The decision to conduct the Sicilian Expedition is met with opposition from senior leadership and was not a good long-term strategic option for Athens. The vast differences between the strategic leadership styles of Nicias and Alcibiades, coupled with the allied support shortcomings, lend to the failure of this expedition and ultimately with Sparta defeating Athens in devastating fashion.
The Sicilian Expedition takes place between the period of 415 BC to 413 BC and the States of Athens and Sparta had been in a period of peace since 421 BC as a result of the Peace of Nicias treaty. Allies of Sparta and Athens indirectly bring them into this confrontation. Commanders Nicias and Alcibiades are in opposition from the beginning on whether or not to participate and the strategic direction of the expedition.
Nicias is in opposition from the start of a sea engagement that furthered the Athens’ interests and he made these opinions known in front of the entire assembly. He felt that Athens did not need to be “persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do.” (Strassler, p. 367, 6.9) In addition, Nicias outlines to the assembly the downfalls of fighting in distant lands (uncertainty of ally support for resources and the fact that cavalry resources will be detrimental to them) and the fact that
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In addition, Alcibiades fled to Sparta due to impending charges and became an advisor to Sparta on the ways to defeat Athens. The end result is that the majority of all the expeditionary forces from Athens are killed or captured and the Athenian democracy is overthrown in 411 BC. Most of the predictions made by Nicias for not engaging in war come to pass and he is killed in the
Thucydides accounts that the allies saw this as a great advantage – ‘Because of their dislike for Pausanias, [the allies] were glad to see her [Athens] do so’. Yet this seems terribly ironic considering the events that followed Athens’ promotion of leadership. Athens first task as leader was to assess the various forms of finance that were crucial to the league. It required a strong fleet of ships and strong funds in order to function.
Dating back to 449 B.C., Sparta and Athens always had an alliance, but as time grew that balance slowly began to fall as one felt threatened by another. Before any sight of unsteadiness the Spartans and Athenians had a bound partnership. Beginning after their domination of the Persian war, the two states slowly became aware of one another’s growing power. More time went by, and the Spartans began to grow conscious of the other states, feeling wary and paranoid around them (Fox, 170). No state was particularly to blame for the strain on their peace treaty, nor for the war, it came as the two states developed. Eventually the two states had clashed enough and declared war. Although the Spartans gave the Athenians a chance to back down and temporarily stall war, the two states would never be equal, their allies resented one another far too much. The growing urge for power was bound to take over sooner or later. Finally, after 7 years of uneasy tension, Sparta could wait no longer and declared war against Athens (Fox, 167). Although the Athenians and Spartans lived together in peace for so long, they existed in a fragile balance that was bound to eventually lead to war.
Thucydides set out to narrate the events of what he believed would be a great war—one requiring great power amassed on both sides and great states to carry out. Greatness, for Thucydides, was measured most fundamentally in capital and military strength, but his history delves into almost every aspect of the war, including, quite prominently, its leaders. In Athens especially, leadership was vital to the war effort because the city’s leaders were chosen by its people and thus, both shaped Athens and reflected its character during their lifetimes. The leaders themselves, however, are vastly different in their abilities and their effects on the city. Thucydides featured both Pericles and Alcibiades prominently in his history, and each had a distinct place in the evolution of Athenian empire and the war it sparked between Athens and Sparta. Pericles ascended to power at the empire’s height and was, according to Thucydides, the city’s most capable politician, a man who understood fully the nature of his city and its political institutions and used his understanding to further its interests in tandem with his own. After Pericles, however, Thucydides notes a drastic decline in the quality of Athenian leaders, culminating in Alcibiades, the last major general to be described in The Peloponnesian War. While he is explicit in this conclusion, he is much more reticent regarding its cause. What changed in Athens to produce the decline in the quality of its leadership?
First of all, it is feasible to say that one of the most important reasons for the Athenian defeat was due to the fact that they were essentially not ready for another battle. The importance of prepraredness was exemplified by Percile's in his War speech, he was recollecting the Athenian ancestors success against the Persians and he stated it was "more good planning than good luck." The problem is that the Sicilian expedition was spontaneous and unanticipated, thus unplanned. As Thucydides recounts "that same winter, immediately after the destruction of Melos, Athens decided to attempt the conquest of the Greeks on Sicily."
Athens government and military is considerably different from their neighbors. According to Pericles, Athens government is not a copy of our neighbors...
The rocky relationship between the two became irreperable when Sparta asked Athens for aid against the helots. When the large Athenian army arrived, Sparta had a change of heart, and dismissed the force, fearing that the Athenians would side with the helots against them. Insulted, Athens broke off relations with Sparta, striking an alliance with A...
Compare and contrast a prominent political and cultural element of the Athenian and Spartan poleis and how this was reflected by the Athenian Army at the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC and the 300 Spartan hoplites at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC.
Both these debates have a background question at hand, whether or not the speakers were presenting their opinions out of honest opinion for the well-being of Athens or self-interest. Out of the four speakers two (Nicias and Diodotus) honestly cared for the future of Athens and did not act on the slightest bit for their self-interest. Cleon also cared about the well-being of Athens but merely gave out the immoral and haste answer to a problem that obviously needed more thought to it. Alcibiades stands alone on this one, being the only one to have acted out of self-interest who only spoke to protect his name and gain a few points of honor here and there. Within the same book Thucydides presents two debates that ask the same question of the speakers where the answer apparently depends on the debate and the text.
The decision of Achilleus is a crucial moment in understanding how fate works in epic (Homerian) literature. Thetis tells Achilleus of his opportunity to win renown as the greatest warrior of all time, earning glory through his fearless acts in battle against a foe who is sure to overcome the Achaians. The fate of ten years of attack on Troy hinge upon the decision of Achilleus, who is given the choice to win glory for the Achaians and, more importantly, himself.
As can be expected from pioneer governmental institutions, Athenian democracy was not perfect. In fact it was far from it. It resulted in the establishment of poor policies by aggressive populists who sought "...private ambition and private profit...which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and their allies." (Thucydides). These self interested populist leaders with personal gain in mind established extensive internal political instability "...by quarrelling among themselves [and] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state." (Thucydides). Repeated opportunities to accept terms of peace after the battles of Pylos (425), Arginusae (406) and Aegospotami (405) were ignored by the inefficient Athenian demos eventually resulting in the devastation of the once dominant city-state. Internal political strife can also be attribu...
The causes of the Peloponnesian War proved to be too great between the tension-filled stubborn Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. As Thucydides says in Karl Walling’s article, “Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed” (4). The three phases of the war, which again, are the Archidamian war, the Sicilian Expedition and the Decelean war, show the events that followed the causes of the war, while also showing the forthcoming detrimental effects that eventually consumed both Athens and eventually Sparta effectively reshaping Greece.
He says "..... The Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the territory of a neighbour, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their home". Pericles is telling the funeral audience that just because we sit here at a funeral we are winning easily against Sparta. They need help even on land they are more familiar with and we still defeat them. So not only does Athens have the better form of government that was passed down from generation to generation but we also obviously have better war tactics than Sparta in which that is supposed to be their specialty. He says this to distraught funeral crowd who deep in their mind are questioning if they could win this war and Pericles is giving them a sense of hope and a sense that they could win this war with
In section 110, the Melians threatened that if their allies the Lacedaemonians were provoked by the takeover of Melos, they might attack Athens itself: "...the Cretan sea is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach: and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer home, for the preservation of your confederacy and of your own territory. " In addition, the Melians complained that they would be thought of as cowards if they surrendered, and they warned the Athenians that hostility would turn other neutral city-states against them. The Melians offered mere speculation. Their arguments sound like the work of a weak and desperate g... ...
The Lacedaemonians were not content with simply sending aid to Sicily; they also resolved to take the war to the Athenians. The Corinthians, the Spartans, and others in the Peloponnesian League sent more reinforcements to Syracuse, in the hopes of driving off the Athenians; but instead of withdrawing; the Athenians sent another hundred ships and another 5,000 troops to Sicily. Under Gylippus, the Syracusans and their allies were able to decisively defeat the Athenians on land; and Gylippus encouraged the Syracusans to build a navy, which was able to defeat the Athenian fleet when they attempted to withdraw. The Athenian army, attempting to withdraw overland to other, more friendly Sicilian cities, was divided and defeated; the entire Athenian fleet was destroyed, and virtually the entire Athenian army was sold off into slavery.
Sparta is the most formidable city known in history. Famous for her impressive military power, she proved that strength didn’t lie in numbers, it lay in Spartan discipline. Sparta started out as a small city fighting only to survive against enemy invaders. Her goal was to avoid defeat from other city-states and she very nearly succeeded in achieving it. Using self-denial, strong discipline and harsh training, Sparta focused almost all her attention on achieving her goal. Known as the ‘tamer of men’, her strength made all but Spartan men shrink in fear. However, Sparta did not wage war any more lightly then any other army, she simply waged it better. Despite the cold, military driven surface, Sparta often engaged in merriment. Festivals were celebrated with vigor, men were good to their families and their women were renowned for their beauty. Nevertheless, they always refused to become distracted from their purpose. Civil wars and ancient rivalries made it painfully clear that Sparta had no intention of allowing Athens or any other rival take over. However, she was still quite willing to join arms with the same rivals to fight off foreign invaders. When Greece was threatened by Persia, Sparta halted her competition with Athens and relentlessly fought back the enemy forces. After her triumph over the Persians, Sparta’s temporary peace with Athens was short-lived. The Greeks soon returned to their petty affairs. For 75 years Sparta and Athens fought for supremacy. Eventually, Sparta won, but in doing so she finally allowed all of Greece to witness her tragic flaw.