The Extended Mind Hypothesis does exactly what it says on the tin. It is a theory suggesting that the human mind is not necessarily limited to a mental capacity. According to Clark and Chalmers the mind can extend to include information storage devices (such as computers, diaries, or even other peoples minds) to which we can have ready access, can rely on and trust as we would our own minds. These devices would be in a similar mode or state as the subconscious mind, that is; they would embody dispositional beliefs. This is known as active externalism.
Clark and Chalmers begin with a case to illustrate why the mind is extended whereby a person has the option to use their mind (a), use a physical computational aid (b), or a futuristic neural computational brain implant (c) to solve a problem. They argue that all three options are more similar than most people believe with the following reasoning. I have included the example of a heart, a defibrillator and pacemaker for the sake of clarity.
The mental (a) and computational processes (c) are the similar in that they do the same job, and both occur internally. They could be analogised to a heart and a pacemaker.
A physical aid (b) and a neural implant (c) are the similar in that they both have a computational structure. They could be analogised to a defibrillator and pacemaker.
By this reasoning (a) and (b) must also be the similar.
With this notion, Clark and Chalmers try to establish an interactive cognitive link between humans and external entities, thus showing how it is the system between the two makes up the mind - both the internal and external components are vital parts of the mind. In this essay, I shall oppose this view by revealing firstly, a fallacy and Clark and Chal...
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...eory of active externalism and the case of Ottos and Inga, showing how a system between humans and external objects may well be occurring, but the mind requires authority and identity.
References
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The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
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In this essay I will argue that Rosenthal's Higher Order Thought Theory provides a possible account of conscious awareness, in doing so addresses and gets to solve the mind-body problem for that particular mental phenomenon.
The mind-body problem has troubled many thinkers for centuries because it is not clear if mind and body interact with each other and/or how they interact with each other. Dualists ' claim is that the mind is a non-physical thing because it is impossible to be explained by physics; therefore, mind is different from the body. However, Dualism does not clearly explain what a non-physical mind is, and it simply ignores the fact that many ideas were thought to be impossible one day but now they are proven by physics. In fact, it has been proven that human behaviors change when something, like a damage, occur in the brain. Even though laws of physics cannot explain mind in physical ways, it does not mean that mind is non-physical. Because science improves and discovers new things, it is possible and very likely that the mind will be explained by scientists one day and it will be proven that the mind is, in fact, physical. When scientists learn about the relationship between mind and body, they will be able to
To attempt to relinquish some of these concerns regarding the differentiation of mind and behaviour definition, Whiten (1996) established four distinct variations of mind- reading. These are implicit mind- reading, counter- deception, recognition of intervening variables, and experience projection. Impli...
The first argument to be discussed is that of conceivability, which aims to disprove that the mind and
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The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.
Keil, F. C. and Wilson, R. A. (1999) The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press
Speculations on the origin of the mind have ranged from ghosts to society. Each new theory brings about more speculation and disagreement than the last. Where the mind resides, where it came from and if the brain has any involvement with the concept are common questions that fuel theory paradigms. Those questions are also the foundation of the debate about the roll of experience versus the existence of innate capacities. Steven Pinker theorizes the mind as a computing system created by the brain to fill the gap between innate capacities and capacities missing using common sense and learned critical thinking skills.