Organizing Insurgency by Paul Staniland

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Organizing Insurgency by Paul Staniland, introduces the question, “Do resources like diamonds, drugs, and state sponsors turn insurgent groups into thuggish people or do they help build a more disciplined organization?” The reason this question is asked is because in some cases it suggests that “resource wealth encourages the degeneration of armed groups into greed and criminality” and other evidence shows that “external sponsorship and criminal activity can help leaders build organizations in the face of state repression” (p.142). This question is being presented because with different insurgent groups like the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Hizbul Mujahidden, having very similar interactions with state sponsors, could have very different outcomes determining the fate of the insurgency. In looking at insurgent groups and how they operate, we are able to learn how some groups prosper while other groups fall apart.
To illustrate the fact that not all insurgent groups operate in the same way, Staniland suggests that “all insurgent organizations are built on social linkages” (p.150) and the preexisting social networks of insurgencies will determine the fate of the group. In his article, Staniland distinguishes between two different social bases that are the groundwork of most insurgency groups; the two groups he talks about are overlapping and divided social bases. Overlapping social bases are preexisting networks that come together and combine strong links that pull organizers and communities together, and divided social bases are weak ties that are between organizers and communities. The best social base to have of the two is the overlapping social base because it is more likely to prosper due to preexisting social...

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... with a strong basis that is the starting point for everything that happens within the group. The structure of the insurgency will effect wether the organization has discipline or not, like Staniland states “the structure of the social ties on which an organization was originally built shapes the new institutions that that emerge” (p.148). Although some insurgencies are an exception, most prosper because of their strong social basis’, in order to determine wether or not material objects such a diamonds and drugs will effect the insurgency negatively or positively, the answer is usually within how the group was built. “Organizations built through strong preexisting ties can rapidly absorb and use large resource endowments without losing discipline, whereas fragmented groups built on weak social ties fall prey to military ineffectiveness and internal conflict” (p.174).

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