Analysis Of Objections To Kantian Ethics

IV. Objections to Kantian Ethics
Interestingly, some critiques consider Kant’s theory to be constraining. Yet, the work of O’Neil suggests otherwise. She focuses on the second categorical imperative specifically to say that we need to ensure that we do not use someone as a mere means. More simply said, we do not coerce or deceive someone to reach our end (104-105). I would like to emphasize that she specifically points out we “cannot just claim that our intentions are good and do what we will” (105). Relating back to Kant’s theory of a ‘good will’, our maxims should be out of duties sake. Therefore, we do not have to spend a life committed to doing the most good and creating the most happiness, but rather a life in which we are fair and do not act to use others to promote happiness as a mere means.

This is not the point of Kant’s theory however, because he does not look at consequences for determining moral law, but rather at maxims. In order to determine what may produce more or less harm, it is true we would need to know the consequences of our actions. But, sometimes we cannot be sure of our consequences, and thus when we look at our intentions we can know if we are acting fairly (without deception or coercion) and decide on an action that would be moral based on a maxim of good will. O’Neil does point out that it is possible for a society to endure more pain in effort to protect individuals from being used as a mere means, yet they are doing so in a way to be the most fair, and therefore their actions can still be applied to the theme of giving everyone a fair value in life