The Nature Of OPEC

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Since the 1973 oil price shock, the history and behaviour of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have received considerable attention both in the academic literature and in the media. Many conflicting theoretical and empirical interpretations about the nature of OPEC and its influence on world oil markets have been proposed. The debate is not centred on whether OPEC restricts output, but the reasons behind these restrictions. Others explain production cuts in the 1970s in terms of the transfer of property rights from international oil companies to governments (Johany, 1980; Mead, 1979). Others explain output restrictions in terms of coordinated actions of OPEC members.
Within the literature, OPEC behaviour ranges from classic textbook cartel to two block cartel (Hnyilicza and Pindyck, 1976), to clumsy cartel (Adelman, 1980), to dominant firm (Salant, 1976; Mabro, 1991), to loosely co-operating oligopoly, to residual firm monopolist (Adelman, 1982) and most recently to bureaucratic cartel (Smith, 2005). Others have suggested that OPEC oscillates between various positions but always acts as a vacillating federation of producers (see for instance Adelman, 1982; Smith, 2005). The existing empirical evidence has not helped narrow these different views. Griffin’s (1985) observation in the mid-1980s that the empirical studies tend to “reach onto the shelf of economic models to select one, to validate its choice by pointing to selected events not inconsistent with model’s prediction” still dominates the empirical approach to studying OPEC behaviour and its pricing power.

We examine OPEC’s ability to influence oil prices. As in any other issue related to OPEC, there are divergent views regarding its pricing power. M...

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...mand from oil importers (hardly showing any sign of relenting in the near future), the situation will worsen. In the process, OPEC might just continue to exercise its non-compliance with the “call” more often in order to counter its own revenue loss leading to more spikes. As a consequence, problems for developing and less developed oil importing countries would get compounded with threatened resilience and severely constrained macroeconomic management.

We can conclude that OPEC ‘s claim that it has actually lost the price setter or has lost the pricing power cannot be accepted and the role of Saudi Arabia is very important and cannot be neglected. Thus, the recommendation is that they all should try to self reliant and not so energy dependent on other countries and they should try to reduce their import bill by being less dependent on imports of oil.

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