A man named Edward Strief was arrested by detective Douglas Fackrell during an anyonoymys tip relating to the sales of drugs at a nearby residence. Fackwell witnesed Edwad coming outside the residence that he was watching for two weeks. Fackwell then decided to stop and detain Strief as he was walking out. In addition, Strief had a warrant out for his arrest which was deemed “outstanding”. In addition, the deective discovered methamphetamine and a pipe used for drugs. Stried fought it in court claiming the search was unreasonable because the officer has no suspicion., thus affirming the exclusonary rule. According to the district court , the detective conducted an unlawful investigative stop, but the evdience found justifies incident to arrest. …show more content…
The Utah Court affirmed their the disitrct corts decision and ruled the evidence as admissable. However,ther Utah Supreme Court ruled revered the decision and suprresed thed evidience stating that “attenuation exception” in relation to the exclusjonary rule does no justifiy incident to arrest, thus the exeption is exlcuded. According to the majorirty of th Supreme JSuitice’s an illegal stop is justified and the exlcuonsary rules does not apply if the suspect has an outstanding arrest warnt and that the misconduct was not blatlant. In other words, “the exlcusuon outweights its befnefits”. In addition, calucalting the dsiitance from the arrest to theresidence and its further anyalysis is suffeicnt enough to jsutifiy the arrest and clarify the evidence as asmissable (suffiecntly attenuated). In this case, the exlcuujonsary rule did not help Edward
In this case, the Supreme Court decision in reversing the decision of the trail court. Although the suspects were conducting an illegal crime, the officers were reckless in the procedures in collecting the evidence. In this case, if there was a report or call concerning the drug activities in the apartment, being that the Police Department was conducting a the drug sting, it would have justified the reasoning behind the officers kicking the door in and securing suspects and evidence.
The issue that this case raises, is whether or not the officers had the right to search the car of a person who they just arrested, while the person is handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car?
The Supreme Court ruled that due to the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police, no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination Clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect has been made aware to his rights and the suspect had then waived them
Facts: On November 2006 the Miami-Dade police department received an anonymous tip that the home of Joelis Jardines was been used to grow marihuana. On December 2006 two detectives along with a trained drug sniffing dog approached Jardines home. At the front door the dog signaled for drugs, as well as the detective who smelled the marihuana coming from inside. Detectives then wrote an affidavit and obtained a search warrant that confirmed the growth of marihuana in Jardine’s home. Jardines was then charged for drug trafficking. Jardines then tried to suppress all evidence and say that in theory during the drug sniffing dog was an illegal search under the 4th amendment. The trial courts then ruled to suppress all evidence, the state appellate courts then appealed and reversed, the standing concluding that there was no illegal search and the dog’s presence did not require a warrant. The Florida supreme court then reverse the appellate court’s decision and concluded that a dog sniffing a home for investigativ...
This case is about Scott Randolph, who’s home was searched without a warrant. Due to this “corrupted” search, police ended up finding cocaine in his home. As a matter of fact both Randolph and his wife Janet Randolph were present during the search, it’s stated that Randolph’s wife gave permission to search the house. However Randolph denied to give that consistent, but police believed that the wife’s permission was all they needed. After the encounter with the drugs, Randolph was arrested for drug possession. This case was taken to trail and both the appellate court and Georgie Supreme court believed that the search of Randolph's home was unconstitutional.
Defenders of the Miranda decision say that fewer crimes solved are for a good reason. They believe that law enforcement officers were forced to stop coercive questioning techniques that are unconstitutional. Over the years, the Supreme Court has watered down its stance in saying that the Miranda rules are not constitutional obligations, but rather “prophylactic” safeguards intended to insure that officers do not force a confession from a suspect. The need for both effective law enforcement as well as protection of society dictates the need for potential alternatives to the limitations of Miranda that would simultaneously protect the interest of society in effective law enforcement while at the same time providing protection to suspects against unconstitutional force (www.ncpa.org).
Hicks is like the search of Justin Meyers home conducted by police in the fictional case in the text book. In both searches police were in the defendant’s homes and were searching for specific items, and during that search items were found that implicated the defendants in other crimes. There are several differences between the two cases. First, the severity of the crimes. Hicks’s case involved the theft of stereo equipment, while Myers case involved murder. Second, the search of Hicks home did not include a search warrant, and in Meyers case the police did have a search warrant. In Myers case, police had a lawful search warrant to search for drugs and drug paraphernalia. During that search police located a bloody rag, which was sent for testing. The results of this test revealed the blood belonged to a murder victim, implicating Myers for suspicion of murder. Although the police did have a search warrant, the warrant only listed drugs, and paraphernalia. This arises several questions. First where was the bloody rag found? Second, did the police have probable cause that Meyers was under suspicion of murder? Or was it simply a case of reasonable suspicion? In my opinion the results of the tests performed on the bloody rag found in Meyers case should not be admissible since Myers was not under suspicion of murder, and the bloody rag was not included in the lawful search warrant. The search is not considered legal, and not covered under the plain site doctrine. Myer’s fourth amendment protection against illegal search and seizure was violated by testing the bloody
After arriving at Miss Mapp’s residence and failed to gain permission to enter the residence the three Cleveland police officers should have gone to the DA and retrieved a real search warrant. The fact that they tried to pass off a piece of paper as a search warrant is useless and everything that they find cannot be used against her in court. All of the paraphernalia regarding the bombing that they found is useless because of the pursuant search warrant. Because Miss Mapp did not answer the door when they came back they forced their way into the house and conducted an illegal search. When Miss Mapp’s attorney arrived the police officers would not let the attorney into the house. When Miss Mapp grabbed the purported search warrant the police officers struggled with her to retrieve it and did. Miss Mapp was then placed under arrest as the police conducted a widespread search of the residence wherein obscene materials were found in a trunk in the basement. Miss Mapp was convicted of possessing these material...
According to the Justice Kagan, in the case of Florida vs. Harris, “we considered how a court should determine if the “alert” of drug-detention during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle” (Kagan).
Mann (2004) is another precedent setting Supreme Court case, whose main issue dealt with search and seizure laws that infringed upon Phillip Mann’s rights that are guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The issue that was brought before the court was if the investigative detention against Mann was a violation of his section 8 Charter rights, which states that “everyone has the right to be secure against an unreasonable search and seizure”. The purpose of the search was to determine if Mann was in possession of illegal weapons because it so happened to be that he was in the same place a crime scene investigation for a burglary was happening and coincidentally matched the suspect description. While police were searching Mann, the officer felt a soft bag in Mann’s sweater pocket. Even though the officer was aware they were only investigating for weapons, the officer intentionally pulled out the bag of Marijuana and arrested Mann immediately. This case went to the Supreme Court, where the court stated that “investigative detention was definitely reasonable given that Mann matched the suspect description and was close to the crime scene, but it was not done for valid objective because the cops could only search for officer safety- once soft object was felt, there was no risk (i.e was not a gun)- ultimately determining that the officer should not have pulled the bag out of Mann’s pocket, resulting in the Supreme Court ruling that the search
Elsen, Sheldon, and Arthur Rosett. “Protections for the Suspect under Miranda v. Arizona.” Columbia Law Review 67.4 (1967): 645-670. Web. 10 January 2014.
The Court sets up their argument by listing two competing concerns which must be accommodated in defining a voluntary consent. They are the legitimate need for such searches and the requirement of assuring the absence of coercion. The Court digresses from the case at hand with the first concern. The facts of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte indicate that the suspects were stopped for the violation of having lights burned out on their automobile. Given these circumstances there is no legitimate need to search for further evidence. All the proof needed to give a ticket for...
...anded a need for subjective question of information into the definite trust of the police officers. The Supreme Court remanded the case return to the previous lower power courts authoritative instruction to decide on the case in a court of law (based) implementing on the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness test.
I observed the officer claim that when he questions the defendant, he felt as if he was off. The victim gives a full detail report to the officer, describing what the person looked like and everything. One of the officers had taken his picture, and sent one to the transit police, to see if it was the same person they were looking for. In the meantime, the woman officer was interrogating him about where he has been and of prescription medication that was discovered in his bag. However, the defendant lied about why his taking the medicine. I observed that the police mentioned the defendant was very yielding and being extremely corporative. The officer mentioned that he took him to the hospital for psych assessment being that he was acting odd, so they kept him because of strange behavior. I observed the officer mention that from there, they got a report that the defendant was the same person they were looking at in the pictures. It was at the hospital that they arrested the defendant.
In summation, there is no real way to dismiss the utilization of certain rules to protect and or eliminate evidence. The defendant must preserve his or her constitutional rights. The prosecution and investigators must also be accountable to these rights to ensure that the judicial system in this nation does not become a mêlée of wrongful or unfair convictions, which may be motivated by speed and necessity, rather than good experienced police and legal work. It is also important to note that many legal violations of the disclosure laws and events that would obtain the use of the exclusionary rule have ended in false convictions, giving further proof to the efficacy of the law. The rules for presenting evidence are designed to help the court and jury establish truth and administer justice (Paul B. Watson, 1986).