land rover case

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In order to successfully launch the Discovery, LRNA had to identify a target market. The influx of Japanese models proved that consumers clearly wanted an SUV. As with any successful product launch, it was imperative for LRNA to identify its target market. The American market was dominated by Jeep and Ford at the time. Land Rover decided that they could deliver a product that would satisfy consumers as well as compete with the market leaders. Analysis of research data revealed that two separate groups of consumers were the most likely to be in the SUV market. The first group is comprised of young, childless adults. Generally affluent and upwardly mobile, they wanted their vehicles to portray a symbol of status and image. This information appears to belie the data found in exhibit 8. For example, when consumers intending to purchase an SUV were surveyed on the most important attributes before buying, they scored status/image among the lowest. These results, however, were considered biased because people are less likely to admit in person that they bought something for the status it provides. The second segment of consumers who were likely to buy an SUV were older, middle-class Americans that valued practicality and utility over image and status. They wanted a vehicle that was dependable and carried a strong road presence. Further market research revealed even more information about the type of consumer that intended to purchase an SUV. For total SUV buyers in 1994, they were married people who had attended college and who averaged about $63,000 dollars per year in annual income. In fact, For Land Rover vehicles specifically, however, the numbers revealed that their customers tended to earn a significantly higher income than the res...

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... of the gadgetry and expensive features of the Range Rover and created the Hunter which “was, in effect, ‘a cheaper stripped down Range Rover.’” The Hunter failed and was removed from the product line right away. The Hunter was not in-line with the corporate strategy that LRNA was trying to achieve. The Hunter detracted from the exclusivity associated with the Range Rover brand in North America. Management recognized that to position the Discovery as the more affordable Range Rover would be to make the Hunter mistake all over again.
Positioning the Discovery as the definitive family 4x4 creates one great big problem. According to exhibit 19 only 38% of discovery buyers have children. Although 38% is a good portion, focusing on this positioning strategy excludes over half of the customers, and could potentially forfeit those customers’ future sales to competitors.

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