AAB

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In the post Osama bin Laden era al-Qaedist ideology is flourishing across the Arab world. A significant development has been the rise of al-Qaeda offshoots in the Middle East. The Abdallah Azzam Brigades franchise has increasingly become a noteworthy actor in terrorism. On May 8th, 2012 Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary of State designated Abdallah Azzam Brigades as a foreign terrorist organization (Nides, T.R. , 2012). Abdullah Azzam Brigades may have only recently been added as a foreign terrorist group; nevertheless the organization has deep roots, lethal capacity, and is capable of contributing to supplementary instability in the Middle East. Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) has several aliases listed by the State Department: Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions, and Yusuf al-‘Uyayri Battalions of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Nides, T.R. , 2012). AAB first surfaced in 2004, after claiming an attack carried out in Egypt. Oct 7th the day after the Egyptian holiday commemorating the 1973 War with Israel, a truck bomb exploded next to the Hilton Hotel in the resort town of Taba, close to the Israeli border. Just to the south of Taba, smaller bombs exploded at a resort campsite popular to Israelis. Two days later, Abdullah Azzam Bridagdes- Al Qaeda in Egypt and the Levant claimed responsibility (Winter, 2011, p. 884). AAB claimed two more attacks in Egypt after the first bombing. Spanning only a few months apart, the assailants targeted popular tourist and resorts areas. In April 2005, a suicide bomber detonated his vest in Cairo’s main bazaar; followed by the bomber’s sister and wife opening fire on a tourist bus then killing themselves (Winter, 2011, p. 884). In July 2005, the Sinai Peninsula was hit aga... ... middle of paper ... ... Assessment of al Qaeda Affiliates, 2014). That’s not to say that the organization can’t or won’t try to target Israel or Western interests in the region. AABs lethal attacks are indicative of a legitimate organization with a lineage of sophisticated jihadi leadership. The organization does not appear to seek the same high-casualty high-impact that became al Qaeda’s signature (Winter, 2011, p. 891). Simultaneously, the group seems unable to cultivate a sizable number of “resistance call units.” (Winter, 2011, p. 891) Notwithstanding, neither is necessary to have significant impact. The Middle East is in a transitional period; by inflaming sectarian tensions, and bolstering insecurity it only takes a small group to act as saboteurs (Winter, 2011, p. 891). Until attacks cease or cells are disrupted, AAB will be a relevant terrorist organization.

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