Armed Force Research Paper

A Modern Incompetent Force The Cold War sparked a massive conventional and nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. This heavy investment in military forces by two competing superpowers endured for almost 50 years, ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This international power shift ushered in a unique era of United States military domination, which persisted for nearly a decade. The practicality of utilizing and maintaining a large conventional military force in the 21st century came into question when non-state actors became the primary adversary. A decentralized, civilian-driven threat undermined the usefulness of brute force and empowered nonmilitary solutions to international conflicts. The military operations

During the conflict in Afghanistan, United States armed forces were tasked with overcoming enemy insurgency. The counterinsurgency doctrine, also known as COIN, was a critical component of the 2009 Afghan surge and stressed the need to protect civilians from enemy insurgents. However, the United States military had to accomplish this goal “without the appropriate language skills and with only a superficial understanding of Afghan culture” (Eikenberry 4). This overall lack of preparedness not only signifies that the military was ineffective at counterinsurgency operations, but also highlighted the Army’s failure to learn from their Vietnam insurgency experience. After the war in Vietnam, the United States military needed to be overhauled and instead of improving its irregular warfare doctrine, the military “focused on a massive conventional force buildup” (Nagl 21). This failure to adapt resulted in inadequate contingency planning to secure peace and fostered a chaotic environment, which permitted the insurgent establishment. By maintaining its rigid structure, the military has solidified its inability to effectively handle 21st century

A core military doctrine, fighting, is no longer a priority when dealing with 21st century conflict. The American military contends that a legitimate government, in addition to protecting the people, must be established to combat insurgency-generating instability. The military’s ability to “establish local governance, conduct information operations, build economies, service infrastructure, and provide security” now takes precedence over combat abilities (Gentile 27). The Army’s experience with this new core objective of nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan has revealed not only the military’s limited ability to reform governments and societies, but also the significant amount of resources the process requires. For example, the Karzai administration in Afghanistan “neither funds nor delivers the key public services offered in the country” and is void of an incentive “to improve his state’s effectiveness or accountability” (Eikenberry 6). This motivation to resist rule-bound Afghan institutions indicates a failure by the American military to establish government legitimacy and regional stability. By the end of 2014 Afghan forces will take on the responsibility for Afghanistan’s security from US combat troops. According to current projections, a stalemate between the Taliban and the