The Possibility Of Parity, By Ruth Chang

652 Words2 Pages

In “The Possibility of Parity,” Ruth Chang rejects the “Trichotomy Thesis,” where “if two items A and B are evaluatively comparable, then A must be better or worse than B, or A and B must be equally good” (Chang 660). Chang argues that, instead, “there is a conceptual space in our intuitive notion of evaluative comparability that may hold when ‘better than,’ ‘worse than,’ and ‘equally good’ do not. I call this relation ‘on a par’” (Chang 661). Using her example of Michelangelo and Mozart, I do agree with Chang that it is seemingly impossible to compare these two using the Trichotomy Thesis, and that this points to its insufficiency. This is not to say that they are incomparable, but that they may be comparable in certain aspects instead of …show more content…

Elizabeth Anderson’s account of “incommensurability” addresses this with her discussion of pragmatic values. She states that “Pragmatism implies that goods are incommensurable whenever we have no reason to compare their values in practice” (Anderson 91). She goes on to say that: If there is no point to comparing the overall values of two goods, the comparative value judgement about them will serve no practical function. Pragmatism says that if a value judgment serves no purpose practical function, then it has no truth value or warrant. (Anderson 99) While Chang would argue that two goods are commensurable because they can be on a par, but it is still difficult for me to understand how two on par goods can be rationally compared. I prefer Anderson’s account that making choices regarding these incommensurable goods is simply dependent on what the individual prefers at the time they are choosing. When choosing among truly incommensurable goods, this appears to be a fully rational …show more content…

we have no good reason to try to compare the values of one’s mother and one’s friends, or of her life and one’s friendships, in terms of some common value they possess to a greater or lesser degree. These goods are therefore not commensurable. Both are valuable - not more or less but in different ways. (Anderson 103) Though some may argue that the value of a mother would be stronger by fact of her being a mother, this would not make sense if it were the case that the mother was abusive while the friend was always supportive and loving. The specific circumstances of a situation would be important to this decision, not a generalized account of the comparative value between mother and friend. In her conclusion, Anderson states that “Failures of commensurability among goods are pervasive in our lives because we have no reason to weigh the values of many goods on the same scale” (Anderson 107). I find Anderson’s recognition of incommensurability to be more realistic in terms of day to day decision-making. I agree with Chang there certain things are “on a par,” where two things are not equal to, better than, or worse than each other. What seems most common is for two things to be so different that they are incommensurable, although we still make daily decisions where incommensurable goods are compared, and these decisions often come down to personal preferences and circumstances. I am still unclear as to exactly how Chang argues that there are no incommensurable goods, because

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