Battle Of Pak Marro Essay

Prior to the battle on 8 January, the British had already lost a few hundred men to smaller skirmishes with American troops. The losses caused Pakenham to lose confidence is an immediate retaliation against the U.S. forces, giving MG Jackson and his men time to set up a defense and rest. Going into the Battle of New Orleans, the British forces consisted of a main force of 5,300 soldiers under the command of Pakenham, and a smaller force of approximately 700 men under Colonel William Thornton, who was to attack General Morgan and his men. Pakenham split his main force into two larger formations and one smaller unit. The first half of the force was composed of 2,600 soldiers from the 93rd Highlanders and 95th Rifles, while the other main force

consisted of roughly the same amount of soldiers from the 44th, 21st, and 4th Foot who were also assigned to assault Line Jackson. The third smaller unit of only about 100 men were led by LTC Robert Rennie and consisted of the 43rd Light Infantry, 93rd and 7th Fusiliers, as well as the a few men from the West Indian Infantry. LTC Rennie was ordered to seize forward stronghold. COL Thornton’s forces were made up of infantry and some light artillery. The reserve forces consisted of 7th Fusiliers and 43rd Light Infantry, estimating at about 2,000 troops.
Separating his forces, Pakenham created decentralized control; this was the norm of the time due to a lack of communication technology. Pakenham’s chief issue was his inability to follow through on his preparation plans. Without learning from previous engagements in Louisiana, Pakenham called for the construction of artillery batteries, but did not take into mind the soft Louisiana soil, which the British had already learned cannot support heavy cannons. Moreover, during the attack Major General Samuel Gibbs led his men down the wrong road. When the error was recognized, Major General Gibbs sent up to his troops to right the column, however word was not sent to the lead element and MG Gibbs lost control of nearly his entire formation. Once MG Gibbs regained control, he marched his men into range of the American Forces and his troops quickly gave up on volley fire for individual efforts. Nearly all of the planning and command and control for all of Pakenham’s elements went down the drain after shots were fired.
The British used almost no intelligence sources in the Battle of New Orleans, instead they gave up very critical information giving the American Forces forewarning before each battle. On 23 December 1814, the British took control over two American officer’s plantations and allowed them to flee to notify General Jackson of the British presence in Louisiana. Additionally, two days before the Battle of New Orleans two British sailors were captured and confirmed the American’s belief that the British were planning an attack on 8 January, and that same night a local American, Pierre Denis de la Ronde, entered the opponent’s encampment and ate with them. Without questioning if the man was anti-American, the British soldiers shared all of their plans in detail and after dinner Pierre rode to alert MG Jackson of the British plans. The single most detrimental blunder of the British was the ennui midst the British officers. The night of 7 January 1815, the British officers had decided that the American troops were undeserving and less than worthy adversaries causing them to treat their reconnaissance mission as irrelevant. The officers lack of reconnaissance led to MG Gibbs troops marching down the wrong route, and other officers not truly knowing the terrain they were about to fight on.
Pakenham’s troops only mission was obtain control of the Mississippi River in order to cut off resupply to troops in northern United States. After the first couple of fights with Jackson, Pakenham second guessed his men and decided to delay his advance on MG Jackson in New Orleans. Pakenham decided upon a two prong assault, the main attack consisting of two main attacks. MG Gibbs led the main effort against the left side of the American troops, while simultaneously Major General John Keane assaulted the right. Colonel Thornton and his troops’ mission was to cross the river and attack BG Morgan’s soldiers. By the time Pakenham began the attack Jackson’s troops were already dug-in and prepared to defend their positions. Pakenham had the ability to attack the Americans nearly a week earlier while MG Jackson was withdrawing, but refused to do so because of fear of defeat.
The morning of the battle, Pakenham awoke to learn of only a few hundred infantry men from COL Thornton’s unit were able to successfully cross the muddy river.

Furthermore, Pakenham’s entire plan revolved around morning fog to disguise their advance, but by daybreak the fog had disappeared and the British formations, being only one-half mile away from Line Jackson, were clearly visible to the Americans. Pakenham gave the order to start the advance and the British marched 60 soldiers abreast and four deep, once they closed in on the American’s Jackson ordered for artillery fire, immediately causing large numbers of casualties. The American’s gained the advantage from the start of the battle being able to hit the British with barrages of fire, while limiting the British’s ability to return fire because of distance and fortifications of the canal. Despite the American’s clear advantage, the British continued to advance. Once MG Gibbs formation was within 300 yard of the American line they began taking fire from the American sharpshooters, causing the lead element to disperse in all directions. The rear units, seeing their comrades run in fear, began seeking cover and concealment in tall grass and ditches, delaying the

advance.