Intersectionality Of Women Essay

Law is a tool, a tool of resistance, power, or even oppression. In many women’s experience with the law, the law exists as a tool of oppression. Internationally, across many states like Ohio itself, a husband can legally rape his wife if his wife is subdued by drugs, or any substance that lesser her chances of resistance and encourages consent (Allen, 2015). Across many legal institutions, and systems a woman suffers from discrimination or oppression due to her ‘multiple identities’ (Lockhart & Mitchell, 2010). Legal institutions and their processes overlook and ignore the experiences of people, in particular women who are subjected to dimensions of “race, class, gender and sexuality… in relation to their struggle against racial, sexual, sexual orientation and class oppression” (Lockhart & Mitchell, 2010). Law and legal processes hardly examine other characteristics of women because these institutions are centred on “objectivity and universalism” (Marchetti, 2008); only one characteristic or experience is examined to determine the outcome of a case. The objective of this essay is to explore the intersectionality of women and how it has come to be the forefront battle for equal rights for women. This essay will also look into how and why legal processes and law centre their

judgements and determine their claims based on a “universal woman” (Lockhart & Mitchell, 2010).

Intersectionality was first developed by Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) to showcase the difficulty law has in identifying the amalgamation of discrimination experienced by black women (Marchetti, 2008). Intersectionality arose from goals of feminist scholars for all women to come together (unison) and speak out about their shared experiences of discrimination and marginalisation (Lockhart & Mitchell, 2010). With this goal in mind for feminist movement, the core source of discrimination and oppression was based solely on gender, ignoring women’s other identities in other categorical groups (Simmington, 2004). This movement was to promote an image of a “universal woman” (Lockhart & Mithcell, 2010), instead it was challenged by women of marginalization, who stated that these experiences of a universal woman were the same experience women of colour and lower class experienced. Thus arose intersectionality, challenging the argument that gender was the core source of women’s discrimination and that all women shared the same experience (Edwards, 1996).

It is a framework that recognizes the multiple identities of women that originates from “biological inheritance, social relations, political struggles, economic status, and societal power structure” (Lockhart and Mitchell, 2010). According to Crenshaw (1994) intersectionality enables individuals, and society to look at the interaction of social and cultural groups on many levels, which significantly contribute to oppression, and discrimination. “An intersectional perspective suggests that to fully understand the oppression of women, one must understand the multidimensional, social constructed categorization that influenced the experiences of women in general” (Lockhart & Mitchell, 2010), especially women that are victims to domestic violence.

Although intersectionality is encouraged, legal institutions and their processes still ignore the experiences of people, in particular women who are subjected to dimensions of “race, class, gender and sexuality… in relation to their struggle against racial, sexual, sexual orientation and class oppression” (Lockhart & Mitchell, 2010). Therefore still creates inequalities for women, especially black women. In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, a suit was made against General Motor’s policy “last hired-first fired” (McDonough, Sheppard, Jonik, 2015). These five women claimed that the policy of General Motors was a direct hit for Black women. Thus, these women sought to bring a sex plus race discrimination, not a claim of discrimination against women, or discrimination against African American, but a discrimination against both (Crenshaw, 1990). However the court stated that a discrimination claim of both race and sex could not be allowed (Crenshaw, 1990). Therefore the five plaintiffs had to decide whether to bring suit on either a sex discrimination claim or race discrimination claim. However, the court held General Motors not guilty on both claims, seeing as General Motors were able to supply evidence of hiring white women and black males, prior to the Civil Rights Acts passing (McDonough, Sheppard, Jonik, 2015). According to the courts, for a sex plus race discrimination claim to be allowed, legislation would of created and acknowledged a “new classification of black women” (Crenshaw, 1990), “the creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical principles of permutation and combination would clearly raise the prospect of opening the hackneyed Panadora’s box” (Wangelin, 1976), and would “unduly advantage Black women over Black men or white women” (Crenshaw, 1990)

A study carried out by Neena L. Chappell (1980) called the ‘Double Jeopardy Hypothesis’ presents that woman in particular who identify with multiple stigmatized statuses or groups experience more discrimination and oppression of both marginalized groups. For example being black and a woman or being lesbian and black. The plaintiffs of DeGraffenreid v. General Motors faced double oppression and discrimination, seeing as they were African American but are also women. Double Jeopardy Hypothesis (1980) found that women of more than one identity experienced more discrimination and oppression than black males, and white females. In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, the Civil Rights Act did not ensure protection for the plaintiffs, seeing as they identified with two minority categories (McDonough, Sheppard, Jonik, 2015). Those identified with one minority group obtain more protection under legal discrimination acts than those who identify with more than two minority groups.

The legal institutions and legislation fail to protect those with multiple identities, in particular women with multiple identities. As stated by Lockhart and Mitchelll (2010), law and legal processes oppress women by failing to recognise a classification of Black women. This is due to the unequal sanction that establishing a new category for Black women may put them at a disproportionate advantage over Black men or white women (Crenshaw, 1990).

Further into intersectionality is structural intersectionality.

It is conditions of women of colour and their compound identity with race and gender that make experiences and incidents of domestic violence, rape and medical assistance not the same as white women (Crenshaw, 1991). Structural intersectionality can be illustrated by the battering of women. It is important to recognize that not all battered women are the same; it depends on views of domestic violence, services available, worldviews of the world, and the intersectionality of different cultural classes (race, age, sexuality, class, citizenship status) that help define a women (Danis & Bhandari, 2010) and her experience of

battering.

A study carried out by Crenshaw (1991) in shelters of battered woman showed battered women of colour had double burdens of “gender and class oppression” which is then combined with “racially discriminatory employment and housing practices” (p.1246).

The compounded identity for women of colour was not aided or covered by intervention policies. Intervention policies were centred on a “universal woman” (Danis & Lockhart, 2010, p.xxiii) whose experiences of domestic violence are different for women of different class and race, as they face different challenges (Crenshaw, 1991). This is evident in 1990 when amendment was made for the “marriage fraud provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (Crenshaw, 1991, p.1246). This act aims to keep safe and protect foreign individuals who are exposed and experience domestic violence first hand by United States citizens (Kandel, 2012), or by United States individuals whom women immigrated over to marry (Crenshaw, 1991). The marriage fraud provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act