us the definition of strategic art, stating “it is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action) and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.”1 During the Peloponnesian War we see Sparta and Athens following and discarding the first words of the definition with sometimes skillful formulation of strategy, and at times anything but skillful strategy - completely ill-informed, unimaginative, and incomplete. We also see how well each city-state adapts to strategic realities through the first phase of the war. There are lessons in Thucydides history of the Peloponnesian War for strategists today on how a country develops a
The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) was a conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta that resulted in the end of the Golden Age of Athens. The events of the war were catalogued by the ancient historian Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ writings showed the ancient Greek belief that there is a parallel between the city-state and the character of its citizens; in order for the city-state to be successful, its citizens must be virtuous. Thucydides did not believe that the true cause of the Peloponnesian War were the immediate policies of the Athenian Empire against the city-states in the Peloponnesian League but rather the fundamental differences in the character of the two city-states
The Peloponnesian War could easily be considered one of the most life changing and significant wars that occurred in classical Greece. It was fought between two empires which originally stood together against a common enemy, the Persians. However, once this common enemy was defeated, Sparta and Athens began to become great rivals vying for control of Greece. This resulted in the First and Second Peloponnesian Wars, which saw the rise and fall of the Athenian Empire. Sparta eventually rose to be the victor with the assistance of their former enemy Persia, but the era city-states would not live on for very much longer. The Peloponnesian Wars should be studied, because it details the rise and fall of one of the greatest city-states in Greek history.
Throughout the Ancient Greek world, there have been many wars and standoffs. However, there has been only one which changed the course of Greek history forever; the Peloponnesian War. Caused by the growing tension between Athens and Sparta, it came and left, leaving only destruction in its wake. The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War caused the downfall of Greece, and the end of the Classical Age.
When examining the causes for the Peloponnesian War, which was between 431-404 B.C., there are a number of causes that factored into the cause of this war. However, one of the most important causes to this war was largely due to the fact that the Spartans feared the growing power and success of Athens. The Spartans were “particularly alarmed at the growing power of Athens” (Cartwright, “Peloponnesian War”). During the Persian war in 479 BC, Athens grew fiercely strong with power with help of its many allies and continued with their no mercy attacks on Persian territories. When the Persians left Greece, Athens further enraged Sparta when they built large and tall walls around its empire in the event of an attack, which was mostly thought to be from Sparta if it happened.
In Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles commends the ergon of Athenian heroes, which has placed them in the realm of logos, while directing the Athenians to follow these ideals of logos. The maintenance and continued success of Athens' political establishment relies on the prevalence of polis, rationality and discourse over family, emotion and reckless action. However, the indiscriminate turns of fate and fortune, often place logos in opposition with the base, primal nature of ergon. Both Thucydides and Sophocles recognize that when logos conflicts with the unexpected ergon, the preservation of rationality and unanimity among the citizens of the polis depend on the leadership of a single honest leader. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides presents Pericles as a man of logos, whom Athens needs to achieve its full potential as an empire and later to rescue her from disaster. Likewise, Sophocles presents Theseus, in Oedipus Colonus, as the perfect successor of Pericles, who returns Athens to its former glory before the end of the war. In these two examples, we see that the dominance of logos over ergon within a polis lies in the ability and logos of the city’s current leader.
The Peloponnesian War is the conflict between the pelopoponesians league led by Sparta and the Delian league, led by Athens. Much of our knowledge on the causes and events of the Peloponnesian War, depends on the Athenian Thucydides 460-400 BC, writer of the History of the Peloponessian War. He servd as an Athenian commander in Northern Greece during the early years of the war until the assembly exiled him as he lost an outpost to the enemy. During this exile, he was able to interview witnesses on both sides of the conflicted. Unlike Heredotus he concentrated on contemporary history and presented his account of the war in an annalistic framework that only occasionally diverts from chronological order. In his account, he discuses the precursors to the war, including the 30 years truce and revolutions, such as the stasis in Corcyra. When looking at wars, the primary focus is normally the fighting itself, such as what we see for World War II. However, it is important to look at the anatomy of war, meaning what effect the war has on the people who are experiencing it first hand, and the consquences that the conflict has on the rest of the world. Therefore in this essay I shall discuss, drawing directly from Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, how the civilians reacted to the war, their involvement and socio economic factors. Furthermore, the first section of my essay shall focus on the direct effect of war on the people, regarding the plague, and violence and hopelessness that was experienced. Then I shall go on to discuss more general effects of the war and how it affected the Greek world, discussing the social and economic losses that occurred such as the cost of the war in attica, the coup d’etat that occurred in gove...
Athens and Sparta were both city-states in Classical Greece. While Athens embraced democracy, Sparta was a dictatorial fierce warrior state. Sparta was a militaristic community, Athens was a freethinking, and commerce minded city-state. Modern societies have modeled their government organizational structure and military discipline practices from lessons learned of these ancient city-states. There is much is to be praised regarding Classical Greece for their courage, their progressive thinking and the birth of democracy. However, I think it is important to remember that in both cases, Athens and Sparta were able to sustain their lifestyle on the backs of countless slaves, non-citizens and women and that there is a darker and less romantic side to the past.
Because of the tranquil times, the civilization’s society had more time to focus on writing, math, astronomy, and artistic fields, as well as trade and metallurgy. Out of all the city-states of Greece, two excelled over all the rest, Sparta and Athens. Even though they were the most advanced and strong civilizations, they were bitter enemies. While Athens focused mainly on the people’s democracy and citizen rights, Sparta were ferocious and enslaved its original inhabitants, making them unable to leave and kept under a close eye to prevent insurgence (History of Greece:The Golden Age of Greece). Additionally, Sparta had strict and trained soldiers that underwent intense physical exercising and instruction.