In Nelson Goodman’s The new riddle of induction, the problem of inductive knowledge is brought into question and a collection of possible solutions are presented. The paradox of inductive knowledge has been misunderstood into bringing forth a radical ideology of relativism by philosophers such as Quine and a variety of other modern thinkers, however a possible solution presented by Hempel and a new version outlined in this paper present a different case all together concerning the acquisition of knowledge.
In order to understand the new paradox presented in this paper the argument presented in the original raven paradox has to be made clear. The paradox of the raven stems from the belief that viewed scientific phenomena, in connection to a hypothesis in fact does not necessarily lead to truth but instead only serves to strengthen the held hypothesis regardless of what facts the evidence presents. The belief that all ravens are black under normal scientific standards is thought as being supported by the evidence of only black ravens being observed, in logic such a statement would be described as their being such a thing that it is a raven and it is black. From this statement a logically equivalent hypothesis can be made, if an object is not black it holds that it is not a raven, this statement unlike the initial hypothesis of all ravens being black however presents problems, all evidence of non-black objects seems to strengthen the prior held belief even though there is virtually no connection between all those possible objects and the raven.
The observation of non-black things that are not-ravens strengthening the hypothesis unjustifiably is arguably showing how inductive reasoning is ungrounded in truth, however Hempel ...
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...r a possible world, which itself is a problem.
The issue of inductive knowledge is still one that remains unsolved, however in the various attempts at a solution the problem has changed from being one of a seemingly impossible actual knowledge to a further examination into a criterion of meaning. Because of the misinterpretation of this paradox there has been a great deal of confusion over the legitimacy of modern science however the paradox itself can be seen as only a matter of philosophy and is more concerned with the solution to a long standing philosophical puzzle then a critique of modern science.
Works Cited
Nelson Goodman, The new riddle of induction; knowledge readings in contemporary epistemology, oxford university press: 2005.
Willard Quine, Two dogmas of empiricism; From a logical point of view 2nd edition, Harvard university press: 1980.
The Raven paradox includes three plausible premises, and derives from them a fairly implausible-looking conclusion about the confirmation of generalizations.
...ion. Hempel’s solution provides to give a reason as to how induction can lead to confirmation and how the logical gap can be filled through the use of logically equivalent statements. However, his view and answer to the paradox prove to be a stretch and lead to the issue of common sense being broken and illogical observations being made to confirm the hypothesis. Good successfully brings attention to this rather blatant error on the part of Hempel to eventually lead to the Raven paradox being invalid. Not only is Good effective in highlighting errors within Hempel’s solution, but Popper, Scheffler, and Goodman are all equally successful in negating individual parts of Hempel’s argument as well. In the end, it is the addition of all these counterarguments that prove to exhibit that Hempel is unsuccessful in trying to come up with a valid answer to the raven paradox.
(1) Kelly, Thomas (2005). “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Eds. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pg.1 – 36.
In this short paper I will examine the positions of foundationalism and coherentism, and argue that a form of weak foundationalism is the most satisfactory option as a valid theory of justification for knowledge and is therefore a viable way of avoiding any sort of vicious regress problem and skepticism.
Stumpf, S. E., & Fieser, J. (2008). Philosophy: History and problems. . New York: McGraw-Hill.
Any hypothesis, Gould says, begins with the collection of facts. In this early stage of a theory development bad science leads nowhere, since it contains either little or contradicting evidence. On the other hand, Gould suggests, testable proposals are accepted temporarily, furthermore, new collected facts confirm a hypothesis. That is how good science works. It is self-correcting and self-developing with the flow of time: new information improves a good theory and makes it more precise. Finally, good hypotheses create logical relations to other subjects and contribute to their expansion.
How we approach the question of knowledge is pivotal. If the definition of knowledge is a necessary truth, then we should aim for a real definition for theoretical and practical knowledge. Methodology examines the purpose for the definition and how we arrived to it. The reader is now aware of the various ways to dissect what knowledge is. This entails the possibility of knowledge being a set of truths; from which it follows that one cannot possibly give a single definition. The definition given must therefore satisfy certain desiderata , while being strong enough to demonstrate clarity without losing the reader. If we base our definition on every counter-example that disproves our original definition then it becomes ad hoc. This is the case for our current defini...
...pedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Section 1.2, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved February 11, 2011, from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/
In the selection, ‘Skeptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding’, David Hume poses a problem for knowledge about the world. This question is related to the problem of induction. David Hume was one of the first who decided to analyze this problem. He starts the selection by providing his form of dividing the human knowledge, and later discusses reasoning and its dependence on experience. Hume states that people believe that the future will resemble the past, but we have no evidence to support this belief. In this paper, I will clarify the forms of knowledge and reasoning and examine Hume’s problem of induction, which is a challenge to Justified True Belief account because we lack a justification for our beliefs.
In the first category of theories, knowledge is acquired first by detecting patterns in the external or empirical world received by means of the sensory organs. The child’s mind then organises these random signals into a coherent pattern. Developmental psychologists who have accepted this view see the role of education as a process to induce the perception of patterns in a given context and recall these patterns for use in different contexts (Chase, 1992). Page number? Therefore, all knowledge comes from experience. British empiricists rejected the idea of innate knowledge (fieser, unk).
For week 5, we went into depth on the topics of Empiricism and Rationalism, two important and differing theories of knowledge acquisition. Empiricism focuses on gaining information and knowledge through specific experiences in perception. Evidence for this theory ...
It is important to distinguish forms of reasoning in science in order to distinguish between science and pseudo-science. This essay will explore the concept of the scientific method and how it utilises inductive reasoning, followed by an exploration of Karl Popper’s argument that when scientists explore their ideas through inductive reasoning, they make it impossible for science to hold any more credibility than pseudo-science. This will then be followed a dismantling of Popper’s argument and deductive reasoning proposal on the basis that inductive reasoning is justified, falsifiable, and allows for scientific progress.
Inductive reasoning can be quickly summarized as a method through which a conclusion is drawn from particular cases; this conclusion may be applied to another specific case or generalized. All of our conclusions about the world around us, which we rely on daily without question, are dependent on this process. The expectation that our house will not cave in, that water will come from the faucet when turned on, that we will wake the next morning, are all propositions extrapolated from inductive arguments.
...tely it may change our knowledge. This leads on to my point that knowledge and philosophy is always changing, this then changes the world we live in. This is because eventually we change our concepts and theories. For example if a theory is changed, that is related to the conceptual framework and social construction, and then this too is changed. I have seen that in the creation of knowledge and philosophy, the process of induction is vital because it allows us to build theories and more importantly economic realities. When studying or researching accounting we sometimes come across a few paradigms such as the All Ravens are Black paradigm and the inductivist turkey. These paradigms helps to better understand knowledge and also it can separate true from false and fact. It can help us to refine our knowledge so that the end result is almost prefect e.g. neutrality.
Lagemaat, Richard Van De. Theory of Knowledge for the IB Diploma. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. Print.