Question 1:
The form of intention required for the creation of an express trust was scrutinized in Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253. The judgements by French CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ and Heydon and Crennan JJ, provide insight into the current legal standpoint on the relevant form of intention.
Justices Heydon and Crennan found that the intention should be determined by “the words used, not a subjective intention which may have existed but which cannot be extracted from those words.” They went on further to suggest that the “subjective intention is irrelevant both to the question of whether a trust exists and to the question of what its terms are.” Justices Heydon and Crennan made analogy between the form of intention required in express trusts with the intention of contracts, statutes and The Constitution, that is, they are all to be construed objectively.
Justices Gummow and Hayne similarly found that “the relevant intention is that manifested by the declaration of trust.” They added that there need not be any inquiry into the “subjective or ‘real’ intention of the settlor” as this is unnecessary for the establishment of a trust.
Chief Justice French agreed with the reasons of Gummow and Hayne JJ, however not to the same extent. The decision in Byrnes was pivotal on the case of Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) v Jolliffe (1920) 28 CLR however French CJ acknowledged that Jolliffe involved the sham doctrine, which he thought should not apply to Byrnes v Kendle. Therefore French CJ does not challenge the subjective intention approach in such an intense way as the rest of the bench does.
Question 2:
In the past, Jolliffe has provided authority for the proposition that the subjective intention of a settlor should be consider...
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...nd any relevant circumstances concerning the relationship between the parties.
If the respondent did express to others his intention and there was a direct conflict between that intention and the trust document, the respondent could rely on the principles in Saunders as set out in question 3. The evidentiary onus would be on the respondent as the contradicting party to show a contrary intention. If the respondent did express his intention to others, that would appear to be necessarily strong evidence to rebut the decision in Byrnes. It seems appropriate to use the surrounding circumstances in this case in order to find the objective rather than subjective intention. If he had told others of his intention, unlike in question 1, it would no longer be a hidden intention. It would more likely form part of surrounding circumstances rather than merely an oral averment.
In the past recent years, we have heard in the news around cases involving assault and battery cases involving professional athletes or other celebrity figures, however, it is “not uncommon in the sport and recreation environment for a person to be harmed as a result of another’s intentional conduct, both on and off the “field of play” Cotten & Wolohan, p. 214). Nonetheless, it is important to understand that the term “liability” is often not limited to athletes-as-combatants. For example, in Law for recreation & sport managers uses an example from page 215 that discusses a youth football game regarding how a referee was attacked by three coaches and also was tackled by a 14-year-old player, resulting in charges of felony battery. Thus, Hamakawa remarks to say, ”recreation and sport managers should be aware that their organizations are not immune from incidents involving participants, parents and other spectators, coaches, and officials, security
The case of Graham v. Connor is about DeThorne Graham a diabetic that had an insulin reaction, and was pulled over and stopped by Officer Connor. The case is important because it has set the bar when it comes to other cases and the use of force and violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
“The principle of stare decisis does not demand that we must follow precedents, which shipwreck justice.”
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment in this case is one of much controversy that we will analyse in this essay. The principle laid down by Lord Browne-Wilkinson for the need for causative links between the breach of trust and the loss suffered was then applied in AIB Group (UK) Plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors where the solicitor had similarly breached the trust. Pro-Target Target had given a sum of money to Redfern (solicitors) to hold on bare trust until Crowngate had completed the purchase of a property and executed the mortgage. However, Redfern had instead, breached the trust and gave the money to another company, Mirage, by writing to Target to falsely inform them that the purchase had gone through and the mortgage had been executed.
The duty of prosecutorial disclosure is one that is safely entrenched in our understanding of the legal system. The prosecution must disclose evidence that relates to the case and is favorable to the defendant. While not explicitly stated in that duty, it also means that the histories of the witnesses are available to the defense. And when police officers are called to testify at cases, their disciplinary histories come into play as a factor in their credibility. Taking all this prior information into account when addressing the dilemma of the police officer with a good record who used the department computers to look at pornography using his login information, and then lied about it only to confess when the internal investigation proved
Question Presented: Petitioner Giridar C. Sekhar was convicted of extortion under the federal law for potentially exposing an extramarital affair unless the general counsel for the state comptroller recommended that the state pension fund invest in a fund managed by Sekhar’s company. The meaning of the word “property” would be determined by the courts under the federal extortion law. They would also decide whether the General Counsel had recommended the “property” and if it could be subject to extortion by the federal law. The petitioner had argued for a narrow of the meaning or definition of the word “Property”. He wished that it were brought to the meaning of something that is of value and that is transferable.
Though there is no need for either party to use the word trust, the courts must be able to construe some sort of positive intent that the equitable interest was not to reside in the transferee. However Lord Millett later in Twinsectra Ltd denounces the emphasis previously placed on the party’s intent. Twinsectra involved a borrower seeking short term finance for the purchase of land and Lord Millett in this case states that Quistclose trusts are resulting trusts which arise by operation of law. His conclusion is based on the theory that resulting trust emerges when there is a transfer of property in circumstances in which the transferor did not intend to benefit the recipient. Carnworth J, however contends that from Twinsectra it seems that the parties place no real significance to the purpose so even applying Lord Millett’s newly configured resulting trust analysis, there is no real intent on the lenders part to ensure that the recipient does not receive the money at his free disposal. Furthermore, a key aspect of any intent to create a trust always revolves around the funds being held separately and so by devaluing this factor Lord Millett is detracting from traditional trust law principles and in the process is making it much easier to find a Quistclose trust in situations where it was never
Palmer, Elizabeth A. "The Court and Public Opinion." CQ Weekly 2 Dec. 2000. CQ Weekly. SAGE Publications. Web. 1 Mar. 2000. .
Given that it lies within the domain of equity, the case law indicates a great flexibility in its application, both in the substantive requirements of proof demanded by the courts and in the manner in which the courts will satisfy the equity. It is the first of these aspects of the doctrine that I will examine in this essay. I will look at the shift in the evidentiary requirements and what a representation (or an assurance of rights), a reliance (a change of position on the basis of that assurance) and a detriment (or unconscionable disadvantage) - the three pre-requisites for a successful claim - have come to mean with regard to case law and in particular the judgement of Judge Robert Walker in the Court of Appeal in Gillett v. Holt[1], in which the plaintiff had been given repeated assurances over many decades that he would inherit the defendant's estate, and remained in service to him at least p... ... middle of paper ... ... operty, 16th Ed, Butterworths K. Gray & S.F Gray - Land Law, 2nd Ed, Butterworths Professor Cedric D Bell - Land: The Law of Real Property, 3rd Ed, Old
...trust and confidence, which implores for a doctrine of good faith. Hence, although the future of a general principle of good faith in English contract law may not be certain, a judicial movement is slowly gaining momentum to increase the steps towards its realization.
It has been generally acknowledged that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel has much in common with common intention constructive trusts, i.e. those that concern the acquisition of an equitable interest in another person’s land. In effect, the general aim is the recognition of real property rights informally created. The similarity between the two doctrines become clear in a variety of cases where the court rely on either of the two doctrines. To show the distinction between the doctrines, this essay will analyse the principles, roots and rationale of both doctrines. With reference to the relevant case law it will be possible to highlight the subtle differences between the doctrines in the cases where there seems to be some overlap. Three key cases where this issue surfaced were the following: Lloyds Bank Plc v. Rosset (1991), Yaxley v. Gotts (1999) and Stack v. Dowden (2007). This essay will describe the relevant judgements in these cases in order to show the differences between the two doctrines.
M. Pawlowski, 'Imputed intention and joint ownership - a return to common sense: Jones v Kernott (Case Comment)' [2012] CPL 149, 158
Despite it’s longevity, consideration is not without criticism. Lord Goff observed in White v Jones that: ‘our law of contract is widely seen as deficient in the sense that it is perceived to be hampered by the presence of an unnecessary doctrine of consideration’. Abolition has been urged. Since the publication of the Law Revision Committee’s report in 1937, la...
Oblique intention requires foresight of the consequences, finding oblique intent is difficult; as a result, there have been a number of cases, which have helped in clarifying the law of intention.
The courts of England and Wales acknowledge that the above must be something of value, in order to amount to consideration. A valuable consideration in the perspective of the English La...