Psychology as a Science: Jaegwon Kim's Argument and Why it is Faulty

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Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those mental states realized in the alien way etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim’s argument they do not result in his final conclusion of psychology failing to be a science. By attacking his principle of Casual Individuation of Kinds I will show that Kim has failed to find the correct conclusion. Furthermore, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might have to my stance and give a short rebuttle. I will conclude by explicating Jerry Fodor’s account of what is Kim’s essential problem is. By showing that Kim’s conclusion fails it will entail that Fodor’s conclusion is more viable in reality.
Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psycho...

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...rtunately for Kim, he can’t decide what is an official sanction.
As Fodor states in his 1997 papers conclusion one must not only attack the generalizations but also the evidence, predictions and then the generalizations don’t actually yield true results. As he simply states, “You have to actually do the science,” (Fodor, 1997. p.162). Once you do this you can clearly see that mental states can be multiply realized in so far that results are logically confirmed. Through examples and explicating why Kim’s conclusion is a fallacy I have shown that Fodor’s conclusion that psychology is a science is valid.

Works Cited

Kim, Jaegwon (1992), “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 1-26.
Fodor, Jerry (1997), “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years”, Philosophical Perspectives 11: 149-163.

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