Issue
The issue is whether Paul can evict George at will i.e. Does George have an interest in the property? Or is he merely a licencee?
It is evident that George has no legal interest in the property, as his name is not on the title deed, and the house is registered only in Rose and Paul’s names as joint tenants.
Since Rose has died, the legal title now solely belongs to Paul as the Right of Survivorship (‘Jus Accresendi’) applies.
Rules/ Principles
Equitable interest is when an occupier whose name does not appear on the title deed i.e. appears “off the land register” still have some rights. In law, equity is a concept of fairness, justice and good conscience.
Trust is a legal device/ mechanism where the trustee, who is typically
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Licence is mere permission to be on the land.
There are four different types of licences namely- contractual licence, licence by way of estoppel, licence coupled with an interest and lastly bare licence.
A contractual licence is the most powerful, and it is a permission to use or occupy land based on an express or implied contract.
Licence by way of estoppel is a verbal agreement, which consists of promise, reliance, detriment loss, and unfairness.
Estoppel occurs when a party “reasonably relies on the promise of another party, and because of that reliance is injured or damaged.”
Licence coupled with an interest is a licence that grants an interest in land or in personal property, i.e. when a person mortgages his house to the bank.
Bare licence is the weakest among all four types of licences. Specific to property law, bare licence refers to permission given to a person to enter another’s property for that person’s benefit, and this permission can be retracted at any time.
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It is highly probable that George’s financial contribution from the sale of his flat has directly increased the value of Paul’s house. [William & Glyns Bank v Boland (1981)] [Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1989)]
In the case of William & Glyns Bank v Boland (1981), a husband was the registered sole legal owner of the matrimonial home. His wife had made contributions to the purchase, but she had failed to register her rights in equity as a minor interest.
However, the court ruled that her interest in the property was still protected as an overriding interest due to the fact that she had both equitable interest in the property and was also an occupant in the property.
In the case of Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1991), Mr Rosset purchased solely in his name a house that needed renovation.
Mrs Rosset and the builders shared the work, which started prior to the completion. Mrs Rosset claimed an overriding interest in the house, based on the fact that she had equitable interest and was an actual occupant in the house. However, she had difficulty proving these
The failure to talk to the justice of the peace is not evidence of fraud; see Young v Hoger [2001] QCA 453 at [26]. The other conduct by the agents did not amount to fraud either as a result the court finds in favor of the plaintiff thus requiring Mr Gray to pay the mortgage and pursue legal action against SHELLA LONERGAN in pursuit of recovery of funds, as Fraud must be shown to have been practised against the person who seek relief who in this case is Mr
Gummow and Bell JJ concluded that clause 1 of the Deed signed Rural’s debts and its interests under the loan agreements to Equuscorp. Their Honours observed that the phrase “other remedies for these matters” located in clause 2 assigned a claim in restitution for money had and received . Heydon J agreed with this decision on similar grounds .
Jones was party to the contract and mortgage together with Mrs Jones as surety for her husband, even though Mrs Jones was the actual owner of the property. This produced a legal consequence as it affected the appellants with a conduct on the part of the husband in relation to his wife which raised equities in her favour against the indication of a mortgage. The husband exercised undue influence on Mrs Jones to procure her signature to the mortgage which consisted of no consideration. The plaintiff brought proceedings against the defendant upon a contract to pay interest and principal contained in the mortgage over the property at Walkerville owned by Mrs Jones. It was understood that Mrs Jones executed the mortgage without understanding the effect of the contract and presumed various false misrepresentations. She argued that the mortgage which she s...
Tooher, Joycey, ‘Jubilant Jamie and the Elephant Egg: Acquisition of Title by Finding’ (1998) 6 Australian Property Law Journal 117
If the partnership was found to exist - the application of the three elements of s5 of the Partnership Act 1958 (Vic), two parties carrying on a business in common with a view to profit, there would be joint liability between the two parties of Williams and Goudberg. The main discussion point in this case was whether the “carrying on a business” element was in existence to establish a partnership. Relevant law relied on by the judge(s) in making their decision According to the Partnership Act 1958 (Vic) s5, the judge Maxwell P analysed whether Goudberg and Williams was in a partnership at the period when Williams had a contract with Herniman. S5 includes three elements that need to be satisfied in order for partnership to exist: carrying on business, in common and with a view of profit.
Rather, the Court finds and rules that the duty to pay the bi-annual assessment is an equitable servitude. It is the rule in the Commonwealth that a previous grantee's promise to make annual payments connected with land may impose on the granted premises an equitable servitude enforceable against the subsequent owner taking title with actual or constructive notice of the obligation, even where the equitable servitude calls for the payment of money. It is an indisputable fact that Plaintiffs' took title to the Property with full knowledge of the existence of the Association; moreover, they certainly had constructive—if not actual—notice of their obligations to the Association. Therefore, there exists an equitable servitude that requires Plaintiffs to pay the assessments as the previous owners
Both a licensee and an invitee have the permission by the owner to be on the premises. However, a licensee enters a business or property having no business there. For example if I stop at a gas station to ask for directions or use the restroom. I have no business there or is shopping there. An invitee, enters a business or property, but benefits the owner. For example, I stop at the gas station and buy an item or get gas. I am benefiting the owner because I am purchasing something. An invitee could also be me going to the park because it’s for the community and it’s available for all the public to go there.
In the case between Arnholt vs. Carlisle, William Arnholt the plaintiff in this case filed a complaint against John Carlisle, the defendant in this case in order to seek the title to the disputed property on the grounds of adverse possession after a dispute broke out (Bagley, 2016, p. 572). So the two biggest issues to take out of this case are zoning and adverse possession.
Monetary value is however indicative of property as evidenced by Yanner v. Eaton’s example of debt as property. The initial issues in Hoiland v. Brown similarly regard the deliberation of whether a chattel “left in the possession” of another for their “use” constituted a gift or a resulting trust. While the chattel in Hoiland was found to constitute a gift, it can be distinguished from the facts at hand because the claimant satisfied the onus to prove that “there was indicia of a gift.” A contributing factor to this finding was that the chattel had never been in possession of the purchaser. In contract to the fact of this case, Brenda did have possession of the eggs both before and after the purchase. They were put in her cart, paid for and subsequently retained by Brenda. It is only after the eggs were put in Brenda’s car and driven to Wendy’s apartment that the eggs were relinquished from Brenda’s possession into the care of Wendy. When the eggs Brenda purchased were left in the possession of Wendy Brenda gave the impression that they were for her use but, as indicated above, never indicated the intent to transfer full title and beneficial interest to Wendy. Supported by persuasive case law found in Yanner, it seems Brenda’s actions imply that she intends to hold beneficial interest proportionate to her
One of the special concepts in land law is of overriding interests. The standard practice in the English land law is all the interest and rights affecting or is binding over particular a land should be registered in the Register. However, the concept of overriding interest denotes that there are interests which are binding on the owner (the registered proprietor) regardless of not being formally registered. It was introduced because in that era it was though that it would be unreasonable and unjust to overlook such rights and interest enjoyed. Overriding interests need not be registration to bind the legal owner of the land. Therefore, if the land is sold to another person the interests and rights would not be lost. It can be said that overriding by nature are unregistered if they are registered they will cease to be an overriding interest.
4.1 – The facts provided my client (Mr Ziebell) agrees with the removal of the tower due to size stimulated was approximately double in size witch was never agreed upon. In regards to the second structure there was no mention at all that Opfone needed or wanted to build a second structure. 4.2 – In regards to In Downing v WIN, we can differentiate the differences between the current facts were there was never any mention about a separate brick building were as Downing v WIN it was evidently a specification of the agreed terms. This shall support and determine that our client (Mr Ziebell) had not indented to give permission to build a second building. Due to this Opfone is in breach for conducting a third party that consisted outside of the projected terms of the original understanding between Mr Ziebell and Opfone, there for it is direct and not a substantial loss.
part of the Doctrine Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd V Heller and. Partners Ltd (1964), Rondel V Worsley (1969).
Licensing occurs when a firm pays a fee and enters into a licensing agreement giving it the rights to another company's product, resulting in the rights to make or sell that company's product.
Promissory estoppel cases arise from a doctrine of contract law, enabling a damaged party to recover compensation due to consequences of a promise that wasn't kept. Promissory estoppel aids the party who relies on a promise of another party and experiences loss because the promise wasn't honored. The purpose of promissory estoppel was to prevent the promisor from reneging on the promise they made, being unable to claim that the original promise, should not be legally enforced. Promissory estoppel deters the promisor from disputing the promise which the promisee depended on.
Victorian Stevedoring & General. Contracting Co Pty Ltd & Meakes v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73