The Bush Administration's Relation With Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

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The Bush Administration's Relation With Iraq Prior to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

Prior to the August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait on the part of Iraq, the

United States had questionable relations with Iraq dictator, Saddam Hussein, to

say the least. In retrospect, which is inherently advantageous as a 20/20

perspective, questions remain unanswered as to whether or not the United States

was too appeasing to Saddam Hussein in the years, months, and days leading up to

that early August morning. There remains to this day lingering questions as to

the role that the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, played in conveying the

Administration's message to the Iraqi leader. In addition, questions

surrounding the Administrators official policy, the calculations (or

miscalculations) on the part of the State Department and other agencies within

the US government, the Administrations covert plan to aid an Italian bank in

illegal loans to benefit Saddam's military and the advice that the US received

from other Arab nations with respect to what US relations should be with Iraq in

terms of any impending border dispute, constitute a limited context of the

issues that faced the Administration as it tried to deal with the leader of the

largest economy of the Persian Gulf region.

The Bush Administration's relations with Iraq prior to its invasion of

Kuwait were clouded in a context of misperception by both states and further

complicated by a lack of credibility on the part of key actors of both sides as

well. This tragic sequence of events that led to the invasion of Kuwait cannot

solely be attributed to personality traits or even actions by key individuals

within the Administration. In retrospect, it is much more complex than that.

However, the actions and public and private statements on the part of key

personnel on both sides most likely contributed to the eventual invasion of

Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.

Since, a brief, yet modest account of the history of the events leading

up to the invasion and the invasion in itself along with the regional and global

actors has been offered in section A, section B will be an analysis of the role

of misperception and questions of credibility with respect to key actors on both

sides of the issue, from State Department officials to Saddam Hussein himself.

While touching on the importance and significance of o...

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..., 3/20/91

6 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, 3/20/91

7 Iraqi Government, Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with US Envoy, "The

New York Times, 9/23/90, p.19

8 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,"

The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1

9 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,"

The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1

10 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,"

The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1

11 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,"

The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18

12 Sciolino, Elaine, "US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,"

The New York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18

14 Friedman, Thomas, "US Explains View of Envoy to Iraq," The New York Times,

3/22/31, p.A9, col. 1

15 Sciolino, Elaine, "Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed," The New York Times,

7/13/91, p.A1, col.1

16 Sciolino, Elaine, "Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed," The New York Times,

7/13/91, p.A4, col.1

17 McAllister, J.F.O., "The Lessons of Iraq," Time, 11/2/92, pp.57-59

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