Facts: Christopher Osinger harassed and intimidated his ex-girlfriend under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A (2) (A) and 2261(b) (5). He sent sexually explicit content of his ex-girlfriend to her family, friends, and coworkers without her permission, and tried to communicate with V.B in many occasions even after she told him to stop trying to contact her. Seeking to the demission of the charges, he stated that 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2) (A) was unconstitutional because free speech was being prohibited and it is protected by the First Amendment. He challenges his conviction for stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A and faces facial charges to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A as unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct. He maintains a sentence of 46 months imprisonment. …show more content…
§ 2261A (2) (A) in the case was unconstitutional because it prohibits free speech that is protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. (2) Whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague under the definition of harassment or substantial emotional distress. Holding: (1) The panel held that because § 2261A forbids intimidating and harassing conduct, it is not objectively invalid under the First Amendment. The defendant’s argument that the statute’s failure to define substantial emotional distress or harass furnishes it unconstitutionally vague. Thus, Osinger should not be afforded First Amendment Protection. (2) These terms were found to be not complex and could be understood by individuals with common intelligence. Therefore, the statute is not facially invalid. Reasoning: (1) The defendant declared that the version of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261(2) A is objectively unconstitutional due to its prohibition of freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. He also argued that the indictment filed in this case shall be dismissed because it does not state an offense and that the emails he sent to V.B were not directed to her, so the emails shouldn’t be taken in the case as evidence. According to him, he solely sent the emails to her co-workers and there was also no evidence of
The federal court rejected dismissed Franklin’s case, because Title IX did not allow for monetary relief, The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the court’s
Freedom of Speech is a fundamental right that makes America the “land of the free.” But this right is abused by many people, and Philip Malloy is one of those individuals. Philip Malloy’s First Amendment Rights regarding his Freedom of Speech were not violated because there was a rule that he was informed about multiple times, but he still disrespected it.
The district court found the disruptive-conduct rule unconstitutionally vague and broad, and that withdrawal of the student's name from the graduation speaker's list violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the rule did not mention such removal as a likely sanction. The court made the case that nothing in the Constitution forbids the states from insisting that certain forms of expression are unfitting and subject to sanctions. (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 1969) The court affirmed that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."(Tinker) If the student had given the same speech off the school premises, he would not have been penalized because government officials found his language inappropriate.
Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment-Rummel, Solem and The Venerable Case of Weems v. United States. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 1984:789. Retrieved from http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2886&context=dlj&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar_url%3Fhl%3Den%26q%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fscholarship.law.duke.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D2886%2526context%253Ddlj%26sa%3DX%26scisig%3DAAGBfm0U6qTJJcBT1EoWmQVHDXIojJgBHw%26oi%3Dscholarr#search=%22http%3A%2F%2Fscholarship.law.duke.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D2886%26context%3Ddlj%22
2. Was the Chicago ordinance, as defined in this case, unconstitutional in its contents because it failed to provide support for the First Amendment?
3. The court stated: "We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
...ase established freedom of the press and deemed it unconstitutional to censor the press in any way. The Court decided to discard Near’s prior limitations on his newspaper. The Court held that liberty of the press is not an absolute right and the State may interfere in certain cases. The reason the Court held that the state statute was unconstitutional because, “A statute authorizing such proceedings in restrain of publication is inconsistent with the conception of the liberty of press as historically conceived and guaranteed” (283 U.S. 697, 713).
Contentions of the Parties: The State Supreme Court acted on the grounds that Mr. Hendricks’ condition appeared to be substantial enough to satisfy the due process requirement that involuntary civil commitments must be predicted on a mental illness finding. Hendricks appealed and argued that his commitment violated his due process rights, as well as his protection against double jeopardy
The Court finds through the O’Brien test that symbolic speech is protected only if the speech does not undermine the interests the government institutions uphold. We observe a clear example of how the O’Brien test is applied in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and in what way this case can attest to the unconstitutionality of Section 3 in the Identification and Registration Act. In this case, the Court decided that “as long as speech does not disrupt the educational process, government has no authority to proscribe it” (262). This reasoning could be applied to Irene Ryan v. United States as well because the symbolic speech Ryan took part in had no effect on threatening the interest the government has established and the interests the law displays. Therefore, Ryan’s action is protected and Section 3 provides an unlawful “authority to proscribe it” due to the fact that her speech posed no threat to the government
The possibility that other measures will serve the State's interests should also be weighed. Landmark argued in the Supreme Court of Virginia that "before a state may punish expression, it must prove by `actual facts' the existence of a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice." 217 Va., at 706, 233 S. E. 2d, at 125. The court acknowledged that the record before it was devoid of such "actual facts," but went on to hold that such proof was not required when the legislature itself had made the requisite finding "that a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice would be created by divulgence of the confidential proceedings of the Commission." Id., at 708, 233 S. E. 2d, at 126. This legislative declaration coupled with the stipulated fact that Landmark published the disputed article was regarded by the court as sufficient to justify imposition of criminal
Four out of the seven judges disagreed while the three agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeal .They believed that section 319(2) infringed section 2(b) of the Charter, which was restricting the individuals’ freedoms they deserved, because an addressed speech that might be offending may be perceived as an expression that should be protected under section 2(b). Although the infringement that one section of the Charter had over the other, the judges concluded that there wasn’t a similarity between the effects of the freedom of expression and the objective. Hence, Keegstra’s conviction was
Taylor, Bruce A. "Memorandum of Opinion In Support Of The Communications Decency Amendment." National Law Center for Children & Families. 29 June 1995, 1-7.
Reno, Attorney General of the United States, et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union et al. 000 U.S. 96-511 (1997) Argued March 19, 1997. Decided June 26, 1997
The first amendment of the Constitution declares, essentially, that no individual, institution, or any laws made by individuals or institutions may abridge a citizen's right to free speech.
The offender’s rights and well-being is also greatly considered when determining a route of punishment. Not only does the constitution protect offenders from cruel punishments, double jeopardy, and unlawful searches;