The question of why liberal democracy failed in Germany, often referred to as the Germany Question, is an unfair one. Bearing a negative connotation, this question implies that Germany’s path of political development, towards absolutism and not democracy, was the wrong one. Yet, as it entered the 20th century, compared to other European powers Germany had the second largest economy, the largest population (excluding Russia) and the largest army. Some might argue that despite its lack of liberal freedoms, Germany was better off than most democracies at the time. Thus, a better question is; why did Germany develop politically in the fashion it did? In his book The Military Revolution and Political Change, Brian Downing provides arguments concerning the origins of democracy, dictatorship, and autocracy in Europe and in doing so, outlines a long-term pattern of political development within Germany that lasted throughout the 19th century. This pattern is supported with evidence from numerous other theories, and by studying this pattern one comes to understand why Germany developed politically as it did.
Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries Europe was ravaged by frequent wars, and coupled with the decline of feudalism and advances in technology, this constant warring set the stage for what Downing claims to be a military revolution. As feudalism dissolved, vassals were no longer the ones fighting wars. This meant that states had to build their own armies to protect from foreign aggression and contestation. Furthermore, these armies had to be equipped with the progressive weaponry of the era, for if one power wielded new weapons, so too did the other powers need to. Downing argues that due to such circumstances, if territories were f...
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...s Craig and Dahrendorf, criticisms of the likes Berman produces, simply do not hold up. Whether Germany was set on a special path of development into the new world, as the Sonderweg theory suggests, is a different question altogether. Simply admitting that Germany did follow a distinct path, indeed unique as every state’s path surely is, should be enough.
Works Cited
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Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945. London: Oxford UP, 1964. Print.
Dahrendorf, Ralf. Society and Democracy in Germany. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967. Print.
Downing, Brian M. The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992. Print.
Gottfried, Ted, and Stephen Alcorn. Nazi Germany: The Face of Tyranny. Brookfield, CT: Twenty-First Century, 2000. Print.
Hagen W (2012). ‘German History in Modern Times: Four Lives of the Nation’. Published by Cambridge University Press (13 Feb 2012)
The period after World War One was very politically unstable. Many different kinds of governments, such as fascism and communism, were coming up all over Europe. One country that especially faced this political fluctuation was Germany. After the war, Germany was forced into a democracy known as the Weimar Republic, but this government soon collapsed and Hitler’s fascism took over. There were various factors that contributed to the fall of the Weimar Republic, but three major ones were the lack of popular support for the government, the lack of efficiency and internal organization, and the competition of other, more conservative parties such as the Nazis.
The understanding of European politics during the latter half of the extended nineteenth century, particularly from 1848 onward to the First World War, is as much about the European political climate as a whole as it is about the key figures within this climate. For example, one cannot fully understand the multitude of independence and nationalist movements in the Balkans during this time without first understanding the outside pressures placed on these movements by the three competing empires of the Russians, Habsburgs, and Ottomans; and only then delving into the multitude of persons whom inspired the individual movements. Likewise, understanding the German situation at this time is just as much about the European picture as a whole, as it is about the people within the German system itself; of which, Otto von Bismarck is clearly the synonymous figure. With that said, it follows that a purely biographical approach to this turbulent time in German politics, focused on Bismarck, will leave one largely without the knowledge of the greater European situation; however, this same biographical approach also helps to understand the political interworking and personal relationships that forged a unified Germany, something that the study of the European climate as a whole fails to do.
In the years following the First World War, a new era of democracy seemed to be unfolding and it was looked promising. The autocratic regimes in Russia, Germany and Austria, were all overthrown and replaced by republics. The seven new states in Europe all had a republican form of government. Democracy seemed to be doing good in the post-war world.
The Songerweg emphasizes the particular model of history that Germany, unlike other Western countries, has gone through. Specifically, ‘proponents of this concept emphasize the peculiarities of German history, such as political institutions, social structures, or mentalities and experience, usually in comparison with other Western countries, to demonstrate the unique course of German history’ (Buse & Doerr, 1998, p. 934). Although initially the theory of Sonderweg viewed the characteristics of German historical development as positive, the situation has changed after the World War II. Specifically, in the 19th and early 20th centuries historians applied the Sonderweg model to stress a focus on the role of strong central state and military as the driving force of the development of the country (Buse & Doerr, 1998). In addition to this, historians regarded social reforms in Germany that were made from ‘above’ rather than being the outcomes of revolution to be a positive feature that depicted German state in a favorable way. Finally, the historical school viewed the course of German industrialization and culture as superior to similar processed in the rest of Western European
Kaiser, David E. Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990. Print.
Many historians in the period 1970 – 2000 attempted to write a complete account of the Weimar republic and very few succeeded, however, E.J Feuchtwanger’s ‘From Weimar to Hitler’ published in 1993 is one of the most successful overviews published. Feuchtwanger excellently examines the high politics of the Weimar re...
...ism is determined to make that authoritarianism absolute, all-surpassing, consolidating the state as the new steel-like instrument of power.” The German people tolerated these actions because they felt that Hitler and the Nazi party would bring Germany out of economic ruin and back to the forefront of European affairs. Nazi doctrine of militarism, expansionism, and ultra-nationalism appealed to the attitudes and beliefs inherent in the conscience of the German people at the time.
Treitschke, Heinrich. “History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century and Historical and Political Writings.” The Human Record. By Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield. Vol. 2. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2011. 2 vols. 292-295.
The causes of the failure of the Weimar government are multi-faceted. However, I assert that the Weimar government's inability to keep the people's confidence in their capabilities, which eventually rendered them obsolete, was fundamentally due to the threats from within rather than the external hazards. Through exploring the flaws in the constitution and the threats to the WG's authority from the outside, it will be proven that what brought the WR down were its intrinsic vulnerabilities , and that the external threats were only catalysts of their downfall; without the presence of the internal weaknesses in the first place, the external perils would not have been able to threaten the rule of the government.
Fulbrook, Mary. A Concise History of Germany. 2nd ed. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Print.
Richard Bessel’s article stresses the political structure of Weimar Germany as the cause of its failure. Its structure was flawed in numerous ways, all of which contributed to its inevitable failure. First of all, the problems within Germany due to the First World War were massive. This caused economic, political and social problems which first had to be dealt with by the new Weimar government. The loss of the war had left Germany with huge reparations to pay, and massive destruction to repair. In order to gain the capital needed to finance efforts to rebuild, and repay the Allies, the economy had to be brought back to its prewar levels. This was not an easy task.
On November 11th, 1918, the Second Reich of Germany formally surrendered to the Allied powers and officially ended World War 1. In its wake, millions were dead and many of the European economies in ruin. Germany, a unified nation since only 1871, was at the center of this conflict and blamed by most for the destruction of much of Europe. But how did this young nation go from a couple dozen states and city-states, to a European power, to lying in ruins in such a short period of time? Several factors, such as increased nationalism, shifts in cultural and sociopolitical factors, and an increase in military power all led to the quick rise and fall of the Second Reich of Germany.
Prior to unification in 1871 the territory that would become Germany was comprised of thirty-nine independent states and city states joined together in a loose German Confederation. The most powerful among these states was Prussia, both geographically the largest state and that with the largest population. The influential politicians and policies that came out of Prussia were instrumental in the gradual formation of a united Germany. Beginning with the rise of Napoleon, the nineteenth century was a time of incredible change which dramatically altered the political balance of Europe. In order to understand the factors that culminated in official German unification on January 18 1871, it is necessary to examine the preceding decades. No single factor can be credited for the unification of the German states. Rather, the combined forces of social change, economic strength within a unified customs union, the moral justifications provided by nationalism, Bismarck’s careful manipulation of internal politics and the advantages gained through military action resulted in the unification of Germany.