New Deal Dbq

Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal (1933) was a major turning point as it ‘helped make Civil Rights a political issue’. It aimed to help the poor and stimulate the economy and it was somewhat successful as AAs got ‘more help and attention’. DePennington however, emphasises that it was ‘indifferent to the needs of AAs’ with PW revealing that ‘aid to minorities was diluted by the racist attitudes of the administrators’. The majority of black employment (domestic and agricultural workers) were excluded from social security with over 6 million farmers having no help from the federal government. Roosevelt didn’t enforce any anti-lynching bills and introduced little Civil Rights legislation. WW2 however, made it ‘difficult for FDR to ignore black demands’

while claiming to fight for ‘democratic freedom’. In 1941, he introduced Executive Order 8802, banning discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government, and the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), which DP gives as ‘somewhat successful’ and LP explains that while it led to an ‘increase in jobs’, It had ‘no enforcement power. Despite AAs being ‘overwhelming supporters’ of FDR ‘little was done at a federal level to help AAs’ as he ‘only did what was safely expedient to retain the black vote in the North and no more’.

Eisenhower was similar to Roosevelt in his lacklustre commitment to Civil Rights. MC argues that ‘his election did not augur well’ for the movement as he was a ‘reluctant player’, exhibited by his lack of endorsement regarding the BROWN decision and the declaration by the supreme court that ‘separate but equal’ was unconstitutional. LP describes how he ‘expressed doubts’ about using the ‘stick of legislation to force the south into submission’ paralleling Sanders who explains ‘he could be helpful when forced into action’. Eisenhower preferred to rely on ‘gradual change’ rather than federal initiatives with Sanders vouching he was ‘ideologically opposed to large scale intervention’. Like many other Presidents, he ‘flexed his federal muscles at key moments to smash white resistance’ and while he didn’t support the Montgomery Bus Boycott, he felt ‘compelled to intervene’ during Little Rock. PL writes how he had ‘little choice’ to respond with force and put 10,000 troopers of the Arkansas National Guard under state control revealing the ‘enormous might’ of the federal government and exposing the ‘reluctance of Presidents to deploy it’. He worked against discrimination in federal facilities and was stimulated to introduce the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts with aims to increase black voting. However, they were relatively unsuccessful, having been diluted by Southern Democrats, with Sanders describing them as a ‘sham’. Cook (Pg 115) sees ‘relative federal inactivity’ as the main reason the movement stagnated in the 1950s with AAs themselves bearing the most responsibility for initiating change as Eisenhower, by ‘temperament of belief’ chose not to speak out forcefully on behalf of equality.

Sanders claims that Kennedy’s ‘view on civil rights was mixed’ as he ‘helped greatly albeit reluctantly at first’.

This ‘complex’ attitude is affirmed by LP who suggests that the first 2 years of his administration seemed to be an ‘extension of Eisenhower’s regime’. He was ‘not committed to it heart and soul’ and gave ‘less than full support’ to the movement as it was politically risky and he didn’t want to alienate southern white democrats due to his narrow victory in the election. DePennington states he was ‘slow to respond to the demands of the Civil Rights movement’ being hesitant to support the freedom rides or force the issue of desegregation, as despite condemning white attacks on AAs, he was ‘reluctant to interfere in Southern justice’. Indeed, activists felt he was a ‘great disappointment’ and had to be ‘activated’ by the disorder the movement provided e.g. the violence of spring 1963. LP writes that he ‘responded to extraordinary circumstances’ such as the James Meredith case where he sent federal troops to Mississippi University to force integration. MC argues he ‘played an important role’ in the advancement of Civil Rights as he put pressure on the Civil Service to employ AAs, continued to support social welfare, and orchestrated the creation of the Voter Education Project. He may have genuinely believed he ‘couldn’t stand idle with such violence’ and that it was a ‘moral issue’ but when he did act it was undoubtedly because he was forced to respond to the ‘growing demands of the Civil Rights movement’ By his death, he had begun to take, as MC interprets, an ‘active role’ and that his actions ‘benefitted the Civil Rights movement’. Prompted by Birmingham and the March on Washington, he drafted the 1963 Civil Rights bill that paved the way for the 1964 Act. Despite ‘the movement’ being ‘more important in promoting change’, ‘for the first time in years, the initiative in Civil Rights was to come from the

Whitehouse’.

Truman is seen as one of the most effective Presidents in the advancement of civil rights with Sanders arguing that he ‘was a genuine patriot’ who ‘did more to help than any of his predecessors’. He recognised that the general principle of respect for the law was at stake with LP reinforcing that it was ‘a combination of moral repugnance against anti-black violence and political realism’ that prompted him, expressing that he was ‘appalled by the problem’ and was ‘motivated to do something’. PW agree claiming he ‘personally favoured a better deal for black Americans’ backed up by his consistent support for anti-lynching bills from the late 1930s onwards and his reputation for fairness during the war. DePennington reveals that he ‘realised the implications of blatantly denying citizens basic democratic freedom to vote, while claiming to fight for democratic freedom’ in the Cold War. Sanders claims he believed AAs should have ‘equality, civil rights, and better housing’ as he wanted to do what was best for the USA and he knew racism was wrong and should be combatted by those in power. In 1946 he established the Presidents Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR) where To Secure These Rights ‘exposed the inequalities’ and ‘called for measures to end segregation’ such as voting rights and an end to discrimination in travel and the army. No legislation followed, however, as he couldn’t persuade congress. In 1948 he issued executive orders 9980 and 9981, which ended segregation in federal employment and the army respectively. PW argues they were more ‘concrete’ measures showing that the Whitehouse would ‘no longer positively support’ segregation. MC argue that he made ‘tentative steps towards proving better rights for AAs’ reiterating PW view that ‘by the end of his presidency his civil rights achievements were limited’ but he had ‘identified civil rights as a moral issue’ in a way that no President had previously done. Indeed Sanders agrees that he had ‘implemented changes within his power’ and ‘awakened US consciences to civil rights’. LP describes how he managed to ‘advance the cause of civil rights’ and ‘ set legislative agendas that would guide lawmakers for the next 3 decades’ with the PCCR paving the way for the 1964 Civil Rights and 1965 Voting Rights Acts.

Perhaps the most significant president in the fight for civil rights was Johnson who as Sanders argues, ‘did more for blacks than any other president’ with his ‘Great Society’ and comprehensive legislation giving AAs as MC states ‘a chance for social and economic advancement’. LP takes the view that ‘the movements legislative agenda boosted when he entered the Whitehouse’ paralleling PW who affirms that his ‘commitment for civil rights’ began as soon as he became president. Indeed, Sanders argues that he had a ‘genuine sympathy for racial equality’ as he was ‘motivated by his own childhood poverty’ and that even COREs James Farmer believed him to be genuine. It is widely thought that his passion for civil rights exceeded that of Kennedy and that he achieved more. The 1964 Civil Rights bill seemed an ‘appropriate tribute’ to the late President who had, in Johnsons own words “fought for so long” to get it passed. PW argues that he ‘exploited the shocked mood’ after Kennedy’s death and used his impressive ‘powers of persuasion’ and devoted a ‘staggering amount of time’ to getting the bill through, ending legal segregation and discrimination. PW brings the idea that Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ ‘benefitted black people’ targeting racial injustice and black poverty. He worked hard to alleviate black unemployment and poverty, which consequently decreased by 34% and 25% respectively. His Voting Rights Act gave AAs the opportunity to ‘vote without fear’, the Education Act ended school desegregation, and Social Security Acts developed all-inclusive ‘community action programmes’ such as Medicare and Medicaid. They did not, however, bring an end to ‘AA discontent’ as shown by riots in 1965, which slowed the chance for further legislation. Additonally, legislation was not always enforced, due to local officials being reluctant to co-operate. PW adds that ‘with the passing on the Civil Rights Act, the cooperation between the movement and the administration reached its peak’ and that the escalation of the Vietnam War made ‘further reforms impossible’ as it was merely a distraction and an expense. DePennington interpretation however, that he was ‘there when the nation needed him’ is backed up by LP, saying he was one of the most ‘sympathetic’ and ‘activist presidents’ who, like Truman, did as much as possible given the circumstances. Goodwin suggests that he was ‘more advanced’ than any other president paralleling LP who argues that he showed ‘that a president could directly affect the cause of civil rights’.