Conventional warfare follows the single battle concept, where two or more well defined forces using weapons that target the opposing force. The contiguous battle-space is well defined with a deep, close and rear area allowing the force commander to array forces that can be visually displayed in a linear graphic. This does not hold true in an unconventional warfare, where the rear area may also be the close and deep fight and forces may target the civilian population either through direct, indirect or propaganda attacks. The will of the people play an important part in unconventional warfare and their support to either force is equally important. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), the Marine Corps force in readiness is capable and properly equipped to conduct not only conventional but unconventional/irregular warfare.
Unconventional / irregular warfare is normally a conflict between opposing forces whose relative military power differs and strategy or tactics differ from one another. As a result the less technologically advance force will utilize unconventional methods to conduct warfare and exploit the adversary’s weakness. The strategy is to coerce a political body by using clandestine, sabotage and other tactics with a goal of subversion or intimidation. In unconventional warfare civilian populations may be targeted as a means to reduce the legitimate power of the government or political party that it has targeted.
Unconventional warfare targets the commander’s area of responsibilities through any means in order to disrupt, discredit or expel the force from the area. This forces the commander to conduct operations against logical lines of operations (LLO). These LLOs are not the same for conventional engage...
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...ors in the evolution of the MAGTF; previous tactics, techniques, and lessons learned in order to respond to the next threat or region. There will be enhancement in equipment, training (both cultural and tactics), personnel (adding civil affairs, economic and infrastructure subject matter experts, agricultural specialist, and an array of other specialist that are needed for the mission.) Through all of these changes the one consistent theme is the premise of the MAGTF, which still remains the core of the Marine Corps force in readiness capable of conducting operations against both conventional and irregular forces.
Works Cited
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MCDP 1-0; Marine Corps Operations; Department of the Navy, HQ USMC, Washington D.C. 20308; 27 Sept 2001; p. 10-2
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This book contains a powerful dramatization of current Marine Corps doctrine, but it also holds a hidden vision for many Generals. There are lessons in training methodology, leadership, and ethics as well. Because of this, it has made Card’s book, an often read title for many years; Ender’s Game has been a stalwart item on the Marine Corps Reading List since its inception. Then Captain John Schmitt, author of Warfighting (a foundational book on Marine maneuver warfare doctrine) used it to teach. Schmitt said, "Winning wars depends on the quality of the people you put into battle. Start with smart people, train them in imaginative and challenging ways, and ensure you force decisionmaking authority down to the person with a superior awareness of the tactical situation." Ender’s Game was published at the same time Marines started reading The Maneuver Warfare Handbook. We have since institutionalized maneuver warfare into the Marine Corps. The challenge to every generation of Marines is to continue to live up to what Maneuver Warfare philosophy demands of
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
In late November 2001 Task Force 58 launched from ships off the coast of Pakistan to conduct the longest ranged amphibious assault in history with 403 Marines and Sailors, 4 fast-attack vehicles, and a variety of supporting equipment,. General James N. Mattis successfully accomplished this in large part to the effective execution of mission command. Commanders can utilize mission command as a philosophy or a warfighting function. Mission command as a philosophy is the use of commander's intent and mission orders to empower agile and adaptive leaders. It enables commanders to counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty required to act in a given situation. Commanders build cohesive teams, provide a clear commander's intent and guidance, encourage the use of disciplined initiative, and use mission orders through the operations process to effectively use mission command as a philosophy. Commanders drive this operations process using mission command through six steps. First, they must understand the operational environment and the problem. Second, a commander must visualize his desired end state and operational approach. Third, he must describe that visualization to subordinates using time, space, purpose, and resources. Fourth, commanders must direct forces throughout preparation and execution. Finally, through each of the first four steps, commanders need to lead through purpose and motivation and assess through continuous monitoring and evaluation. General Mattis successfully utilized mission command as a philosophy by understanding, visualizing, leading, describing, and assessing through the operations process as the commander of Naval Task Force 58.
Lawson, Robert L., and Barrett Tillman. U.S. Navy Air Combat: 1939-1946. Osceola, WI: MBI Pub., 2000. Print.
... of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011),III-10
The world’s history is majorly shaped by mega wars that happen both inside and outside the boundaries of individual nations. Almost every sovereign state in the world had to forcefully liberate itself from its colonizers and oppressors mainly through warfare. For instance, America had to fight a long and exhausting revolutionary war against the British before it could attain its independence in 1783, likewise is the fate of many other nations. It is important to understand the two distinct types of wars that exist and their implications. Guerrilla warfare and the conventional military warfare are two types of war that are very different in their execution and military approach. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the similarities and differences existing between the American war in Vietnam and the American Revolution (Vetter, 1997).
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
Insurgency is defined as a rebellion against an indigenous government or a foreign occupier. In an asymmetric war there are two sides a strong and a weak side which have two strategies each. The French, who were the “stronger” side used “direct attack” which aimed at destroying the weak actor’s (Algeria) armed forces and thereby their capacity to offer violent resistance. During the seco...
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), V-17.
Thinking historically while conducting counterinsurgency in the 21st century poses questions regarding how to develop political and strategic plans. This bibliographic essay will examine the political and military aspect of fighting counterinsurgent warfare by 20th century theorists Galula’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice” and Trinquier’s, “Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice”. Strategy in fighting guerilla wars will be discussed by comparing conflicts in battles and ideologies from the past to current day. Moreover, ways to avoid the one size fits all war mentality when combating modern day insurgents will be recommended.