Variables Impacting Congressional Oversight As the oversight literature covers a broad expanse of topics in regards to it, it is best to start with one of the earliest articles on congressional oversight written in 1966. John Bibby in his observational study of Congress tries to find when a committee will engage in oversight and when they will shirk those duties and why? Bibby lays the groundwork for an analysis of congressional oversight specifically the features and degree of oversight activity. Bibby finds that these factors will determine Congresses engagement in oversight. The methods that Bibby uses are different than those that come later in the study of congressional oversight in that he does not use any type of model but uses observations …show more content…
of the internal procedures of the senate committees that he is studying and their relations with their jurisdictional committees (Bibby, 1966). He also conducts interviews of those involved with the committees that he is studying which is a technique that is not seen in the other literature. This basic method of studying congress through observation is why I believe that it is the foundation to which all other studies of congressional oversight should start. It does not run complicated models but it does set an easily used framework in which one could use to analysis any congress throughout time. It is extremely generalizable in its simplicity. The work that Bibby does here could be used to create a model predicting how a certain committee within Congress will be on oversight because of his findings on the internal factors that influence oversight behavior. He finds several internal factors that will contribute to whether or not committees will engage with their oversight powers. As Bibby names them they are: the chairman and his style of leadership, subcommittee structure, staffing, committee recruitment patterns, member interest in committee work, and the members' conception of the committee's function (Bibby 1966). Each of these factors has a different type of influence on oversight but they all have the same basic function in either increasing or decreasing the amount of oversight. Even as internal factors influence congressional oversight there are other factors within not only congress as a whole but within specific legislators and the electoral system that has a high likelihood of changing whether or not congress actually engages in oversight. The ability to do legislative work and economize on oversight being chief among them (Weingast and Moran 1983) Congressional Oversight and Congress Congressional oversight is fundamentally different than the other functions of Congress. It is not like the legislative duties in that if Congress does not engage in oversight they are not seen as dysfunctional or broken by the public. Even if scholars sees this neglect of oversight as a failure the viewpoint does not seep into the public viewpoint making it necessary for Congress to engage in it as often as scholars think they should. When it comes to congress actively deciding to engage in oversight there are decisions that have to be made. After first deciding that they need to actually engage in oversight of an agency, which has its own set of factors, they need to determine which type of oversight technique they will use. McCubbins and Schwartz present a theory that congress does not neglect its congressional oversight functions but rather they prefer the fire alarm style to police patrol oversight. Police Patrol oversight is the more active form of oversight in which congress takes the lead on studying executive agencies and their behavior in order to find noncompliance and then fix the violations. Fire alarm oversight is less active and relies on other outside forces to bring to attention to violations that they can then hold investigations and hearings to fix (1984). Through their model and by presenting real life evidence they find support for their idea of congress having a preference of fire-alarm oversight over police-patrol oversight. This is a major contribution to the literature of congressional oversight in that this debunks the misperception of congress’s neglect. Despite this, however many still operate on the assumption that Congress is in fact neglecting their duties rather than having a rational preference that makes them more effective and efficient at all of their jobs within Congress. This preference for fire alarm oversight is supported later in 1995 by David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran” in which they also use a formal model. Their model is that interest groups provide legislators with information about bureaucratic policy behaviors (Epstein and O’Halloran 1995). This reception of information as in line with the preference of Congress for reactive oversight as they do not have to use any of their already limited time in order to discover bad or outlier behaviors by agencies. They also present the police patrol versus fire alarm method of congressional oversight dichotomy that McCubbins and Schwartz initially mention. Their findings are that interest groups reduce the asymmetric information gap between congress and the bureaucracy that McCubbins, Noll and Weingast also mention as a problem in conducting oversight in general. By getting rid of this gap of knowledge and time Congress is more likely to want to engage in oversight. If constituents or groups with similar interest to their constituents are bringing forth an issue within an agency that they think needs to be addressed Congress then has a reason to engage in oversight. At this point oversight has a net benefit to them with a drastically lowered cost then if they had to institute the entire process themselves. Thus having lowered cost is an important aspect of whether or not congress will decide to engage in oversight. Contrary to the beliefs of these scholars on Congresses relationship with oversight that it is mainly a function of preference Brian Feinstein disagrees. Feinstein finds that congress members preference against oversight subcommittees as they are more likely to hold freshmen members and have a high transfer rate. This brings forward they idea that members do not prioritize oversight and that the lack of oversight is not simply cause by time and informational constraints but a general reluctance to pursue oversight. This aligns with conventional wisdom. This lack of interest in serving on oversight subcommittees also counters the assumptions that they prefer fire-alarm as an alternative to having to always be diligent. It supposes that if members lack this much interest in oversight that they will not want to do it in any circumstances including if all the harder more time-consuming work is already competed. This reluctance could also affect the deterrent affect of oversight against misbehaving agencies as how good will the oversight be with such reluctant members carrying it out (Feinstein 2011). Effectiveness of Congressional Oversight Feinstein concludes after he studies member’s subcommittee behaviors that members are really reluctant to engage in oversight and that this may affect the effectiveness of overall oversight.
Even though fire-alarm oversight most likely ends in a hearing that does not mean that the hearing will not get the proper responsiveness from executive branch officials. As mentioned in the previous section this lessons the deterrent effect of fire-alarm oversight (Feinstein 2011). This leads to the conclusion that fire-alarm oversight should not check the box of congress actually performing their oversight duties. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast come to similar conclusion about how effective congress actually is in their oversight. Their work is based on the premise that members of congress, bureaucrats, and the president all have personal policy preferences that more than likely will conflict with each other. If there is not effective control than the bureaucracies will project their own preferences that are not aligned with congresses, which is when oversight needs to happen, if it has failed to this point. The deterrence effect of oversight is determined by the likelihood of punishment. A system of reward and punishment they say is also unlikely to deter noncompliance because of the information gap inherent in the system. If the agent who is specializing in an issue has more complete information on the policy it makes agency discretion harder to detect (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast …show more content…
1987). This is where monitoring would take place, but we know that congress members are reluctant to engage in this type of oversight (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). The seriousness of the noncompliance problem determines if there will be monitoring, a form of oversight (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987).
Monitoring and sanctions are the more costly of oversight functions and the least likely to be used; they also do not ensure that the noncompliance problem will end. (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987) This follows with McCubbins and Schwartz who theorize that members of congress do not neglect monitoring and their oversight functions but that they prefer the fire-alarm policing in which citizens tend to alert them to problems because it allows them to also do their legislative work (1984). Monitoring along with its economic costs also has political costs if an action that an agency takes in its noncompliance creates a new political interest then by sanctioning them members can incur political costs that would not have otherwise been present with proper anticipation and prevention. (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987) Anticipatory prevention of noncompliance is a form of latent control that congress can exercise that is more effective; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast develop a theory that includes this finding, “Latent oversight is, by definition, never observed; but its role in implementing political control over the agency is in principle just as important as that of active control (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989).” This often occurs when the agent fears sanction in the case of this theory developed the veto, this point would
be set by congress before the agent takes action making it an important part of control. If congress has control then they do not need oversight as often (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989). This type of oversight is the most effective form of oversight even over the more preferred version, “fire-alarm,” which is found to not be the savior of congressional oversight that McCubbins and Schwartz claims it to be (Feinstein 2011)(1984). It is interesting that in the literature of congressional oversight the most effective form of oversight is the one that cannot be completely observed. It is also telling that latent oversight is often a function of the legislative duty of Congress. This is the duty that is preferred by congress. Latent oversight is also the least consequential form of oversight possibly because it is the hardest to observe and it has both formal and informal components (Ogul 1976). In the next section the consequences of many of the forms of oversight will be explored and it will give more insight into why Congress makes certain decisions regarding oversight.
Chapter 3 gives you the current (according to the book) issues in rulemaking. It delves upon public participation problems, the quantity/quality of rules coming through Congress and agencies as well as control.
Most individuals with a general background knowledge of the United States Federal Government system are aware that in order for a bill to become a law, it must first pass a majority vote in Congress. There is, however, a very important step in the legislative process that sometimes goes unnoticed. The committee system of the legislation process ensures that the appropriate attention is given to each bill introduced to Congress. Each member of both chambers are assigned to committees and subcommittees, and are expected to become subject matter experts in their respective roles as committee members.
As seen quite often in the Obama administration, legislation gets stuck and lost in Congress due to the polarization of the parties in recent years. In Obama’s case, he has frequently threatened to go around the House and Senate if they could not reach an agreement or would shoot down his plans. Cato’s Pilon points out, however, that the hurdles of Congress are no mistake. Pilot states that the framer’s of the Constitution knew what they were doing, and this was intended to keep the checks and balances as well as accountability to the public (Lyons,
In the past century, people continued to express an increasingly discontent view of Congress especially true when one looks back before the Clinton Impeachment debacle As the size of the nation and the number of congressman have grown, the congress has come under attack by both public influences and congressman themselves. Yet looking at one congressman's relationship with his or her constituents, it would be hard to believe that this is the branch of government that has come under suspect. In “If Ralph Nader says congress is 'The broken branch,' how come we love our congressman so much?” author Richard F. Fenno, Jr., provides insight into this view and why, through congress coming under fire, constituents still feel positively about there congressmen. Although congress is often criticized, its fine tuned functioning is essential in checking the power of congress without hindering the making of legislation.
Stemming from a loose interpretation of the Constitution – and specifically the necessary and proper clause -- congressional oversight is one of many enumerated powers bestowed upon Congress per Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. As the legislative body, Congress is charged with overseeing the inner workings of the Executive Branch and its federal agencies as a part of a system of checks and balances. However, as previously mentioned, this power is one of the implied powers of Congress, thus making it very difficult for many to delineate rightful oversight from reckless meandering. In the Constitution, for example, there is no singular mention of a definitive power such as “congressional oversight.” Consequently, there is no clear set of goals or practices through which Congress can oversee the executive branch. This is where things can become slightly tricky, however.
In conclusion, even though some of the Congress processes and its structure seem to be made to slow things down and to reduce effectiveness, they exist to, as discussed in class, protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority. After all, one of the main objectives of having a government is to create a balanced society, and to reduce the chances of having social convulsion and anarchy.
Power is the main influence on Congress members. Without power there would not be a need of money, people wanting the best career for reasons other than to be successful, and Republican and Democratic parties who dominate all parties who have other views. Power is great or marked ability to do or act, strength, might, force. A certain member or party who has a lot of force in Congress can persuade other Congress men or women to vote for what they are told. The people who are tricked into schemes tend to be young members or those seeking approval and power themselves. These plans and wishes for control can cause loss of confidence and criticism of government, not only Congress. If members are found guilty of pressuring, paying money, among other things they can be brought to trial. In the end, this costs the country money to hold a trial that will most likely go to supreme court who have enough trials to take care of. Not all Congress members play mind games and vote for what they believe is best for the public good. The hard part is voting for who you believe is the best fit to make those decisions.
...ilities of Congress is that minorities and factions exist: dissent takes place, not disagreements. Verbal brawls take place rather than actual argumentation, and that is what kills democracy. That is why things never get done.
Bureaucratic agencies give information on the subject of the bill pressuring the congressional committees to listen to the interest groups and to pass the legislature.
The Constitution gives powers to Congress in order to execute its many responsibilities. These responsibilities are necessary and proper for carrying out its policies such as, imposing taxes and regulating interstate commerce. The constitution has 435 members in the House and 100 more in Senate. Congress faces issues with action problems and the solution to correcting these collective problems are at the expense of the incentive members. The Cabinet, President, state and federal courts, political groups, media, etc. all have input when determining a political decision in the United States. Open arrangement is an objective arranged strategy that the legislature follows in managing an issue or issue in the nation. Open approaches are focused around law; however numerous individuals other than officials set them. People, gatherings, and even government organizations that don 't follow strategies can be punished. This confounded procedure has been concluded with an anticipated arrangement of steps.
Norman Ornstein is regarded as one of our nation's foremost experts on Congress. Mr. Ornstein received a Ph.D.. from the University of Michigan, he writes for the NewYork Times, USA Today, Washington Post, and he has a regular column in Roll Call newspaper called 'Congress Inside Out';. Mr. Ornstein is also an election analyst for CBS and appears frequently on television shows including the Today Show, Nightline and the Mac Neil/Lehre News Hour where he has been a consultant and contributor for
Many Americans in today's society will find it difficult to answer the question of what Congress exactly does and why it exists. Others simply don't care and see Congress as a failed system where nothing gets done. Lee Hamilton, in his book Why Congress Works and Why you Should Care, proves these people wrong and gives an insider's look at what Congress actually does do and how it affects every American each day.
These pluralistic interest groups are free to operate and lobby in the political arena, fighting against the majority and other competing factions for voice in Congress. With the influence of multiple factions operating throughout the political system, a balance of power is created (Kernell 2000, 429). This is much like the international theory of sovereign states balancing each other’s power to create a political system that focuses on stability, yet is always in a constant flux of power. With this in mind, special interest groups are constantly contending for power by raising money, campaigning, and lobbying in Congress. When a special interest group is threatened by a competing policy, the group will organize efforts to balance, or transcend the power of the competing group.
Light, Paul C., and Christine L. Nemacheck. "Chapter 7 Congress." Government by the People, Brief 2012 Election Edition, Books a La Carte New Mypoliscilab With Etext Access Card Package. By David B. Magleby. 2012 Election Edition ed. N.p.: Pearson College Div, 2013. N. pag. Print.
Gross states that it is inevitable “that executive officials in times of crisis will act extra constitutionally” (713). Since this is expected, in Gross’ opinion, it is necessary to give legislators the authority to “act extra legally when they believe that such action is necessary for protecting the nation and the public” (713). Gross argues that, as long the legislators “openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their actions” (713) this is a benefit for society (713). Gross defends his arguments by reminding us that by requiring legislators to be transparent with their extra-constitutional actions, they subject themselves to the “judgment of the people” (714). In doing so, the legislators must fairly represent the citizens that they speak for; otherwise they run the risk of not being elected, this in turn will avoid the “abuse of executive powers”