Brendan Dassey Case

On Jan 30, 2013, the Wisconsin court of Appeals declined Brendan Dassey’s plea for a Judgement convicting him of first degree intentional homicide and second degree assault, and mutilation of a corpse, all as party to a crime. Dassey wanted the court to reverse his conviction, grant him a new trial or hearing all of which were declined by the court.
Dassey, during the trial, had argued that the confession he made on Mar 1, 2006 was involuntary and should have been suppressed. He claimed that his interviewers had used tactics such as fact feeding and suggestions of leniency to lead him into making those inculpatory statements upon which his conviction was based.
The court’s view was of the contrary, stating that Dassey did not appear to be intimidated nor were any promises of leniency made to him, the acts of telling Brendan that “his cooperation would be to his benefit”, that they were “in his corner”, and that they would “go to bat” for him, were all adjudged not to be coercive by the court. Rightly, the assessment of Dassey’s voluntariness by the

court was to be based on whether his statements were as a result of coercion or improper pressures by the police. State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 235-36, N.W.2d 759 (1987) and since these were not found to be the case with Dassey, the court gave a ruling in his disfavor.
The appeal court also decided that Dassey’s allegations that both the pre-trial and trial counsel offered ineffective assistance were baseless.

He was not able to show by clear convincing evidence that his pre-trial counsel in the person of Robert Kachinsky had an actual “conflict of interest” nor that the advocacy rendered to him was adversely affected, such that it was detrimental to his case. Dassey was also required to show that he was prejudiced by deficiencies in the performances offered by trial counsel, Attorneys Mark Fremgen and Ray Edelstein. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). The court “strongly presumed” that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable judgement. Id. At 637 because Dassey failed to sufficiently show otherwise. Based on these circumstances the court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial or

hearing.
Did the court of appeals make the right judgement on Brendan Dassey’s case? Had it met its burden to show that the statements made by Dassey on March 1, 2005 were voluntary? A close review of some key factors in the background to the case makes me believe otherwise. A 16-year-old boy who has been noted to be highly suggestible was subjected to interrogation without a supportive adult being present, a clear indication that his interviewers could have taken advantage of his naivety. A defendant’s statements are deemed voluntary if they are made of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which pressures brought to bear on the defendant by the representatives of the state exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist. (Clappes, 136 Wis 2d at 236; Norwood v. State). The fact that the court considered Dassey’s statements to be deliberate suggests that the reasonableness of the police investigation wasn’t well tested. In my view, Brendan Dassey was indeed exposed to interrogation tactics, his interviewers appeared to have led him on and fed him with facts and details, while urging him to state a “different truth”. This to me is a glaring picture of coercion in play.