Dbq Pearl Harbor

On the morning of 17th December, 1941; the royal Japanese Navy carried out a surprise armed attack at the Pearl Harbor against the US naval base. The strike came as an extreme shock to the people of America and immediately led to the US entry into the Second World War in the Pacific theatre. In the year 1938, as shown by the statistics; the population of America was two times bigger in comparison to Japan. The average level of industrialization of US was approximately 3 times higher in contrast to Japan, not to indicate the GDP and the military power. Hence, it would be completely irrational for the Japanese to strike Pearl Harbor (Darman, 2012). Few critics maintain that such an unexplainable decision should also be an illogical one. This

essay will critically research, analyze, and explain this point by revealing that the strike must be ascribed to the series of political failures. By utilizing researches and assessments of national character, it will be particularly discussed that why Japan opted to fight under the crisis of a complete embargo.
Unreasonable Approach Reconsidered
As shown by the common sense or any statistics, Japan was so evidently over matched in facilities for pursuing a war against the US. A lot of observers hence referred the decision of Japan to an act of impracticality, a choice that cannot be described by any calculation of probabilities and utilities that would be arrived at by any rational decision makers. The statement of Roberta Wohlstetter is an accepted one in this literature maintaining that the association between this material (the details regarding the relative Japanese and US armed strengths at that time) and the determination to take on America as a rival is clearly not explicable in logical terms. For another instance, Churchill wrote: “A Japanese declaration of warfare could not be adapted with reason” (Zimm, 2013).
It has been considered that such statements are merely partly true, and a complete assessment of the background is essential. For example, as the Ambassador of US in Japan, it been stated by Joseph Grew that “national stability would dictate against such an occurrence, but Japanese stability cannot be measured by our logical standards.” Under the framework of the arbitration at that time, this statement was actually threatening against the America against enormous utilization of deterrence theory.
Unsuccessful Deterrence Policy
The condemnation of Washington Naval Treaty by Japan (3rd December, 1934) pointed the deterioration of the association between the Japanese Empire and the US.

In July, year 1939; after Japan seized the Southern Indo- China, congressional support was being found by President Roosevelt to revoke the treaty of navigation and commerce of 1911, hence releasing him to give rise to trade limitations. The government of Japan was astonished by this move. The soft liners like Kichisaburo Nomura the Foreign Affairs Minister; proposed to change preexisting strategy towards China. So it can be derived that at least America had partially attained its objective. Faced with the moderate attitude of the cabinet of Prince Konoe, the Washington hard liners; like special adviser Stanley Hornbeck, yet found Japan doubtful. He had an obsessive dislike towards Japan, and advised Roosevelt to give rise to an embargo. Hence, Japan, discerned that America will no longer be a stable oil origin, it strived to rely less on America. Also that was the occasion when Blitzkrieg of Germany had stroked a huge success. So in the month of September, year 1940; the Tripartite Pact was being signed by Japan with Italy and Germany, considered to be the insurance against the intervention of America in the European warfare, since this would prompt Japan’s announcing war on America, propelling the America into war on two battlefields. Japan also anticipated the Pact can avert US from encouraging China (Davenport,

2009).
Signing the Tripartite Act immensely altered the attitude of the American government.

By the end of the year 1040, a lot of US diplomats acknowledged that Japan was menacing the life of American citizens. By the year 1941, free trade was slipping, with Gallup Poll documenting a majoritarian dedication to combat Japan on Pacific Ocean. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, considered as a hard liner; prompted Roosevelt that merely with vigorous ‘deterrence effect’ will Japan pick responsible and logical strategies. As an outcome, on July; year 1940, the overseas assets of Japan were frozen. In the month of August, the restriction became absolute. Deterrence theory did perform for this time. Prince Konoe and Nomura believe an agreement is possible, so a meeting was proposed by Nomura between Roosevelt and Konoe in Honolulu but Roosevelt was being told by Stimson that this proposal is a “blind” to lull America away from alertness, so that meeting was being declined by

Roosevelt.
The cabinet of Konoe collapsed soon. Hideki Tojo, the new Prime Minister leaded a government of 14, half of them were armed forces. Both America and Japan requested for peace. But from the above mentioned historical data, it is evident that both America and Japan misgauged one another’s capabilities and intentions repeatedly. And to be more proper, miscalculations was not the entire story, since few occurrences were absolutely foreseeable. For example, as early as the year 1936; studies conducted by the American Naval war College had identified the probability of a Japanese surprise strike. For one other instance, it was always being feared by Roosevelt that an oil restriction would prompt a Japanese invasion. But expecting that Japan would act logically, absolute restriction was yet invoked (Hoyt, 2008).

The Japanese Dilemma
Japan was extremely restricted in resources and size as a world power. The 145882 square miles of the homeland lacked 38 types of raw materials, so it had been a significant importer of US oil and scrap metal. In an absence of oil, the Royal Fleet established at the cost of invalidation of the Naval Limitation Treaty would directly become worthless. Even though for decades, Japan had been accumulating oil to encounter a probable sanction, its accumulation, reportedly thirty eight to seventy eight million barrels, is just ample to encourage a now or never assault. Nomura was being instructed by Tojo to present the harsh suggestion “A” and upon its assured denial to offer the softer “B”. This is now famous as the modus Vivendi, but neither was approved. Modus Vivendi was being put aside by Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State and handed Nomura the 10 point declaration (the Hull note), asking the utter withdrawal of Japan from Indochina and