“Terrible though the 20th century has been, it could have been far worse. The bad news is that the century witnessed three world wars—two hot, one cold. The good news is that the right side won each of them.” Colin Gray’s above optimistic premise from “Why Strategy is Difficult” provides a lens by which one can understand that although our democracy is messy and at times our strategies out of step with historical lessons; generally the United States has succeeded in its endeavors. This success may have come from purposeful effort (strategy) or tactical brilliance but nonetheless successful. Williamson Murray in, On Strategy, states succinctly that “strategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in …show more content…
I submit that Lincoln’s strategy in the Civil War to bring the South to its knees and forge reconciliation with the North to save the United States is one. Though a war and strategy inflamed by passion on both sides, Lincoln was able to focus the strategy on the outcome he intended. In Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen discusses how Lincoln’s leadership was articulate, discerning and decisive. He tells of Lincoln’s five interlocking propositions that provided a clear strategy and of the swift rebuke for those who fell short. Cohen also notes how Lincoln continued to question his assumptions, read the intelligence reports for himself, and went to the front continually assessing the war’s progression, all strengths of his leadership and the …show more content…
Specifically, the strategies of Vietnam, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM provide poignant reminders of our failures and, at times, enduring weaknesses. As reviewed both in the lessons on civilian and military relations and the Vietnam exercise, we can be tactically proficient but absolutely deaf, dumb and blind strategically. In Vietnam, our nation’s leaders wanted to contain Communism but failed to commit the whole of government resources required to win as discussed in the successful strategies above and to gain popular support of our nation and allies. Michael Howard writing about the Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy observes that, “whether these initial operational decisions are then accepted as definitive by the societies concerned, will depend, as they did in 1940-41 and in all previous wars, on the two other elements in Clausewitz's trinity: the importance of the political objective, and the readiness of the belligerent communities to endure the sacrifices involved in prolonging the war.” Further, Vietnam reminds strategists of continuing blind spots for acting unilaterally, without clear objectives, and with ignorance of the historical, cultural, religious, social, and ideological dimensions at play while underestimating the opponents will to fight. Though the Vietnam experience is a classic example
Appy’s book is valuable to its readers in showing how Vietnam became the template for every American war since, from novelties like the invasion of Grenada to the seemingly never-ending conflicts post-9/11. But before all that, there was Vietnam, and, larger lessons aside, Appy’s book is a fascinating, insightful, infuriating and thought-provoking study of that conflict, from its earliest days
When we compare the military leaders of both North and South during the Civil War, it is not hard to see what the differences are. One of the first things that stand out is the numerous number of Northern generals that led the “Army of the Potomac.” Whereas the Confederate generals, at least in the “Army of Northern Virginia” were much more stable in their position. Personalities, ambitions and emotions also played a big part in effective they were in the field, as well as their interactions with other officers.
Lawrence’s purpose in writing this book was concise and to the point. In recent history, due to the fall of the Soviet bloc, new information has been made available for use in Vietnam. As stated in the introduction, “This book aims to take account of this new scholarship in a brief, accessible narrative of the Vietnam War… It places the war within the long flow of Vietnamese history and then captures the goals and experiences of various governments that became deeply embroiled in the country during the second half of the twentieth century” (Lawrence, 3.) This study is not only about the American government and how they were involved in the Vietnam conflict, but highlights other such countries as France, China, and the Soviet Union. Lawrence goes on to say that one of his major goals in writing this book is to examine the American role in Vietnam within an international context (Lawrence, 4.) Again, this goes to show that the major purpose of Lawrence’s study included not only ...
Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate States of America, showed weaknesses within his leadership which may have contributed to the confederacy’s loss and the unions win . Davis failed in three vital ways. These ways were: his relations with other confederate authorities and with the people, as well as in his fundamental concept of his job as president and in his organization and specific handling of his role as commander in chief . Davis failed in maintaining communication with leaders and with his people, often unable to admit when he is wrong which led to lack organization in his role . In addition, Davis was a conservative leader, not a revolutionary one which meant that his strength was often in protocol and convention rather than in innovation . Studying each of these aspects that represented a weakness in Jefferson Davis’s leadership, Lincoln in comparison provided more admirable and outstanding qualities within his leadership which in many ways affected the outcome of the war
A successful army requires discipline, but Confederate soldiers refused to concede authority to anyone they did not vote for, at least in the beginning. Confederate soldiers were also prone to shirking duties they deemed menial, and some even left the army without dismissal if they believed they had served long enough. In the uppermost chain of political command, Jefferson Davis proved deficient in quelling the media outlets which railed against his decisions at nearly every turn. Davis gave deference to the right of free speech no matter how damaging it was. Donald then uses these points to highlight the Union Army and Lincoln administration’s successes. The North had the advantage of numerous immigrant conscripts who were used to being ordered around, so the pecking order was easily established from the beginning. In the political realm, Abraham Lincoln did not let Constitutional rights obstruct his goals; Lincoln suspended habeas corpus and threw defamatory journalists into prison. The Union thus had the unity it needed to achieve victory in the face of the South’s
The memory of massive death was still in the front of everyone’s mind, hardening into resentment and sometimes even hatred. The south was virtually non-existent politically or economically, and searching desperately for a way back in. Along with these things, now living amongst the population were almost four million former slaves, who had no idea how to make a living on their own. They had been freed by the 13th amendment in 1865, and in the future became a great concern to many political leaders. Still, it was no secret that something had to be done. So, as usually happens, political leaders appeared on the stage, each holding their own plan of Reconstruction, each certain their ideas were the correct ones. One of the first people who came up with a blueprint for Reconstruction was the president at the time, Abraham Lincoln. The “Lincoln Plan” was a very open one, stating that after certain criteria were met a confederate state could return to the union. To rejoin, a state had to have ten percent of voters both accept the emancipation of slaves and swear loyalty to the union. Also, those high ranking officers of the state could not hold office or carry out voting rights unless the president said
He was also a Gulf War veteran who commanded an armored cavalry. His desire in writing this book was to examine, through the recently declassified documents, manuscript collections, and the Joint Chief of Staff official histories, where the responsibility for the Vietnam foreign policy disaster lay, but also examine the decisions made that involved the United States in a war they could not win. This book details the discussion of government policy in the stages of the Vietnam crisis from 1961-July 1965. It examines the main characters of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, in addition to the military, which included the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It began in the Kennedy era amidst the Bay of Pigs incident and how that led to mistrust of the military planning by advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“Vietnam: A Mistake of Western Alliance” is not the only piece of writing by Mark Atwood Lawrence about the Vietnam War. He has written two books on the topic: Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam and The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. He has also written other essays about the war and co-edited The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis. He received degrees from Stanford and Yale and is a Professor of History at The University of Texas at Austin (Mark Atwood Lawrence).
Trubowitz claims that the American presidents often respond to national and international events based on his or her own self interest over the course of developing grand strategy, they are likely to be motived by domestic party’s preferences instead of looking at the bigger picture. Essentially, Trubowitz choose to focus on the personal ambitions that these political figures held. It is in his opinion that grand strategy is merely a procedure for the state to meet its means and ends where the president will operate it as the product, to maximize the benefits that they will receive in their own political careers (Trubowitz, Pg1). Yet again, as Brands implied in his work, grand strategy contains more than just foreign policy agendas that the nation wish to carry out. The core of Trumbowitz’s thesis is troublesome for which it shed aggrandize spotlights on the domestic electoral factors and ignored the president’s role as the representative for the U.S.’, and the American’s seat in the international politics.
The war strategies of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri de Jomini are not mutually exclusive philosophies. Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as an extension of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” speak more so to the upper, strategic and political ranges of war. Jomini addresses the operational and tactical levels in the lower ranges of war with his definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”. So if one views their work collectively rather than as competitors, the two philosophies complement each other by addressing different segments of the spectrum of war.
Sun Tzu’s strategy on war is still a very respected and influential book. The book breaks down war in a very strategic and intelligent way that gives extremely useful advice to those reading it. The book emphasizes the importance of strategy and positioning
Contrary to what today’s society believes about Lincoln, he was not a popular man with the South at this period in time. The South wanted to expand towards the West but Lincoln created a geographical containment rule keeping slavery in the states it currently resided in. Despite his trying to rationalize with the South, Lincoln actually believed something different ”Lincoln claimed that he, like the Founding Fathers, saw slavery in the Old South as regrettable reality whose expansion could and should be arrested, thereby putting it on the long and gradual road ”ultimate extinction” (216). He believed it to be “evil” thus “implying that free southerners were evil for defending it”(275). Lincoln wanted to wipe out slavery for good and the South could sense his secret motives. By trying to trick them, the South rebelled as soon as Lincoln became president and launched what is today known as the Civil war.
Amongst military theorists and practitioners who studied war, its origin and implications, Carl von Clausewitz assumes a place among the most prominent figures. With his book On War, he demonstrated his capability to provide thorough historical analysis and conclusions of the conflicts in which he was engaged, and as a philosopher he reflected about all encompassing aspects of war. Today, Western armies conduct modern warfare in a dynamic environment composed of flexible and multiple threats in which civilians form a substantial part. Studying Clausewitz provides current military and political leadership useful insights to understand twenty-first century warfare. He explains the nature of war, provides an analytical tool to understand the chaos of warfare, and he argues for well educated and adaptable leadership capable of creative thinking. Although he died before his work was complete, his writing style was ambiguous and unclear at some moments, and current technology reduced some of his tactics obsolete, his work still arouses and inspires military and political strategists and analysts.
Strategy itself has been deep rooted in society dating back to the Old Testament, and historical Greek times with writings from Homer, Euripides and other major Greek world influencers (Bracker, 1980). Much of origin of strategy was founded during battles and wars amongst the Greek. The revitalization of strategy became wide spread during World War II and the introduction of economies of scale. Strategy would now transform to not only prove beneficial in war, but also business. Large companies had influence in the way business could be done and the number of mid-to-large size organizations became more prominent (Bracker, 1980). As strategic management became more sophisticated the phases of development emerged. Strategy had become common thought
This report provides an analysis and evaluation of strategy implementation used by California Pizza Kitchen (CPK) and discusses the effectiveness of their strategy through organization design, control systems, people and culture. My research concluded that CPK relies on control systems to undertake a majority of the company’s operational activities and that human resources and organizational culture must support the strategy implemented, which it does in in the case of CPK.