Dbq Pearl Harbor

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941, a mysterious aircraft circled overhead U.S. navy’s most important naval base at Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. Many personnel misunderstood the situation as a naive pilot flying in unauthorized areas until additional planes appeared atop with red circles, which were promulgated as the rising sun, the Japanese symbol for war (Wukovits 8). However, this “surprise” attack came with a reason: The U.S. had been at political odds with Japan for over a decade, as it had ceased importing oil shipments from Japan. Although the military tried to defend themselves to their utmost power, America was not prepared enough. Bombs were dropped, destroying infrastructure, killing 2,403 civilians and wounding 1,178 others (Kiong 1). Franklin D. Roosevelt, and navy personnel could have prevented these losses. In retrospect,there were many prognostications that, if were scrutinized more meticulously, the United States government could have used to prepare

for the attack on Pearl Harbor, saving infrastructure, military personnel, and thousands of civilians.
The U.S.

perspective of Japan’s power was both inaccurate and underestimated. Japan and China were in a war, and rather than in Japan, the U.S. had interests in China. On top of that, it supplied no respect to the Japanese in China either. By submitting to the economic reprisals on trade administered by the U.S., “not only would Japan's prestige be entirely destroyed and the solution of the China Affair rendered impossible, but Japan's existence itself would be endangered” (Kiong 2). Japan needed a way to sustain itself, and having two of the most powerful nations against it did not support its case. In order to save its nation, Japan started spreading propaganda about the U.S. Even though Japan asked to restart the shipments, the U.S. refused to have any affiliations with it. Hence, their brash attitude and underestimation of Japan elicited the foreign nation’s inclination for revenge. However, this was not the only indication that Japan was going to retaliate (Wukovits

25).
Moreover, the nominal amount that military personnel in Pearl Harbor did report was overlooked by others. While on a routine sweep of the harbor entrance, Ensign R.C. McCloy spotted a mysterious periscope two miles away and sent word to USS Ward, who searched, but found nothing. Hence, headquarters was not apprised of the incident. (Wukovits 45). In Washington D.C., a few people from the government intercepted a Japanese message that demanded a note to be handed to the president at exactly 1 p.m. Although George Marshall figured it had something to do with the Pacific Coast and sent an alert, hindrances slowed the message and consequently, it was not received until after the attack had began (Wukovits 45). Also, radar operators spotted a large formation of aircrafts approaching. They phoned in to Pearl Harbor, but the response was that those were indubitably the American B-17 bombers that were expected that morning (Wukovits 46). Hence, no attention was provided to them.
Similarly, but distinctly, the little others did do to prevent the attack was ignored specifically by the government. After WWII, papers belonging to American ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, were retrieved. They claimed that on January 27, 1941, Peruvian ambassador to Japan had sent suspicion of a planned attack on Pearl Harbor. Grew relayed the information to the government, but it was disregarded. If a strong piece of evidence was deliberately ignored, there was definitely something queer taking place in the government that they did not want to share with the public. As Kiong claims, "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life and death; the road to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analysed." ( Kiong 6). This conveys that steps need to be carefully considered before any decision is pronounced upon. Roosevelt must have scrutinized all the different ways to approach the oncoming war, and already created a plan- a devious plan.
Roosevelt was cognizant of the fact that the U.S. needed to join WWII sooner or later, so he allowed Japan to take aggressive action first. He specifically stated "We, of course, do not want to be drawn into a war with Japan - we do not want to be drawn into any war anywhere...We have no intention of being 'sucked into' a war with Japan any more than we have of being 'sucked into' a war with Germany ...Whether they will come to us [with] war with either or both of the countries will depend far more upon what they do than upon what we deliberately refrain from doing” (Kiong 3). Roosevelt was obviously aware that Japan would attack Americans at some point. He was intentionally awaiting Japan’s attack to provide the American public with a reason to become irate. Many historians believe President Roosevelt was knowledgeable of the invasion through intercepting messages sent out by the Japanese three days before the attack occurred (Wukovits 45). Roosevelt was also informed the Japanese were in the Pacific Ocean, currently heading towards Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, as the Navy reported. On December 6, a day before the strike, Roosevelt was calmly sitting at a White House dinner when he received the initial thirteen components of a fifteen part Japanese diplomatic declaration that when decoded, read “This means war” (Stinnett 4). Nevertheless, Roosevelt remained seated in serenity.
Furthermore, Roosevelt implemented the eight actions advised through The McCollum Memo. The McCollum Memo, presented more than a year prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, was composed of two essential elements. It proffered many clear interpretations of intercepted Japanese messages, and it also provided eight actions that the U.S. could take pertaining to the Japanese relations. In fact, it recommended provoking Japan so that it would initiate the war (Memo 2). Roosevelt felt that an overt act like this would be the only way to motivate Americans to engage in the European War occurring at that time (Stinnett, 2). Roosevelt decided to execute these eight actions before the attack, and they evoked exactly what McCullom expected.
Whether his intentions were beneficial or detrimental for the nation, Franklin D.Roosevelt refrained from preparing America for an expected Japanese attack. By making this rash decision, he jeopardized people’s lives, including those of military personnel, navy equipment and infrastructure. If he had alerted Hawaii, more than 3,000 lives could have been spared and America’s most essential naval base could have been preserved. Roosevelt may have viewed this as the best choice to make in the current situation, but what he did not realize is the lasting impact this overt attack had on America’s history. It is remembered as one of the first acts of terrorism against the nation, and from then on people have lived in fear, and distress.