Bitter Fruit Chapter Summary

In Stephen Schlesinger's book Bitter Fruit, the 1954 coup in Guatemala is discussed, with a particular focus on the U.S actants involved, the larger hemispheric implications of the coup, and the use of foreign policy and propaganda to circumvent Latin American nationalism in favor of American corporatism. I argue that The United States fear of communism, conflation of nationalism with communism, and loss of economic supremacy in the Western Hemisphere were the impetus to invade Guatemala under false pretenses. Through the use of propaganda, masterful (and unethical) political manuevering, economic pressure, foreign dictators, and indirect (sometimes more direct) CIA intervention, the U.S was able to oust a democratically elected leader. I,

as well as many historians, are inclined to believe that the coup in Guatemala would never have occurred, had it not been for Arbenz's agrarian reform expropriating land from the United Fruit Company.

What was an expressely Guatemalan show of nationalism, the United States twisted into tacit approval of communism, with politicians as high up as President Eisenhower himself referring to the country as a "Soviet beachhead", despite Arbenz and his government's complete lack of contact with the Soviet Union.

During the dictatorial reign of Guatemala's Jorge Ubico, a bond was forged. In 1936, a 99 year agreement was signed by Ubico and United Fruit, permitting a new plantation and furthering the influence of an organization that for all intents and purposes controlled an overwhelming amount of the developing country's economy. Ubico's favorable tax exemptions led the company to flourish as it took over all of Guatemala's railroad, and just as important, the key port city of Puerto Barrios. The company's intimate relationship with Ubico's government afforded them special treatment which contributed to their omnipresence in the region. Following the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution and subsequent ousting of Ubico, Juan Jose Arevalo rose to power. "With its outspoken support for the peasantry and its determination to free Guatemala from the domination of foreign interests, United Fruit was a most obvious target." (72)

Arevalo's nationalistic dogma fostered similar attitudes among his people, many seeing United Fruit as an impediment to true freedom. "To many Guatemalans, United Fruit represented with perfect clarity the alliance of the American government and business arrayed their efforts to attain full economic independence." (72) These pro-Guatemala attitudes eventually became construed as anti-American and led to the downfall of a fledgling democracy. When Jacobo Arbenz took power in 1951, the United States began to realize that their footing in Guatemala, and possibly Central America as a whole, was slipping. United Fruit soon realized that the cushy accomadations they were accustomed to (such as little to no taxation, monopoly of the rail and road, etc.) would no longer be in place. A key point of contention in the many torrid interactions between the Arbenz government and United Fruit were the valuation and expropriation of company owned land. Having falsely claimed that the land was worth ~$627,000 in order to avoid higher taxes, United Fruit found themselves caught red-handed while trying to gain that money back during Arbenz's agrarian reform. The U.S State Department, who had close ties to the company, demanded roughly $16 million in compensation. This action shined a light on how UFCO had effectively operated above the law, and subsequently implicated themselves in such behavior.
Being met with little to no resistance in the past, United Fruit were relatively unexperienced in the realm of diplomacy, so they turned inwards. Before, during, and after the eventual coup, the United States vehemently professed that their only allegiances were to protect the Western Hemisphere (and the world) from communism. However, a closer look at the actants involved and one immediately becomes aware of the major conflicts of interests at play. The most blatant examples of these were CIA Director Allen Dulles, former UFCO president, and his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, former UFCO lawyer. These men eventually became the principal conspirators in the Guatemalan coup, known officially as Operation Success.
Knowing their land and millions of dollars were at stake, the United States, in conjunction with UFCO, embarked on a domestic propaganda campaign, done to ensure popular American support when the coup finally materialized.

They began currying favor on the left via Edward Bernays, a well-known liberal and public relations expert. At Bernays' urging, various journalists were sent over, often on UFCO payroll, to cover the "company's troubles in Guatemala." More often than not, these journalists were given highly doctored and orchestrated accounts of what was happening directly from UFCO themselves. One such example found Bernays in the office of New York Times publisher Arthur Sulzberger. "Bernays talked in detail about the growing dangers of communism in the Guatemalan government and urged the NYT to report on the situation as soon as possible. The following month, Sulzberger wrote Bernays that he was sending another journalist . . . to cover the fruit company's troubles in Guatemala." (86) As word spread among American media of a possible communist uprising in the Central American nation, more and more news outlets paid attention, from Time and Newsweek to the Christian Science Monitor and Miami Herald. Planting these seeds of doubt and misinformation ultimately proved crucial in their (second) coup attempt being a success. After winning over the left-wing, UFCO worked on the right. Then head of the company Sam Zemurray called upon noted conservative P.R firm John Clements

Associates. Clements, described as "at the forefront of the McCarthyite 'crusade' against Communism" (94), soon became a perfect fit for the continued propgandizing of UFCO. Just as useful as Clements himself were his plethora of right-wing connections, from presiding over the "jingoistic" Hearst newspaper corporation, to befriending Nicuraguan dictator "Tachito" Somoza. This last connection would utimately prove more useful than almost any other.