Case, Adeels Palace v Moubarak (2009) 239 CLR 420 entails a defendant, Adeels Palace Pty Ltd and two plaintiffs, Anthony Moubarak and Antoin Fayez Bou Najem. On New Year’s Eve 2002, a function, hosted by Adeels was open to members of the public, with a charged admission fee. A dispute broke out in the restaurant. One man left the premises and later returned with a firearm. He seriously injured both respondents. One was shot in the leg and other in the stomach. The plaintiffs separately brought proceedings against the defendant in the District Court of New South Wales (NSW), claiming damages for negligence. The trial judge issued Bou Najem $170,000 and Moubarak $1,026,682.98. It was held that the duty of care was breached by the defendant as they ‘negligently’ failed to employ security for their function. The breach of duty and resulted in the plaintiff’s serious injuries. …show more content…
The defendant appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal, disagreeing that they owed a duty of care to their customers if criminal conduct was involved.
They referred the principles in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61. The court disagreed, saying the appellant did not provide reasonable protection against intoxicated, unruly or violent customers whom they served alcohol. It was mentioned that the defendant was in control of who entered and exited his premises. The issue of the gunman re-entering the premises could have been deterred or prevented with the presence of security and ultimately stopped the shootings of the plaintiffs. The duty of the proprietor was not to protect their customers but to foresee that unruly conduct that may result in injury could occur on the premises. The High Court of Australia referred to the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) as well as the Liquor Act 1982 (NSW). It was concluded that the evidence at the previous trial lacked the proof that security personnel would have stopped the re-entry of the determined gunman who was acting
irrationally. The irrationality of the gunman distinguished this case from similar cases such as, Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 294 and Stansbie v Troman [1948] 1 All ER 599. In these cases, evidence established that the taking of reasonable care would probably have prevented the injury of the plaintiffs. Adeels taking of reasonable care would not likely have had resulted positively. ... But unless the risk to be foreseen was a risk of a kind that called for, as a matter of reasonable precaution, the presence or physical authority of bouncers or crowd controllers to deal with it safely, failure to provide security of that kind would not be a breach of the relevant duty of care. The taking of reasonable care is to be considered for foreseeable possibilities. Whether, or if any security were to be provided to satisfy the duty of care for Adeels depended on the considerations identified in 5B (2) of the Civil Liability Act. The High Court outlined that these considerations must not occur with the wisdom of hindsight but with the information provided before the function. ... the event which caused the plaintiffs' injuries was deliberate criminal wrongdoing, and the wrongdoing occurred despite society devoting its resources to deterring and preventing it through the work of police forces and the punishment of those offenders who are caught. That being so, it should not be accepted that negligence which was not a necessary condition of the injury that resulted from a third person's criminal wrongdoing was a cause of that injury. Accordingly, the submission that the plaintiffs' injuries in these cases were caused by the failure of Adeels Palace to take steps that might have made their occurrence less likely, should be rejected. The High Court distinguished that the absence of security personnel was not the causation of the plaintiffs being shot. Thus, the “but for” test (of causation) was not fulfilled.
The amendments to the Land Title Act 1994 introduced in s. 185(1A) and s. 11A requiring reasonable steps to be taken to ensure the person who executed the instrument as mortgagor is identical with the person who is, or who is about to become, the registered proprietor of the
They reasoned that since Barnett didn’t either argue against the dismissal of negligence claim at the time of its dismissal or include the claim in subsequent revisions, she had no support for her claim that the court had erred in dismissing her claim of negligence. The court also ruled that the language of section 3-108(b) of the Tort Immunity Act meant that complete, unconditional immunity was to be offered if supervision was present. As a result of this interpretation, the issue of if the lifeguards had committed willful and wanton misconduct was rendered irrelevant. Since the issues of material fact raised by the appellant weren’t actually issues of material fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the District and Appellate Court’s motion and subsequent affirmation of summary
The appeal was heard in The NSW Supreme Court, Court of Appeal. The appellant appealed the issue of “blameless accidents” therefore providing new evidence, with the view that the preceding judge made an error recognising the content and scope of duty of care. He also noted the breach of duty of care and causation .
The litigation of R. v. Buhay is a case where the Charter of rights and freedoms was violated by the policing parties but maintained and performed by the Supreme Court of Canada. This litigation began after two individuals; of which one was Mervyn Buhay, rented a locker at the Winnipeg bus depot. Buhay began to distract the security guards while his friend placed a duffel bag in the locker they had rented. After they left, the security guards were so engrossed by the smell coming from the locker that they unlocked it to find a sleeping bag full of marijuana in the duffel bag. Buhay was arrested the day after the bag was taken into possession even though no warrant was received to search the locker in the first place. During the first trial, due to the violation of the Charter by the police officers, Buhay was acquitted. The Crown, however, appealed this ruling and the case was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada where once again Buhay was acquitted in a 9-0 ruling. Although Buhay committed a crime by possessing marijuana, the police violated the Charter by searching Buhay`s locker without a warrant or his consent, making the Supreme court of Canada`s decision to acquit Buhay reasonable. The Supreme Court of Canada`s decision to acquit Buhay was reasonable due to the fact that the police violated the Charter of rights, no warrant was received to unlock the locker let alone seize the duffel bag, and lastly because the bus depots terms for the locker were not efficiently provided to the customers making them aware of any reasonable search conduct.
In this case entitled Gulash v. Stylarama there was a contract entered regarding the construction of pools. The pool was built and constructed but after a period of time the pool began to tilt, in which that’s when Gulash decided to sue Stylarama. The suit was that Stylarama violated provisions of article 2 of the UCC (Uniform Commercial Code). Due to the fact the cost of the materials and the labor were not written out in detail but instead of in a lump sum it would make it hard to come up with a sum for the exact cost of the damages. Furthermore, since this is a contract with a mix of goods and services, article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code would not apply the services only to the goods but the common law would to the services. And
The Case of R.V Machekequonabe Machekequonabe is charged with shooting and killing his foster father. The difficulty of this case revolves around the fact that his particular pagan Indian tribe believed in the existence of evil spirit wendigos which assume human form and pose a threat to their community. On one hand, there are rules against killing other humans, and on the other, Indian common law says that it is acceptable to kill wendigos (which the defendant believed he was doing). This essay will show how this conflict and ruling can be explained completely by Dworkin's theory of law and judicial reasoning.
This case commentary discusses the different approaches used to be taken in Victoria and NSW, presuming that the admissibility of the Evidence in ss 97, 98 and 101 is of the same decision, not separate decision .
The appellant, Jesse Mamo, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by the respondent, Steven Surace. Whilst the respondent looked down to adjust the radio, a cow wandered on to the road, colliding with the vehicle . The appellant alleged that the respondent failed to use high beam or maintain a proper lookout. The respondent denied liability and pleaded contributory negligence. At trial, the Judge held that breach of duty of care had not transpired, as it was an unforeseeable risk causing an unavoidable accident, as the cow appeared too close to react. The Judge argued that the respondent acted appropriately toward ‘foreseeable risks”, which the cow was not part of.
...own. That handguns cannot be restricted from obtain and carry for self-defend in one’s home. As for the other question that the case did not answer, all we can do now is wait for these questions to be answered by the Supreme Court.
Since Martin Bryant’s massacre on Port Arthur, the legal system in Australia is amended and reformed gun laws to create a more effective legislation. Gun-related deaths have since been drawn to more efficient attention in Australian psyche, whilst the issue of gun-laws on a global level still remains as a conspiracy in many countries. The massacre left the Australian nation in shock, with a heavily involved attitude on behalf of local and national police, and thousands devastated at the aftermath. The legislation of gun-laws and amendments continues to be controversial, with punishments including Bryant’s being one of popular debate, and the general ownership and use of guns causing conflict within the interrelationship of the legal system and society.
Despite the efforts of lawyers and judges to eliminate racial discrimination in the courts, does racial bias play a part in today’s jury selection? Positive steps have been taken in past court cases to ensure fair and unbiased juries. Unfortunately, a popular strategy among lawyers is to incorporate racial bias without directing attention to their actions. They are taught to look for the unseen and to notice the unnoticed. The Supreme Court in its precedent setting decision on the case of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), is the first step to limiting racial discrimination in the court room. The process of selecting jurors begins with prospective jurors being brought into the courtroom, then separating them into smaller groups to be seated in the jury box. The judge and or attorneys ask questions with intent to determine if any juror is biased or cannot deal with the issues fairly. The question process is referred to as voir dire, a French word meaning, “to see to speak”. During voir dire, attorneys have the right to excuse a juror in peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges are based on the potential juror admitting bias, acquaintanceship with one of the parties, personal knowledge of the facts, or the attorney believing he/she might not be impartial. In the case of Batson v. Kentucky, James Batson, a black man, was indicted for second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the selection of the jury the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike out all of the four black potential jurors, leaving an all white jury. Batson’s attorney moved to discharge the venire, the list from which jurors may be selected, on the grounds that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges violated his client’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have a jury derived from a “cross-section of the community”(People v. Wheeler, 583 P.3d 748 [Calif. 1978]). The circuit court ruled in favor of the prosecutor and convicted Batson on both counts. This case went through the courts and finalized in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The application of Browne v Dunn is established in Australia in both civil and criminal cases, however its appliance in the criminal ones differs. There is some vagueness as to when precisely the rule is breached and the penalties that apply to a party in breach. The question that arose recently is whether Browne v Dunn applies to criminal proceedings at all. The case of MWJ v R confirmed that Browne v Dunn applied to criminal proceedings in Australia, despite some differences in judicial reasoning. The case was further followed by R v MAP which moreover elaborates certain aspects of the following rule. Gleeson j and Heydon J stated that “the requirement is accepted and applied day by day in criminal trials”. One of the principles the High court articulated was that the rule must be applied with caution, when considering the conduct of the defense, this was emphasized with reference to the cases of R v Birks and R v Manunta.
9. Woodgate, R., Black, A., Biggs, J., Owens, D. (2003). Legal Studies for Queensland, Volume 1, ForthEdition, Legal Eagle Publications: Queensland. 10. Woodgate, R., Black, A., Biggs, J., Owens, D. (2003).
The Decisions of the House of Lords in the Case of R vs. Special Adjudicator
The first point to note when analysing occupiers’ liability is that originally it was separate to the general principles of negligence which were outlined in Donoghue v Stevenson .The reason for this “pigeon hole approach” was that the key decision of occupiers’ liability, Indermaur v Dames was decided sixty six years prior to the landmark decision of Donoghue v Stevenson . McMahon and Binchy state the reason why it was not engulfed into general negligence, was because it “… had become too firmly entrenched by 1932 … to be swamped by another judicial cross-current” Following on from Indermaur v Dames the courts developed four distinct categories of entrant which I will now examine in turn.