Robert McNamara Paper
Robert McNamara was the longest-serving Secretary of Defense in American history. Between his appointment to the position by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 and his resignation during the administration of Lyndon Johnson in 1968, he oversaw the escalation of the Vietnam War and was perceived as one of the architects of the American effort. His memoir In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam details his role during this period and offers insight into the internal management of the war and his role and decision process in shaping policy. While it addresses other issues he faced as Defense Secretary, it generally only does so with regards to their relationship to the Vietnam War. The memoir is an attempt to contextualize
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McNamara’s first priority as Secretary had been to reevaluate the nuclear strategy. He applied his analytical techniques in reviewing the missile gap between the US and the Soviet Union. During the 1960 election, Kennedy had claimed that the American nuclear arsenal had fallen behind that of the Soviets. Within weeks of starting, McNamara determined that the US in fact had superiority. The nuclear strategy was modified from massive retaliation to flexible response, allowing more options in the employment of nuclear weapons with the hope of reducing the risk of catastrophe. Crises such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, Berlin, and missiles in Cuba dominated over Vietnam policy in these early days. Southeast Asia was seen as important, but not an area with a clearly defined policy in place. In 1961, there was fear of losing the region to communism. How to prevent that was unclear. McNamara felt that “the Indochina problem was intractable” and lacked a clear solution. There were no experts on the region in either the Eisenhower or Kennedy administrations. The perceived consequences of failure, communist domination in all of Southeast Asia, was so tremendous that it could and would justify an open commitment and deep involvement in
One of the key strengths of this book is the author's first-hand knowledge of the people, places, and events that he is writing about. He also supplemented this first-hand knowledge with extensive interviews. In one example, he elaborated on the "chain of command" in Vietnam, which began with General Paul Harkins (and William C. Westmoreland) to the CINCPAC (Admiral Harry Felt) and from CINCPAC to Washington. "Not once in their four years of mutual agony in Vietnam did Harkins's successor, General Westmoreland, pick up the telephone and call his commander-in-chief, President Lyndon B. Johnson. Westmoreland did not have the authority, he told me."(169) This information came directly from an interview with Westmoreland. There are other anecdotes similar to this with each contributing to the extensive nature of the book's detail.
The leadership styles, experience, personality, and temperament of Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy played a role in deepening the U.S. involvement and commitment to Vietnam. Both presidents vowed to stop the spread of communism, which was viewed as a direct assault to democracy, human rights, and capitalism. (Tucker, 1999) Both presidents also subscribed to the domino theory, or the belief that if one key country should fall to communism, then it would have a cascading effect on other countries turning to communism. (Divine, 1981) This theory was used by many presidents as the reason for ongoing support to the effort in Indochina.
Lawrence’s purpose in writing this book was concise and to the point. In recent history, due to the fall of the Soviet bloc, new information has been made available for use in Vietnam. As stated in the introduction, “This book aims to take account of this new scholarship in a brief, accessible narrative of the Vietnam War… It places the war within the long flow of Vietnamese history and then captures the goals and experiences of various governments that became deeply embroiled in the country during the second half of the twentieth century” (Lawrence, 3.) This study is not only about the American government and how they were involved in the Vietnam conflict, but highlights other such countries as France, China, and the Soviet Union. Lawrence goes on to say that one of his major goals in writing this book is to examine the American role in Vietnam within an international context (Lawrence, 4.) Again, this goes to show that the major purpose of Lawrence’s study included not only ...
In the history of the United States, foreign policy has caused many disputes over the proper role in international affairs. The views, morals and beliefs of Americans, makes them feel the need to take leadership of the world and help those countries who are in need. The foreign policies of President Eisenhower will eventually lead to the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War. President Eisenhower’s role in these policies was based on his military-type strategies to safeguard a victory in the Global Cold War. President Eisenhower’s foreign policies led to an effective involvement in the Cold War and enviably the Vietnam War from an American perspective.
JOHN F. KENNEDY IN VIETNAM There are many critical questions surrounding United States involvement in Vietnam. American entry to Vietnam was a series of many choices made by five successive presidents during these years of 1945-1975. The policies of John F. Kennedy during the years of 1961-1963 were ones of military action, diplomacy, and liberalism. Each of his decision was on its merits at the time the decision was made. The belief that Vietnam was a test of the Americas ability to defeat communists in Vietnam lay at the center of Kennedy¡¦s policy. Kennedy promised in his inaugural address, Let every nation know...that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty. From the 1880s until World War II, France governed Vietnam as part of French Indochina, which also included Cambodia and Laos. The country was under the formal control of an emperor, Bao Dai. From 1946 until 1954, the Vietnamese struggled for their independence from France during the first Indochina War. At the end of this war, the country was temporarily divided into North and South Vietnam. North Vietnam came under the control of the Vietnamese Communists who had opposed France and aimed for a unified Vietnam under Communist rule. Vietnamese who had collaborated with the French controlled the South. For this reason the United States became involved in Vietnam because it believed that if all of the country fell under a Communist government, Communism would spread throughout Southeast Asia and further. This belief was known as the domino theory. The decision to enter Vietnam reflected America¡¦s idea of its global role-U.S. could not recoil from world leadership. The U.S. government supported the South Vietnamese government. The U.S. government wanted to establish the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which extended protection to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in case of Communist subversion. SEATO, which came into force in 1955, became the way which Washington justified its support for South Vietnam; this support eventually became direct involvement of U.S. troops. In 1955, the United States picked Ngo Dinh Diem to replace Bao Dai as head of the anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam. Eisenhower chose to support Ngo Dinh Diem. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born in Brookline, Mass., on May 29, 1917. Kennedy graduated from Harvard University in 1940 and joined the Navy the next year.
A momentous decision would soon follow. On July 1965 175,000 U.S combat troops were to be sent by the end of the year to defend South Vietnam, and again, by the years end in 1966 another 200, 000 to be sent, understanding the likelihood of the wars coming to an end was slim to none, however, the fundamental logic expressed throughout was that Laos is the present Key to the entire area of South East Asia.
No one could have realized that what seemed as an insignificant gesture to partake in training South Vietnamese armies and America’s involvement in Southeast Asia would one day have the impact it did on America. Although at the time when Eisenhower was trying to stop of the spread of communism it seemed the right thing to do, the repercussions of that decision and the war it eventually led to was devastating to America politically, socially, and culturally.
President Dwight Eisenhower conditionally pledged to support South Vietnam’s new nation in 1955. In the time period between 1955-1961 the United States pumped seven billion dollars in aid so that Vietnam would not “go over quickly” like a “row of dominoes” (McNamara 31). In the next 6 years Vietnam would cost America billions of dollars, thousands of lives, and the disaffection of much of the United States public. Yet in the end, South Vietnam would fall to the North less than 2 years after the United States military involvement ceased.
Lawrence discusses how Abbot Low Moffat, who was the chief of the Division of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs for the State Department, believed that Southeast Asia and Indochina was of great importance to the U.S. and that its importance would continue to increase. The area was in a great location strategically for naval bases, and both Roosevelt and Moffat didn’t believe that France would be able to keep such an area stable. Moffat also argued that the French would never agree to follow the directions given by the U.S. that would help keep the area safe.
The speech that I chose to analyze and critique is from John Forbes Kerry “Vietnam Veterans Against the War” to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In this speech he did not represent himself, he represented the group of 1000 veterans that feels the same way he does about the war.
This book details the discussion of government policy in the stages of the Vietnam crisis from 1961-July 1965. It examines the main characters of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, in addition to the military, which included the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It began in the Kennedy era amidst the Bay of Pigs incident and how that led to mistrust of the military planning by advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It continues with Johnson and his administration making decisions over and over that continued to commit more and more involve...
President Harry Truman authorized economic and military aid to the French who were fighting to regain control of Laos and Cambodia along with Vietnam. The United States refused to accept the agreement the French had made to the creation of communist Vietnam North and South. President Eisenhower dispatched military advisors to train South Vietnamese Army and the CIA to conduct psychological warfare against the North.
...lanning certainly took on new urgency, focused mainly on how to integrate the American and NATO conventional buildup into existing and new plans. The Kennedy administration in particularly was keen on restarting work in LIVE OAK, on the basis of what they hoped would be a new NATO strength proportional to the new American strength. But their hopes were dashed on the realities of Alliance politics, as both the NATO buildup and renewed contingency planning consistently fell short of what the Americans expected. Not only were the Allies unwilling to spend the money and resources necessary to increase their conventional strength on the front lines, but they were also concerned that such a buildup would undermine nuclear deterrence, and thus were intent on getting Kennedy’s assurance that the basis of NATO strategy, i.e. early use of nuclear weapons, was still in place.
Nonetheless, most of his trips abroad were connected with European countries and visits to Asian states were rare. As it has been already mentioned earlier, while D. Eisenhower was personally acquainted with the political leadership of South Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson hadn’t got the possibility to get to know Southern Vietnamese leaders. As a result, it is sometimes argued that in times of deteriorating crisis in Vietnam the United States lacked the president who was well aware of the specifics of the East Asian region, its history and
Vietnam was a struggle which, in all honesty, the United States should never have been involved in. North Vietnam was battling for ownership of South Vietnam, so that they would be a unified communist nation. To prevent the domino effect and the further spread of communism, the U.S. held on to the Truman Doctrine and stood behind the South Vietnamese leader, Diem.