Comparing The Great Depression And The Collapse Of The Weimar Republic

The 1929 Great Depression was not the primary catalyst of the collapse of the Weimar Republic, rather it compounded the economic, political and social issues faced by Germany. Economic recovery achieved superficially following the 1923 hyperinflation meant Germany’s weak economic framework could not withstand the impacts of the Great Depression. Consequently, the economic turmoil exposed flaws in the Weimar constitution leading to a political crisis. The Great Depression exacerbated deep social distress and psychological disillusionment amongst the German public enabling extremist parties to seize power from the democratic government. Evidently, the Depression heightened the multiplicity of underlying problems that ultimately brought the demise of the Weimar Republic.

The Great Depression warranted the unstable economic foundations of the Golden Years built on foreign debt to manifest into a crisis that

After World War I, the reparation payments outlined in the Treaty of Versailles saw majority Germany of important industrial resources transported to the Allied countries, limiting the capacity for economic recovery. Consequently, the reparations caused severe economic dislocation as Germany failed to make a payment in December 1922 and in response, French troops occupied the industrial Ruhr. The Weimar government ordered ‘passive resistance’ where German workers stopped all production of resources in the Ruhr region, resulting in hyperinflation. Accordingly, Gustav Stresemann negotiated the 1924 Dawes Plan and 1929 Young Plan, adjusting reparation figures to a sum Germany was capable of paying and received US loans to resolve these issues. The Weimar Republic received 20 billion marks in loans making the prosperity of Germany’s economy reliant on US economic stability, and Stresemann foresaw “if a crisis ever hits and the Americans withdraw their credits then Germany would be financially disarmed”