Magda Secondary Victim

While in the case of Magda she is the secondary victim of the incident that took place due to the negligence of David. As discussed earlier a secondary victim is one who is no more than a passive and unwilling witness of injury to others. Here, the friends and families are not in the zone of danger, and therefore they are only secondary victims. As held in Galli-Atkinson v Segal[2003] D does not owe C a duty of care due to the lack of proximity in time and space even though C travelled to the mortuary to find their love ones, for to show that D owes a secondary victim a duty of care. It needs to be shown that the proximity of relationship in which a close tie of love and affection to a primary victim, proximity in time and space, proximity

Such type of shock is reasonably foreseeable and the case law which applies to it is Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire. According to the test of reasonable foreseeability it is found that whether the hypothetical reasonable man in the position of the defendant, viewing the position ex post facto, would say that the shock-induced psychiatric illness was reasonably foreseeable. Magda was present in the scenario at the time when Suzie had succumbed to the burn injuries. So she was proximal to the event i.e. when Suzie died. From the facts of the case it is very much clear that Magda was able to recognise Suzie’s cloths and she could hear her screaming voice. This makes the proximity of perception valid as she witness the event through her own unaided senses i.e. her own, and direct, sight and hearing. In Alcock the three issues that were brought forward in the context of proximity of perception are firstly what is the rationale behind the distinction? Why isn’t it enough for someone to see on TV that his relative has been severely injured? Secondly how much perception is

Causation is different from remoteness as latter is a further control of liability since it places limits on liability for damage for which D’s negligence has factually been a but-for cause, but, as a matter of legal policy, no liability could attach. It acts as a further rule to causation to limit the open-ended ripple effects of the but-for causation test. This is a cut-off rule based on moral intuition. As per Stapleton factual causation concerns the but-for test. Legal causation concerns novus actus, and issues of remoteness. The latter is a normative enquiry drawing the line between recoverable and irrecoverable damage. Hence the steps for the claimants are therefore as follows establish factual causation using the but-for test, establish legal causation (no novus actus etc) and show that the damage is not too remote. Under the s.4 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 the claims for the damages can be made and the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say court means, in relation to any claim, the court or arbitrator by or before whom the claim falls to be determined. Damage includes loss of life and personal injury, fault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or