Hobbes Punishment Theory

Norrie, Alan. 1984. “Thomas Hobbes And the Philosophy of Punishment.” Law and Philosophy 3(2): 299. Alan Norrie, Professor at the University of Warwick, presents a systematic examination of Hobbes’s philosophy of punishment with the intention of demonstrating its connection to the development of modern punishment theory. Norrie begins by attempting to address the contradiction between the sovereigns right to punish and the individual’s inalienable right to self-preservation. Although punishment seems to be the central function of the sovereign, it is described as the infliction of an evil, which no individual of sound and rational mind would ever agree to. Thus, it seems implausible (even impossible) that rational beings would consent to their

307). Subsequently, he denies the possibility that the sovereign could maintain his natural right without the consent of his subjects. In this situation, every act of punishment would constitute a return to the state of nature. Ultimately, Norrie concludes that Hobbes’s attempt to rectify this contradiction is inadequate. Subsequently, the author proceeds to compare Hobbes’s punishment theory to modern retributivist and utilitarian theories. In terms of its retributivist elements, the social contract serves as an individual qualification for punishment because the individual enters into an agreement directed by their own reason. In other words, the subject “establishes a law for himself, and his punishment for crime is his ‘own act’ returning to him” (pg. 314). Hobbes punishment theory also contains clear utilitarian elements as well. For example, the purpose of punishment is that “the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience” and maintains the “possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Laws…”

Judd Owen, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory University, attempts to defend the liberal interpretation of Hobbes’s political philosophy by demonstrating his promotion of a “liberal politics of toleration” (pg. 133). Owen begins by asking the following question: “How can Hobbes’s political philosophy be directed to a tolerant regime, and yet be hostile to the granting of unconditional freedoms or rights?” (pg. 134). In truth, those who enter into a commonwealth via the social contract forfeit almost all of the rights and liberties that they possessed in the state of nature (except the right to self-defense). However, Owen proceeds to explicate how the aim of Hobbes’s civil society is not the alienation of individual liberties (although individual rights are in fact alienated). Rather, this forfeiture of rights is only a means by which to secure the greatest amount of liberty that can actually be enjoyed by the individual. In other terms, human beings possess unrestricted liberty rights in the state of nature, but they are neither free enough nor secure enough to enjoy them without constant threat of violence or death. Thus, individuals consent to engage in civil society because it is the only condition in which they can enjoy a modicum of liberty and true freedom of will. Although the subjects of a commonwealth must give up their claims to absolute liberty, the sovereign authority and civil law allow for a great deal of individual toleration. For example,