Karl Popper's Falsifiability

Karl Popper's Falsifiability

Sir Karl Popper's lecture was very thought provoking concerning "where to draw the line." Unlike most people, the validity of the theory was not his concern as much as how that validity is determined. This is an issue that really does not get the attention that it deserves. Popper's claims concerning, "When should a theory be ranked as scientific?" and "Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory?" seems to be put together in the following summary.

At first Popper seems to just be criticizing the integrity of some sciences and/or scientists who nebulously back their vague and general theories with references to observations that may be inconclusive or scanty which they presumably call "scientific method." He cites Freud and Adler's psychological theories, as well as the socio-economic or historical theory or Karl Marx as theories in which "Whatever happens always confirms it."

The overarching or oversimplification of these theories which seem to many to be a strength, for Popper was actually a weakness. With theories such as these anything could be interpreted into them (or the theory could be interpreted into the evidece). Thus, Popper came to the conclusion that unless a theory can be proven wrong, it cannot be labeled as scientific. He also claimed that risky predictions should be made and be testable. Also, confirming evidence should not count unless it is an attempt to falsify the theory. Now, Popper's concern the problem of the "logic of science" or the "logical problem of induction." Popper sees induction as having the same basic problem as the overgeneralization principle of the psychological, historic theories, ect. He regards no actual rule of induction ...

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...et who is to determine the evidence and theory to determine whether it is ad hoc? More importantly, when interpreting this, no matter who does it, how will you get past induction when interpreting the theory and/or evidence?

I seem to hop off the boat when Popper completely throws out induction. Induction may be used loosely, but Popper even quotes Born in saying "valid induction" putting it in the realm of logic (p. 25). I could understand being skeptical of personal inferences, but valid induction seems crucial. This happens to bring up another point. It is the "conjectures: to jump to conclusions--often after one single observation" that he cites as the way science is done (p. 25). Is this not diametrical opposed to his main point that we must be more stringent and not allow people with personal conjectures (like Freud or Marx) to call what they did science?