B — I am frightfully sorry to disturb you at this hour, Franklin, but matters of a most vital import have transpired and I felt that I must convey them to you immediately. A — That's perfectly all right, Winston. I'm sure you wouldn't trouble me at this hour for trivial reasons. B — Let me preface my information with an explanation addressing the reason I have not alluded to these facts earlier. In the first place, until today, the information was not firm. On matters of such gravity, I do not like to indulge in idle chatter. Now, I have in my hands, reports from our agents in Japan as well as the most specific intelligence in the form of the highest level Japanese naval coded messages (conversation broken) for some time now. A — I felt …show more content…
A powerful Japanese task force comprising six of their carriers, two battleships and a number of other units to include tankers and cruisers, has sailed yesterday from a secret base in the northern Japanese islands. A — We both knew this was coming. There are also reports in my hands about a force of some size making up in China and obviously intended to go South. B — Yes, we have all of that. (Interruption) . . . are far more advanced than you in our reading of the Jap naval operations codes. But even without that their moves are evident. And they will indeed move South but the force I spoke of is not headed South, Franklin, it is headed East . . . A — Surely you must be . . . will you repeat that please? B — I said to the East. This force is sailing to the East . . . towards …show more content…
You must trust me, Franklin and I can not be more specific. A — I accept this. B — We cannot compromise our codebreaking. You understand this. Only myself and a few (conversation broken) not even Hopkins. It will go straight to Moscow and I am not sure we want that. A — I am still attempting to . . . the obvious implication is that the Japs are going to do a Port Arthur on us at Pearl Harbor. Do you concur? B — I do indeed. Unless they add an attack on the Panama Canal to this vile business. I can hardly envision the canal as a primary goal, especially with your fleet lying athwart their lines of communications with Japan. No, if they do strike the canal, they will have to first neutralize your fleet (conversation broken). A — The worst form of treachery. We can prepare our defenses on the islands and give them a warm welcome when they come. It certainly would put some iron up Congress' ass. B — On the other hand, if they did launch a bombing raid, given that the aircraft would only be of the carrier-borne types, how much actual damage could they inflict? And on what
Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the information which the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harbor followed the general pattern of their interest in American Fleet movements in other localities. One might suspect this type of conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those which followed, there was a significant and ominous change in the character of the information which the Japanese Government sought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of an unusual character outside the realm of reasonable suspicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining the general whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to the presence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minute detail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf….These Japanese instructions and reports pointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor. The information sought and obtained, with such painstaking detail had no other conceivable usefulness from a military
Previous to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7th 1941, tensions had been forming between the USA and Japan in the pacific. The US had cut of most supplies to Japan with the fear of Japanese expansion. The conflict that had been escalating between Japan and China since 1937 had the US treating Japan with great cautiousness. They had been monitoring Japanese Americans in anticipation of a surprise attack. However the attack on Pearl Harbour still shocked and outraged the American nation and affected the American psyche. After being assured that “a Japanese attack on Hawaii is regarded as the most unlikely thing in the world”(1), the sudden mass destruction of the U.S Navy’s Pacific fleet and deaths of roughly 2400 U.S soldiers and civilians as a result of such an attack undoubtedly lead to confusion and racial hatred amongst many US citizens. The assumption on the War Department’s behalf that Japan’s Navy were incapable of launching a full scale assault on the US Navy’s chief Pacific base was more than inaccurate. As a result, the US Naval base was unprepared and was quickly taken out. A hidden bias would soon become evident in both average civilians and higher positioned government officials. This bias against Japan aided in the formation of the Executive Order 9066, signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) on February 19th 1942.
“After successfully executing operations in the Southeast and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?”
This paper will compare Gordon W. Prange's book "At Dawn We Slept - The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor" with the film "Tora! Tora! Tora!" directed by Richard Fleischer, Kinji Fukasaku, and Toshio Masuda. While the film provides little background to the attack, its focal point is on the Pearl Harbor assault and the inquiry of why it was not prevented, or at least foreseen in adequate time to decrease damage. Prange's book examines the assault on Pearl Harbor from both the Japanese and American viewpoints to gain a global view of the situation and the vast provision undertaken by Japanese intelligence.
“AIR RAID ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.” This is the message sent out by radioman Kyle Boyer at 7:58 a.m. Sunday December 7, 1941; a date which will live in infamy. The empire of Japan had attacked the United States’ Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor. For months the US Intelligence community, as well as others around the world, had been intercepting and decoding transmissions from mainland Japan to their diplomats and spies in the US. We had cracked their Purple Code, and knew exactly what military intelligence was being transmitted back and forth. The Dutch also cracked Purple and informed our government of the Japanese plan and were shocked to hear reports that we were taken by surprised. Even more disturbing, months before the attack a British double agent, Dusko Popov, codenamed Tricycle, turned over to the F.B.I. detailed plans of the Japanese air raid, which he had obtained from the Germans. The government had the information, and did nothing with it.
B. You won’t be alone when you come to the staggering conclusion, that the CIA played a lead role in the death of our 35th President
Evans, David; Peattie, Mark R. (1997). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-192-7.
Over the year and a half between Pearl Harbor and Midway the United States made headway with various technological and military advantages. One of the most important of which was the code breaking efforts of Commander Joseph J. Rochefort Jr. “Most of the U.S’s information [on Japan] came from Rochefort. R...
At 3:30 am the Japanese were merely hours away from Pearl Harbor and ready to wreak havoc on the very important American naval base in Hawaii. The Japanese had encountered their fair share of troubles on their way to Pearl Harbor but after some trouble shooting, all which stood in their way from completing their mission was the long stretch of ocean left to travel to Hawaii. Around 7:55 the Japanese had arrived at their destination and a pilot dropped the fi...
In December of 1941, the Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor, pulling the US into WWII. The Japanese commander in charge of the Navy, Admiral Yamamoto, was looking for an opportunity to pull the US Navy into a battle in which he could decisively engage and destroy its carriers. He decided that the best target available would be Midway. However, as a distraction, in June of 1942, Yamamoto opened up a second front by attacking the Aleutian Islands.
In The Autobiography, Benjamin Franklin recounts the many paramount experiences throughout his life that shaped him into great American figure he was known to be. On the opening page, Franklin reveals the book’s epistolary format by writing, “Dear Son,” going on to admit that he’s made some mistakes in the past and to recollect that past is a way to relive it. By divulging his desire to “change some sinister Accidents & Events” (Franklin 3) the author indicates how important it is for his son to observe as he amends his mistakes. Pride, virtue and vanity play a pivotal role in Benjamin Franklin’s life and the way he portrays himself to others. Instances occur where the author is shown gloating about his great accomplishments and he puts emphasis on his need to live a virtuous and morally perfect life. Throughout his story, Benjamin Franklin tells his son of his many virtuous acts and momentous achievements, motivating the question as to whether he seeks his own approval more so than the approval of his peers.
Introduction – Pearl Harbor was vulnerable to attack because of the obstruction of defense and warning.
Fuchida, Mitsuo, and Masatake Okumiya. Midway, the Battle That Doomed Japan; The Japanese Navy's Story. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1955. Print.
In the morning hours of December 7, 1941 the Japanese attacked the Hawaiian islands at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had been feeling the pressures of World War II (WWII) as did many others. With the resources of the Japanese dwindling, the Japanese decided to attack the U.S. while simultaneously planning the attack during the negotiations of continued peace between our two countries. The Japanese were able to cover up there planning for nearly a year. Planning for the attack and ultimately war in the pacific, started in January of 1941, and was finalized during the war games in November of 1941. The U.S. on the other hand would become a reactive force after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The inability to crack the Japanese code lead, to a lack of intelligence during this time making the plan of attack for the Japanese a successful one. It would seem that the year of planning and the strategies laid out in the “Combined Fleet Operations Top Secret Order 1” of the Japanese navy would become a reality in the pacific, allowing for an easy sweep of the military targets for the Japanese fleet.
United States during 1940 and 1941 evoke Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor is often regarded by many American’s as a ‘surprise’ attack that was gratuitous, while historical documents from principal figures on both the Japanese side and the side of the U.S, but there has been evidence and research to the contrary. Pearl Harbor is one of the most memorable events in World War II from U.S perspective. While one may debate as to whether or not the U.S would have still entered WWII (though the argument strongly leans to the former,) the attack on Pearl Harbor served as symbol of sacrifice for the American people and help contribute to the patriotism that help them win the war. The scope of this investigation will focus on U.S–Japanese relations between 1937-1941, but will make us of evidence as far back as 1919 to justify analytical interpretations as well as other perspectives. Methods used in this investigation are an examination of a public address (fireside chat) given by Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 9th, 1941, and and an Inventory of Conflict and Environment Case study (The Way to Pearl Harbor: US vs Japan) by Yuichi Arima and conducted through the American University. These two particular methods are evaluated for their origin, purpose, value and limitations. A propaganda film cited is only used for its quotes and/or facts that were then checked through multiple sources.