Operation Chromite Research Paper

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Sun Tzu, the great Chinese general and philosopher once wrote, “All warfare is based on deception.” The United States’ innate ability to conduct glorious amphibious assaults from the sea is no better represented than during Operation Chromite, also referred to as the Battle of Inchon. During the Korean War, on September 15, 1950, U.S. and allied forces led by General MacArthur, inflicted a surprise attack on the North Korean-controlled harbor of Inchon. This operation was so successful, that it propelled Allied forces into North Korean territory, turning the tide of war in favor of allied forces. The success of the operation is attributed to the surprise inflicted upon the North Koreans accompanied by the use of deception by allied forces through …show more content…

The landing at Inchon (Operation Chromite) took place during the Korean War soon after the North Korean Army invaded past the 38th parallel that separated North Korean and South Korean territory. The North Koreans, after their swift invasion, captured the political epicenter of South Korea, Seoul. In order to place troops back into Korea and retake Seoul, General MacArthur of the U.S. forces decided to land at the port of Inchon, which was only 20 miles away from Seoul. This port city would allow MacArthur to tactfully place U.S. and allied forces into Korea and capture the nearby Kimpo airfield to sustain future operations. Likewise, this northern reinsertion would split North Korean forces in half ruining their logistical capability to support forces south, allowing for a simpler re-acquisition of the south. This amphibious assault proved to be tricky. With large tidal variations of the ocean and the region containing coastal defenses, nobody except MacArthur believed this plan would …show more content…

forces intended to land. If the U.S. did not surprise the enemy, U.S. troops would most certainly meet heavy entrenchments and coastal defense. As discussed earlier, enemies tend to know a counteroffensive will take place; however, if you can convince the enemy of a false location, they will be unprepared for the actual assault. The beach of Kunsan seemed like the perfect place to attack the North Koreans; Kunsan was much easier to access, and there were fewer North Korean forces at the time. Nevertheless, MacArthur knew that a shocking assault at Inchon could end the war, while a landing at Kunsan would lead to a long and harsh winter campaign. To achieve the maximum amount of trickery, MacArthur created a deception campaign, misguiding the North Koreans into thinking he would land in Kunsan, which was 105 miles south of Inchon. Nine days before the amphibious assault, bombings began taking place on roads and bridges to isolate Kusan, preventing North Korean reinforcements to the area. Moreover, South Korean soldiers raided enemy positions along the west coast to create further chaos amongst North Korean

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