Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the protective sweep represented the type of intrusive unwarranted search that the Fourth Amendment was created to prevent (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). He also argued that the majority opinion’s limits as to the scope and timeliness of the protective search are not enough to prevent the police from abusing such an unwarranted search (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). After Justice Brennan wrote his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). In my opinion, I disagree with Justice Brennan. From the facts of the Maryland v. Buie case, on February 3, 1986, two men robbed a Godfather’s Pizza in Prince George’s County, Maryland (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). …show more content…
Buie, n.d.). Later that day, the police obtained warrants for the arrest of Jerome Edward Buie and Lloyd Allen and put Buie’s house under surveillance (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). On February 5, the police arrested Buie in his house. Police found him hiding in the basement (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). Once Buie emerged and was handcuffed, an officer went down to determine if there was anyone else hiding (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). While in the basement, the officer saw a red running suit in plain view and seized it as evidence (Maryland v. Buie, n.d.). The facts in the case are cut and dry and this is where I disagree with Justice Brennan, whereas, the officers were legally in the house searching for Buie, the officers protective sweep was for the safety of the officers, and the red running suit was in plain view. In my opinion, this only makes sense and Buie rob a God Father Pizza in a red running suit. The red running suit is key evidence in the prosecution of the case where the clothing of the robbers was found in the suspect’s house. Additionally, it is not like the officers were there illegally and or planted evidence. Some of the Justices are more concerned with citizens privacy than officer’s safety and common
In this case, the Supreme Court decision in reversing the decision of the trail court. Although the suspects were conducting an illegal crime, the officers were reckless in the procedures in collecting the evidence. In this case, if there was a report or call concerning the drug activities in the apartment, being that the Police Department was conducting a the drug sting, it would have justified the reasoning behind the officers kicking the door in and securing suspects and evidence.
In 1989, plaintiff Joseph Benning was cited for a violation of § 1256 for operating a motorcycle without wearing approved headgear in Caledonia County, Vermont. The statue states that “No person may operate or ride upon a motorcycle upon a highway unless he wears upon his head protective headgear reflectorized in part and of a type approved by the commissioner.1 The headgear shall be equipped with either a neck or chin strap.1” The County State’s Attorney dismissed the citation because he deemed the statue vague and unable to establish the elements necessary to prosecute the crime.1 However, the plaintiffs filed suit against the state, seeking to have § 1256 declared unconstitutional.
In the controversial court case, McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice John Marshall’s verdict gave Congress the implied powers to carry out any laws they deemed to be “necessary and proper” to the state of the Union. In this 1819 court case, the state of Maryland tried to sue James McCulloch, a cashier at the Second Bank of the United States, for opening a branch in Baltimore. McCulloch refused to pay the tax and therefore the issue was brought before the courts; the decision would therefore change the way Americans viewed the Constitution to this day.
Said by Justice David Souter “ In the majority opinion, compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casual interaction.” He believes that the co-occupants consent is not valid because their was the refusal of an other occupant. Beside on the Fourth Amendment it states that “ a valid warrantless entry and search of a premises when the police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, common authority over the property, and no present co-tenant objects.”
Justice Harlan’s reasonable expectations test in Katz vs. United States (1967) considers whether a person has an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and if so, whether such expectation is one that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” (Solove and Schwartz 99) If there is no expectation of privacy, there is no search and no seizure (reasonable, or not), and hence no Fourth Amendment issue. Likewise, we must first ascertain whether a search took place. A few questions from a police officer, a frisk, or the taking of blood samples do not constitute a search. (Solove and Schwartz 83; 86) Likewise, the plain view doctrine establishes that objects knowingly exhibited in a public area, in plain view for police to see, do not
The dissenting opinion was given by Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall. Their concerns were that the majority opinion may be the beginning of the exclusionary rule slipping away. Brennon had observed that the Court had slowly began to let more things slide against the Fourth Amendment, and that the ?good faith? exception directly contradicted the Fourth Amendment. He also held that it may seem that the Court may pick and choose what evidence it allows in interest of obtaining a conviction. (United States v. Leon , 1984)
The Court held that because of the “special facts” the “attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.” Under current jurisprudence, we would construe the language about “special facts” as relating to the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment – which resists categorical rules – and instead focuses on the need for the intrusion and the availability of a warrant. However, the language also justifies the search as “incident to petitioner’s arrest,” which would indicate that the test was upheld as a search incident-to-arrest. In situations where it is appropriate, that has been described as a “categorical” exception to the warrant requirement that does not require any case-by-case
Stuart v. Nappi was class lawsuit Stuart’s mother filed against school personnel and the Danbury Board of Education because she claimed that her daughter was not receiving the rights granted in the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). Kathy Stuart was a student at Danbury High School in Connecticut with serious emotional, behavior, and academic difficulties. She was suppose to be in special education classes, but for some reason she hardly ever attended them. Kathy was involved in a school-wide disturbance. As a result of her complicity in these disturbances, she received a ten-day disciplinary suspension and was scheduled to appear at a disciplinary hearing. The Superintendent of Danbury Schools recommended to the Danbury Board of Education
McCulloch v Maryland 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819) Issue May Congress charter a bank even though it is not an expressly granted power? Holding Yes, Congress may charter a bank as an implied power under the “necessary and proper” clause. Rationale The Constitution was created to correct the weaknesses of the Articles. The word “expressly” particularly caused major problems and therefore was omitted from the Constitution, because if everything in the Constitution had to be expressly stated it would weaken the power of the Federal government.
Many people today argue that McCulloch v. Maryland is one of the most important Supreme Court cases in United States history. Three main points were made by Chief Justice Marshall in this case, and all of these points have become critical and necessary parts of the U.S. Government and how it functions. The first part of the Supreme Court’s ruling stated that Congress has implied powers under a specific part of the Constitution referred to as the Necessary and Proper Clause. The second section of the ruling determined that the laws of the United States are more significant and powerful than any state laws that conflict with them. The last element addressed by Chief Justice Marshall was that sovereignty of the Union lies with the people of the
...level and not to the state level (once again undermining state government authority). For these reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in this case was one of the most controversial decisions at that time. Up until this decision was made, police in many states had ignored the search and seizure law.
Terry v. Ohio was in 1968 it had a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that the fourth amendment prohibition on the unreasonable search and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect on the streets and frisks him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer had a reasonable suspicion of that person had commit a crime in which he can be belief that the person may have a weapons that can be dangerous to a police officer.
The Supreme Court had to decide on the question of, does random drug testing of high school athletes violate the reasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment? According to the Fourth Amendment, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The logic used by the Court in order to justify their conclusion is fraught with weak reasoning and dangerous interpretations of the Constitution. It violates the precedent set in Miranda and seems tainted with a desire to justify consent searches at any cost. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte is a decidedly pro-order case because it qualifies another excuse police can raise to search a citizen, but it is also dangerous because it shows that the Court is not the unbiased referee between liberty and democracy that it should be.
In the early hours of the night on June 1993, Whren and Brown were driving the Pathfinder truck in a high drug region. In the same locale, two plainclothes police officers with unmarked police car were mandated with the task to patrol the area in the District of Columbia. It’s at this juncture that the police officers observed that the Pathfinder truck in which Whren and Brown were driving had stopped at a crossing stop sign for an extraordinarily long time (Whren v the United States, 1996). Without even signaling, Whren turned right sharply and sped off on realizing that the police officers had made a U-turn towards them. Similarly, as this was in violation of the traffic rules the police officers raced after them and stopped them at the side of the road at a red light. Notwithstanding, Whren was found to hold two plastic bags of what seemed like crack cocaine in his hand when the police came to the vehicle. Whren and Brown were thus incarcerated on federal drug charges. Before the trial, counsel for the defense progressed to overturn the possession of drug evidence. They contended that the police were in violation of the fourth amendment of the constitution as the police had wrongly used the pretext of a traffic stop to investigate possible drug crimes