Parliament and Parliamentary Sovereignty

Parliament and Parliamentary Sovereignty When we talk about 'Parliament' and 'parliamentary sovereignty' what

exactly do we mean? Firstly we must take the word 'Parliament' to mean

not the actual Houses of Parliament themselves but instead the Acts

passed by Parliament with the consent of the Commons, Lords and the

Queen. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is about the

relationship between those who create the Acts (Parliament) and those

who must apply them (courts).

When Dicey published The Law of the Constitution in 1885 he identified

parliamentary sovereignty as meaning that,

'Parliament has, under the English constitution, the right to make or

unmake any law whatever; and further that no person or body is

recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set

aside the legislation of Parliament.'

To look at this much quoted statement in more detail we can find a lot

of evidence to support his view. It has been shown over the years that

courts are totally unwilling to question the legitimacy of statutes

unless there is some question as to them not being passed using the

correct procedure. As long as an Act has passed through both Houses

and received the Royal Assent judges will not argue whether or not a

statute should or should not exist but will merely try to apply the

statute. One of many examples of this is the case of Edinburgh &

Dalkeith Railway Co. v Wauchope (1842) 8 Cl & F 710. In this case a

man was appealing to the court against a private Act obtained by the

railway company as it adversely aff...

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...m. It is unclear however what would happen if Parliament

enacted a statute in direct conflict to European laws. Although this

is unlikely to happen on political grounds it seems English judges

would be bound to apply a conflicting UK statute irrespective of

European laws.

Therefore it is my conclusion that although the judges may not agree

with the laws they seem to follow them albeit with some prejudice. If

they had less power we might be in danger of losing the flexibility in

our judicial system, if they had more, i.e. they could override

statutes, we may be faced with great uprisals and tension within their

infrastructure. It seems that English courts whilst being allowed a

certain amount of flexibility are still ultimately answerable to

Parliament, however this seems to be more through choice than

obligation.