Theories Of Outsourcing

950 Words2 Pages

Within Organization Economics and Management Theory, two largely separate streams of outsourcing literature dominate the discussion and have been applied extensively: the governance perspective
(New Institutional Economics, especially Transaction Cost Economics) and the competence perspective
(Resource- and Knowledge-Based View) of the firm (Foss 1993). We argue that neither theory has sufficient explanatory power with respect to outsourcing failure.
Within the New Institutional Economics, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson
1985; 1979; Klein et al. 1978) is most relevant to firm boundary choice. Tangential theories include
Agency Theory (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994; 1991) and Property Rights Theory (Grossman and
Hart 1986). In TCE, firms are perceived as avoiders of negative in an environment of opportunistic actors. They can enforce cooperation more effectively than the market and thus save transaction costs
(e.g., search, monitoring, or contracting costs). TCE identifies cooperation/motivation problems (induced by opportunism) as a primary reason for outsourcing failure, arguing that opportunism is a necessary condition for transaction costs (Williamson 1985). There are two important gaps in this theory:
First, postulating opportunism favours a bias toward cooperation problems and downplays coordination issues (Frost 2005; Hodgson 2004; Foss 1999; Camerer and Knez 1996; Demsetz 1988). Second,
TCE focuses solely on vertical exchange processes through a separable interface (Langlois and Foss
1999; Langlois 1992; Walker and Weber 1984). However, horizontal, collaborative, and/or informal relations have been shown to play a key part in inter-firm organization (Kirsch et al. 2002; Grandori
2001). Their role in outsourcing fa...

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...edges) between the nodes. Our model depicts the organization as a graph, with nodes (organization members) connected by both vertical and horizontal relations. We also rely on
Modular Systems Theory (Simon 2002; Baldwin and Clark 2000; Schilling 2000; Baldwin and
Clark 1997; Simon 1962) by including the notion that the relational structure of an organization can be manipulated to create largely independent modules (modularization) and reduce transaction costs.
Finally, in order to identify potential problems of spatial remoteness, we differentiate ownership and location effects. Along with Grossman and Helpman (2005; 2004; 2002a; 2002b), we differentiate three types of outsourcing: domestic outsourcing (ownership split), foreign direct investment
(FDI), also called captive offshoring (cross-country split), and offshore outsourcing (ownership and cross-country split).

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