David Hume On Billiard Ball

Hume explains the concept of cause and effect through the analogy of a billiard ball rolling towards another one. When the first ball hits the second, it is expected that the second ball will move. And yet, the actual cause of the movement of the second ball cannot be observed; all that is seen is that the two balls collide (p.28 gp.25). In addition, this expectation that the second ball will move when the two collide is merely an anticipation based on preconceived notions, prior evidence, and inductive reasoning; that being said, one who has never witnessed the collision of two billiard balls has no idea of what will happen. Hume then argues that inductive reasoning, and therefore causality, cannot ultimately be justified rationally, and

Thus, Hume determines the foundation for any conclusions based on experience is this “habit of the mind,” his radical redefinition of causality since it is not an impression of sensation or an idea derived from such, and therefore it has no basis according to Hume’s criterion. Since the relation between cause and effect cannot be observed, Hume concludes that the notion of causality is a suspect idea, and therefore it must be disregarded. However, uniform experiences—those which happen the same way following the same event every single time—can provide a sort of proof that one event will follow another. For example, based on uniform experience, it can be expected that when one billiard ball collides with another, the second ball will move, even though this cannot be determined based on causality. In this way, uniform experiences provide enough evidence to support one outcome above all

He expounds, “[F]irst, there is not to be found in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves” (p.116, gp.94), explaining that most testimony of miracles comes from poor, unlearned, people who live in remote areas, and whose mental integrity cannot be determined. He continues, “Secondly. […] The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is derived” (p.117, gp.95). By this, Hume reveals that miracle stories are particularly attractive to human beings because it is human nature to derive pleasure from the mystical nature of miracles, and as such, humans tend to pass on these miracle stories because they are entertaining. Hume goes on, “Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors” (p.119, gp.96). Hume draws this conclusion from the idea that miracle stories rarely occur amongst enlightened individuals, but rather among the uncivilized, and that the only reason