The previous sections have drawn several developmental phases of identity construction conceptualisation. In order to approach the current theorising of identity, this section elaborates the account of identity as discursive practices. The section will first recap some key points from the previous studies. Given this linking back to the previous studies of identity, new shift to various parts constituting identity conceptualisation are discussed in between the explanation of the ‘discursive view’. Later moving on to the discussion of the current work on identity from a more dynamic discourse analytical angles.
1. The discursive approach to identity - an overview
The development of discourse study and the attribution of growing movements from
This perspective is developed and introduced by a French philosopher Althusser (1971) with his notion of ideology and ‘interpellation’. Althusser argued that it is ideology that transforms us into ‘subjects’. Given an example of a person knocks on a door, the person inside will only open the door once the person from the outside sounds familiar. Another instance is seeing a friend on the street, the way we use to signal to him/her that we recognise him/her are either saying ‘hi’ or give the friend a handshake. Drawing from such an observation, Althusser claimed that by doing so human beings have constantly taken part in the everyday ritual of ideological recognitions. And it is through these ideological recognitions and interpellation that bring about the being of the ‘subjects’. Althusser’s essay not only explains how people internalise ideology, but also paves the way for the account of identity constructed through discourse. This is precisely revisited and commented by Butler
Foucault in his influential work has not only echoed the idea of ideology making people ‘subjects’, but also further tied the ideology and power to identity. Under Foucault’s account, the enactment of power is permeate and it is power and dominant discourses that produce identities. By viewing social arrangements and practices (ideology) determining and producing the subjects, Foucault went on to even remove and erase the subjects by shifting from examining the process of identification to the discourse that forms subjectivity. This model implies the inscription of subjects’ identities to the dominant discourses available and this process is to reproduce social inequalities. The subjects hence do not have the agentive significance, rather than acquiring the world’s ideology, serving the hegemonic and preserving the status quo (Benwell and Stokoe, 2006). This line of conceptualising identity is reflected through many later studies using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a Foucauldian-inspired analytical framework, to explore political identity, social power and imbalance.
Foucalt’s account, which treated subjects as the mere product of ideology and power, faced some challenges because it failed to “elaborate a theory of how individuals are summoned into place in the discursive structures” (Hall, 2000:26-27).
Taylor, S. (2009) ‘Who We Think We Are? Identities in Everyday life’, in Taylor, S., Hinchliffe, S., Clarke, J. and Bromley, S. (eds), Making Social Lives, Milton Keynes, The Open University.
Shakespeare’s The Tempest and Dante’s Inferno both exhibit Foucault’s idea of categorization and subjectification using “dividing practices.” (Rabinow 8) Foucault argued that people can rise to power using discourse, “Discourse has the ability to turn human beings into subjects by placing them into certain categories.” (Rabinow 8) These categories are then defined “according to their level of deviance from the acceptable norm.” (Rabinow 8) Some examples of such categories are the homosexual, the insane, the criminal and the uncivilized. (Rabinow 8). By the above method, called “dividing practices,” people can be manipulated by socially categorizing them and then comparing them to norms. In this way human beings are given both a social and a personal identity (Rabinow 8) and this is how superiority among human beings can be established.
In her work, “Identity,” Carla Kaplan frames the difficulty of defining the term “identity.” She argues that identity is a tension because personal identity conventionally arbitrates taste and lifestyle, while social identity is regarded as a constellation of different and often competing identifications or “cultural negotiations” (Kaplan, 2007). In addition, she argues that identity politics has caused “suspicion and criticism” by limiting new democratic possibilities by encouraging narrow solidarities rather than broader identification resulting in the struggle for recognition becoming a questioning of recognition (Kaplan, 2007). Lastly, she argues that “A realistic identity politics” is needed to recognize that identities are multiple/dynamic
In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matter. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question of identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail, and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism. Problems of personal identity generally involve questions about what makes one the person one is and what it takes for the same person to exist at separate times (Olson, 2010).
Personal identity, in the context of philosophy, does not attempt to address clichéd, qualitative questions of what makes us us. Instead, personal identity refers to numerical identity or sameness over time. For example, identical twins appear to be exactly alike, but their qualitative likeness in appearance does not make them the same person; each twin, instead, has one and only one identity – a numerical identity. As such, philosophers studying personal identity focus on questions of what has to persist for an individual to keep his or her numerical identity over time and of what the pronoun “I” refers to when an individual uses it. Over the years, theories of personal identity have been established to answer these very questions, but the
(Flynn 1996, 28) One important aspect of his analysis that distinguishes him from the predecessors is about power. According to Foucault, power is not one-centered, and one-sided which refers to a top to bottom imposition caused by political hierarchy. On the contrary, power is diffusive, which is assumed to be operate in micro-physics, should not be taken as a pejorative sense; contrarily it is a positive one as ‘every exercise of power is accompanied by or gives rise to resistance opens a space for possibility and freedom in any content’. (Flynn 1996, 35) Moreover, Foucault does not describe the power relation as one between the oppressor or the oppressed, rather he says that these power relations are interchangeable in different discourses. These power relations are infinite; therefore we cannot claim that there is an absolute oppressor or an absolute oppressed in these power relations.
...easily controls and manipulates the way individuals behave. Although there are no true discourses about what is normal or abnormal to do in society, people understand and believe these discourses to be true or false, and that way they are manipulated by powers. This sexual science is a form of disciplinary control that imprisons and keeps society under surveillance. It makes people feel someone is looking at them and internally become subjective to the rules and power of society. This is really the problem of living in modern society. In conclusion, people live in a society, which has created fear on people of society, that makes people feel and be responsible for their acts. Discourses are really a form in which power is exercised to discipline societies. Foucault’s argument claims discourses are a form of subjection, but this occurs externally not internally.
What is identity? Identity is an unbound formation which is created by racial construction and gender construction within an individual’s society even though it is often seen as a controlled piece of oneself. In Dr. Beverly Daniel Tatum’s piece, “The Complexity of Identity: ‘Who Am I?’, Tatum asserts that identity is formed by “individual characteristics, family dynamics, historical factors, and social and political contexts” (Tatum 105). Tatum’s piece, “The Complexity of Identity: ‘Who Am I?’” creates a better understanding of how major obstacles such as racism and sexism shape our self identity.
As a French sociologist, anthropologist, and philosopher, Pierre Bourdieu focuses on the role of practice and embodiment in social dynamics of power relations in life, which opposes Western traditions. He conceptualizes the notions of habitus and field, which disclose the construction in human society, which, according to him, should not be understood as applying a set of rules. Echoing Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau, Bourdieu intends to analyze the interrelationship between social structure and social practice. His arguments are around a reconciliation of both external power generated from social structure and internal power produced by subjective individuality. Bourdieu transforms Max Weber’s notion of domination and social orders into his theory of fields, defining field as a setting in which agents and their social positions are located, a system of social positions that are structured in terms of power relationships.
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Problems with Foucault: Historical accuracy (empiricism vs. Structuralism)-- Thought and discourse as reality? Can we derive intentions from the consequences of behavior? Is a society without social control possible?
Third, institutions consist of a new type of power, so that all individual relations constitute a power relationship. (Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms” 82-83) A relationship of power may be described as a mode of action that acts upon an individual’s actions through which the behavior of an active subject is able to inscribe itself. (Foucault, “The Subject and Power” 342) Institutions work through an authority network of individuals, and power is employed and exercised by individuals through a netlike organization. “Not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.
“Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse compartments may be realized.” (Foucault)
Fairclough (1992: 88) is of the view that “ideologies reside in texts” (p. 88). But it is noe necessary that the discourse would be interpreted in the same way as desired by the producers. Several interpretations can be made of a single piece of discourse. The ideological import may keep on changing with each new interpretation of discourse (Fairclough, 1992: 89).
Her approach is capable of identifying and describing the underlying mechanisms that contribute to those disorders in discourse which are embedded in a particular context, at a specific moment, and inevitably affect communication. Wodak’s work on the discourse of anti-Semitism in 1990 led to the development of an approach she termed the Discourse-Historical Method. The term historical occupies a unique place in this approach. It denotes an attempt to systematically integrate all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text. As a result, the study of Wodak and her colleagues’ showed that the context of the discourse had a significant impact on the structure, function, and context of the utterances. This method is based on the belief that language “manifests social processes and interaction” and generates those processes as well (Wodak & Ludwig, 1999, p. 12). This method analyses language from a three-fold perspective: first, the assumption that discourse involves power and ideologies. “No interaction exists where power relations do not prevail and where values and norms do not have a relevant role” (p. 12). Secondly, “discourse … is always historical, that is, it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other communicative events which are happening at the same time or which have happened before” (p. 12). The third feature