Organized Being in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals

Kant's argument that good will is the supreme purpose of man's existence based on observations of the influence that reason exerts on the will is inconsistent with what may be observed in nature. It presupposes an intentional cosmos wherein an organized being's purpose, and thus its standard of value, can be extracted from an examination of its constitution and faculties. While this presupposition is logically consistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory it does not coincide with what we can actually observe in nature. The following essay will examine, one, the idea of an organized being, secondly, why Kant proposes it, then we will contrast this idea with what we observe, and finally, analyse the extent of the harm done to the overarching theory of morality presented in the Groundwork if this concept is impaired.

According to Kant, "In the physical constitution of an organized being, that is, a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life, we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose." (6). In other words, we must assume that the physical construction of an entity can be attributed to the tendency of that structure to promote a certain end, life. Although the very term "organized" seems to imply an intentionality by which the arrangement of the subject was determined it is important to note that this is not merely implied, but is an explicit facet of Kant's argument. He goes on later to say, "nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end," (7). This premise is applied not only, as he mentions, to physical traits, but also to all other elements of a being's design including ...

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...ritique of a pure practical reason is to be complete, it must be possible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative reason in a common principle, for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its application." (4) An argument may be arrived at a priori but this only signifies that it possesses a rationally consistent form. We must still seek confirmation of a priori conclusions in the a posteriori if they are to have any weight in guiding our actions. In other words, if we are to accept something as a guide to our actions it ought to be sound, insofar as it can be observed as consistent with observation, as well as logically valid. If a conclusion is merely valid then it can only be speculatively valuable. It requires soundness in order to serve as something that is practically persuasive as well.