The Argument Against Nozick's 'Distributive Justice

Argument Against Nozick’s Distributive Justice

Robert Nozick argues in his Entitlement Theory that there are three main topics in the justice of holdings: the acquisition of ‘un-held things’, the transfer of holdings, and the rectification of injustice in holdings.1 Nozick’s theory of what makes a transfer of holdings ‘just’ should be rejected for two key reasons and the rectification of injustice of holdings should be rejected for two key reasons.

Robert Nozick declares a transfer of holdings just if the exchange is voluntary and if the holding being exchanged was originally acquired by just means.2 The first key point of this argument that should be rejected is the fact that the grounds for a ‘just’ transfer of holdings relies solely on whether or not the exchange was voluntary by both parties. With this low standard of justice, it permits voluntary exchanges in which one party unknowingly, probably because of circumstances they cannot control such as a limited mental capacity, could voluntarily commit to a transfer in holdings that will negatively affect them, either indirectly or directly. These people may voluntarily agree to a transfer in holdings that they would most certainly not agree to if they were in their right mind and could consider all of the factors playing into the transfer. There are these people who are not in their right mind or who don’t have to mental capacity to keep their best interests in mind, and there are also people who would willingly take advantage of these people to further their own selfish agendas. If one was to uphold Nozick’s grounds for what makes a transfer of holdings ‘just’, one is allowing people to cheat people with lesser mental capacities out of what is rightfully theirs through ...

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...nd make the whole process of trade and acquisition very slow and cumbersome. Unless there was someway to effectively track and record every transaction in a fast and streamlined way, the rectification of holdings could effectively halt a market.

Thus, for the four reasons stated above, Robert Nozick’s topics of transfer of holdings and rectification of holdings within his entitlement theory should be rejected. Not only are Nozick’s propositions inefficient and immoral, they may also create double standards as to what constitutes as an injustice.

Works Cited

1 Robert Nozick, “’Distributive Justice’ from Anarchy, State and Utopia” in Tamar Szabó Gendler, Susanna Siegel, and Steven M. Cahn (eds.), The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 309—310.

2Nozick, 309—310.

3Nozick, 310.

4Nozick, 311.