What Mary Can't Expect When She's Expecting

1146 Words3 Pages

In this paper, Paul raises the interesting idea that having a child is epistemically transformative, and in certain cases, can be personally transformative. As a result, our lack of knowledge about what it is like to have a child prevents us from making the rational decision to have a child. In this paper, I will be focusing on the epistemically transformative qualities of having a child as opposed to the personally transformative qualities of having a child for two reasons. Firstly, while having a child is universally epistemically transformative (as Paul claims) it is not universally personally transformative. Secondly, the idea that having a child is personally transformative is based on testimony, something that Paul warns us is an unreliable source of information. The concept of childbirth being epistemically transformative raises a few questions: is childbirth unique in being epistemically transformative, and can we ever know the expected value of an epistemically transformative decision? I answer no to the former and yes to the latter, and will explain my answer as follows. Firstly, I will lay out Paul’s argument and add further reasons to support said arguments that I think she doesn’t really explore. Secondly, I argue that most people don’t make decisions based solely on phenomenal factors, and that even if they do make decisions based solely on phenomenal factors, such decisions can be rational. Lastly, I contend that Paul’s argument runs the risk of over-claiming, and that it does not matter if our decisions, especially the decision to have a child, cannot be rational. Paul’s argument is that under the normative model of making decisions, the decision to have a child can never be rational. For Paul, the normative decis... ... middle of paper ... ...s like for the agent plays the central role, if not the only role” in this decision, as well as the claim that most people make their decision to procreate in this manner. However, I feel that very few people actually make their decision based solely on the phenomenal outcomes. I think this is a reductive claim that discounts the multiple reasons which inform the decision to have children. Paul herself dismisses the idea that individuals might decide “[to have a child] solely on the chance that [they] will end up in a class of individuals who maximized their overall utility”. This is as she finds the claim that anyone might base their decision off a single factor – in this case, the chance to maximize utility – unrealistic. In the same way, the idea that anyone would base their decisions solely on what they think it would be like to have a child seems unrealistic.

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